PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

MAY
JUNE | 1967

Upheaval in China

Richard D. Baum • *Franz Michael*

Eastern Europe

Anton Logoreci • *Alexander Bregman*

Soviet Reforms: A Tentative Appraisal

Theodore Frankel

RED FLAG OVER GHANA

MOSCOW, HANOI, & THE VC

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MAY-JUNE 1967
VOL. XVI
3

PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

Problems of Communism is a bimonthly publication. Its purpose is to provide analyses and significant background information on various aspects of world communism today. Opinions expressed by contributors do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government. Editorial office: U.S. Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., Washington, D.C., 20547.

How to Subscribe: Outside of the United States, *Problems of Communism* may be obtained free of charge by writing to the nearest office of the U.S. Information Service. Residents of the United States may purchase annual subscriptions or single copies by writing to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Price per copy: $.50. Subscription price: $2.50.

Editor: ***Abraham Brumberg***
Managing Editor: ***Marie Thompson House***
Associate Editors: ***Clarke H. Kawakami,***
Robert C. Richter
Editorial Assistant: ***Rosalind V. Avnet***

COMMUNIST CHINA

The New Revolution: III
1 Ideology Redivivus, *by Richard D. Baum*
12 The Struggle for Power, *by Franz Michael*

EASTERN EUROPE

Politics in Flux: III
22 Albania: The Anabaptists of European Communism, *by Anton Logoreci*

THE SOVIET UNION

29 Economic Reform: A Tentative Appraisal, *by Theodore Frankel*

AFRICA

42 A Marxist in Ghana, *by Jon Kraus*

DISCUSSION

Whither Russia?
50 The USSR and Eastern Europe, *by Alexander Bregman*

BOOKS

55 Marxism in France, *by David Caute*
58 Critiques of Marxism, *by Ben B. Seligman*
61 Reviews in Brief

NOTES AND VIEWS

The War in Vietnam
64 Moscow and Hanoi *by Raymond L. McGovern*
72 The Viet Cong *by John Donnell*
75 Correspondence

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The New Revolution: III

EDITORS' NOTE: The articles offered in the following pages continue the effort of this journal to probe into the meaning and significance of Communist China's "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," currently entering perhaps its climactic phase. Mr. Baum's analysis pictures the Cultural Revolution as part of a broader movement of "ideological revivalism" representing the Maoist leadership's answer to the dilemma of a revolutionary ideology already beginning to erode under the impact of modernization. Dr. Michael sees the current convulsion in China as the culmination of a losing, two-sided struggle by Mao to impose his radical, utopian brand of communism at home and assert his claim to world Communist leadership abroad.

Ideology Redivivus

By Richard D. Baum

In the fall and winter of 1963-64, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched a nationwide movement of politico-ideological education and indoctrination designed to rekindle the sputtering flame of China's revolution and to immunize the Chinese people against the pernicious virus of Khrushchev's apostate "revisionism." At first limited in scope and cautious in tempo, the movement gradually gathered momentum until today the entire nation appears to be caught up in a frenzy of ideological revivalism unprecedented in both scale and intensity. This article proposes to consider the origins of China's ideological revival, to chart its contours and convolutions, and to develop a theoretical framework which will relate the revivalist movement to certain generic processes and problems that characterize a modernizing Marxist-Leninist society.

Mr. Baum is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of California (Berkeley) and a Fellow at the University's Center for Chinese Studies. He is currently undertaking research for his dissertation on "Maoism and Modernization" in Taiwan and Hong Kong, under a grant from the Foreign Area Fellowship Program. He has contributed to Asian Survey *(Berkeley, Calif.) and* The Western Political Quarterly *(Salt Lake City, Utah).*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The situation in 1963, on the eve of China's ideological revival, can be summed up briefly: domestically, a partial recovery from the severe economic dislocations of the "three hard years" of 1959-61 was coupled with a potential threat to the political hegemony of the CCP in the form of the rise of an incipient "new class" of bureaucrats and technicians. Internationally, a severe deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations was linked with increasing Chinese restiveness over the progressive *embourgeoisement* of the Soviet Union and over the decreasing international militancy of the Soviet Communist Party.

From Rationality to Revisionism

The more rational economic policies adopted by the CCP in 1961-62, in the aftermath of the disastrous Great Leap Forward, had in effect granted broad decision-making autonomy to local production units. This meant that industrial, commercial, and agricultural "experts"—managers, administrators, and technicians—were given a relatively wide zone of discretion in meeting their contractual obligations to the state. Moreover, the reinstitution of private plots and trade fairs in the agricultural sector served to remove a certain segment of the nation's economic activity from direct supervision by organs of the state and party. Finally, renewed emphasis in this period on piece-rate systems of remuneration and on material incentives in general meant that the egalitarian-collectivist ideals of the party were being diluted for considerations of expediency.

Understandably, such economic concessions to "bourgeois individualism" had a beneficial effect on the morale—and hence on the productivity—of workers and administrators alike, since prior to 1961 ultimate authority for production-related decisions had been vested in local and regional party committees, most of which were long on manipulative skills but woefully lacking in managerial and technological competence. But if the "liberalization" of 1961-62 was thus conducive to economic rationality, the reduced authority of the party committees soon led to the emergence of an incipient "instrumentalism"—the substitution of a largely apolitical production and managerial ethic for the consummatory ethic of the "command economy." As a result, the party's control over the economic life of the country came to be increasingly challenged by the rise of a "new class" of semi-autonomous managers, administrators, and technocrats, and by the resurgence of vestigial "rural capitalism." [1]

A second major feature of the domestic scene in 1963 was the growing apprehension of the CCP leadership over the trend toward bureaucratization within the party itself. Many party cadres had assertedly become "divorced from the masses"—that is, they had become immersed in paperwork and formalistic office routines and had neglected their duties as opinion leaders and propagandists among the masses. Moreover, it was acknowledged that many officials and cadres had been guilty of *pen-wei chu-yi* (literally, "departmentalism"), a catch-all term of derogation referring to such unorthodox practices as the establishment of protective interpersonal relationships among mutually vulnerable officials and the promotion of private ("vested") interests in disregard of the interests of the state or of the masses.[2]

Worried lest these manifestations of increasing bureaucratism lead to a "routinization" of the revolutionary functions of the party—and consequently to a weakening of political controls—the CCP in the spring of 1963 launched an all-out attack on those cadres who "indulge in idleness and hate work, eat too much and own too much, strive for status, act like officials, put on bureaucratic airs, pay no heed to the plight of the people, and care nothing about the interests of the state." [3] In conjunction with this verbal attack, the party initiated a campaign to dislodge cadres and officials from their offices and send them out to live and work among the masses. The rationale behind this *hsia-fang* (literally, "downward transfer") was Mao Tse-tung's doctrine of "revolutionary practice"—*i.e.*, that only by taking active part in class struggle, production struggle, and scientific experimentation could a cadre or official truly learn to "love the masses and put collective interests above selfish interests." [4]

---

[1] The contradiction between "instrumentalism" and "ideologism" lies at the heart of many of the policy controversies which have occurred in China since 1957. On the liberalization measures of 1961-62, see Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966, pp. 163-67 and *passim*; also Schurmann, "China's New Economic Policy—Transition or Beginning," *The China Quarterly* (London), January-March 1964, pp. 65-91.

[2] These deviations bear a close resemblance to the phenomenon of *semeistvennost* ("familyness") which has frequently been noted in connection with the "erosion of ideology" in the Soviet Union. See, *e.g.*, Joseph Berliner, *Factory and Manager in the USSR*, Harvard University Press, 1957.

[3] *Hung Ch'i* (Red Flag: Peking), No. 13-14, 1963, p. 11.

[4] For further documentation of China's cadre problem in 1963, see *The China Quarterly*, October-December 1963, pp. 169-70.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Concurrently with these disturbing domestic trends in the direction of instrumentalism in the economy and bureaucratism in the party, the dominant feature on the international scene in 1963 was the marked deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. Once "comradely" and "fraternal," these relations reached a new low in July following the acrimonious dissolution of high-level CCP-CPSU negotiations held in Moscow. Beginning in late July, the Chinese Communists stepped up their verbal attacks on Khrushchev, calling him a "stooge of imperialism" and an "enemy of the people of the world." [5] The fact that the intensification of the CCP's attack on revisionism abroad coincided with its attack on bureaucratism and instrumentalism at home is suggestive of a certain functional connection between these phenomena. We shall examine the implications of this connection more closely in a subsequent section of this inquiry.

Having sketched with broad—and admittedly oversimplified—strokes the major topographical features of the Chinese politico-economic map of 1963 on the eve of the ideological revival, let us turn next to a descriptive account of the revival itself. Following this, we shall be in a position to assess the significance of the revival and evaluate its impact on Chinese society.

The Anatomy of a Revival

Communist China's ideological revival was presaged in the fall of 1963 by a philosophical debate over what constituted the "proper" Marxist-Leninist viewpoint in interpreting observed "contradictions" both within China and between China and the outside world. On one side of this debate were those who stressed the possibility of resolving such contradictions through the "open exchange of different opinions," *i.e.*, through emphasizing the word "unity" in the dialectic of the "unity of opposites." On the other side were those militants who stressed the need for continuing "struggle" between the contending aspects of contradictions—particularly those of an "antagonistic" nature. They feared that excessive reliance on dialectical unity (read: peaceful coexistence) would tend to undermine China's revolutionary spirit and weaken her vigilance against class enemies, thereby opening the door to ideological degeneration à la Khrushchev.[6]

On October 26, 1963, Chou Yang, then Vice-Director of the party's Propaganda Department, sounded the opening note in what was to become an all-out attack on the advocates of dialectical unity when he called upon Chinese intellectuals to "struggle against the un-Marxist philosophy of merging and reconciling contradictions." In his indictment, Chou charged that under the pretext of reconciling contradictions the "modern revisionists" had

> **. . . completely ignored the enthusiasm of the laboring masses for collective production . . . and opposed giving prime emphasis to political education. . . . They have become infatuated with the widely publicized idea of "individual material incentives" which can only lead people to the pursuit of purely personal interests, . . . encourage the growth of bourgeois individualism, and thus do inestimable damage to the socialist cause. . .**[7]

That this diatribe, though ostensibly directed at the Soviet leadership, was actually aimed as much at heretics on the home front as at apostates abroad was clear from the fact that as early as the spring of 1963 the CCP had recognized the seriousness of the tendency toward ideological degeneration among its own cadres and officials. Indeed, there is precious little difference between the assertion that some party cadres "eat too much, own too much, and care nothing about the interests of the state" and Chou Yang's charge that the modern revisionists had become infatuated with material incentives and bourgeois individualism. But final proof of the double-edged nature of the anti-revisionist sword was provided by the fact that the campaign against Soviet apostasy was rapidly turned inward in the winter of 1963-64 in the form of a sweeping program of "socialist education" set in motion throughout China.

Aimed at "re-educating the Chinese people in proletarian, socialist ideology," the socialist education movement called upon everyone to "arm them-

[5] See, for example, *Peking Review*, No. 31, Aug. 2, 1963. For a capsule summary of important developments in the Sino-Soviet dispute in 1963, see H. Arthur Steiner, "China to the Left of Russia," *Asian Survey*, Vol. IV, No. 1 (January 1964), pp. 625-37.

[6] The former, conciliatory outlook was referred to by the term *ho erh erh i* ("two combine into one"), while the opposing militant outlook was designated *i fen-wei erh* ("one divides into two"). On the "struggle" between these contradictory formulas and the philosophies they represent, see *Hung Ch'i*, No. 4, 1964, pp. 29-33.

[7] *Ibid.*, No. 24, 1963, p. 18. The text of Chou's speech is translated in *Peking Review*, No. 1, January 3, 1964, pp. 10-28. For secondary analysis of the philosophical debate of 1963-64, see Donald J. Munro, "The Yang Hsien-chen Affair," *The China Quarterly*, No. 22, April-June, 1965, pp. 75-82; and John W. Lewis, "Revolutionary Struggle and the Second Generation in Communist China," *ibid.*, No. 21, January-March, 1965, pp. 140.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

selves with the thought of Mao Tse-tung" and to apply the lessons derived therefrom to the "three great revolutionary movements" of class struggle, production struggle, and scientific experimentation.[8] In the communiqué of the fourth session of the Second National People's Congress, issued on December 3, 1963, the goals of the movement were further spelled out in terms which strongly recalled Chou Yang's indictment against revisionism:

Throughout the historical period of transition between capitalism and communism, there is a class struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road . . . Class struggle must not be ignored during the struggle for production and scientific experimentation. It is essential to educate and arm the working people continuously with proletarian ideology and, on the political and economic fronts and in literature, art, and all ideological spheres, to overcome and guard against erosion by capitalist ideologies.[9]

Through the twin instrumentalities of the socialist education movement and the continuing *hsia-fang*, an increasingly radicalized atmosphere pervaded the Chinese countryside in the initial months of 1964. This radicalism was given still further impetus by the initiation of a mass campaign to "learn from the People's Liberation Army" (PLA).

Emulation campaigns had long been an important part of the CCP's arsenal of revolutionary weaponry. The principle underlying such campaigns was simple: the party would select an "advanced" or "heroic" industrial, agricultural, military, or cultural unit (or individual) and hold it (or him) up as a model for others to strive to emulate.[10] Obviously, the unit or individual selected as the model for a particular emulation campaign was considered to epitomize the qualities, virtues or skills which the regime was most concerned with cultivating at the moment.

In the case of the "learn from PLA" campaign, a *Jen-min Jih-pao* editorial of February 1, 1964, singled out the army for special praise because of its "high proletarian and combat character." More specifically, the PLA was credited with having "gained a firm grasp of political and ideological work," and with having "raised high the red flag of Mao Tse-tung's thought and put his thought in command in carrying out all tasks."[11] Most important, however, was the assertion that, by its demonstrated mastery of the so-called "three-eight work style" and the "four firsts,"[12] and through the practice of assigning political instructors to its various operational units, the PLA had considerably raised the morale—and hence the combat effectiveness—of its officers and men.[13]

The moral of the PLA's success story was inescapable: no socialism without revolutionary spirit; no revolutionary spirit without proletarian class consciousness; and no proletarian class consciousness without politico-ideological education and indoctrination. Hence the need for politics (read: the thought of Mao Tse-tung) to "take command" in every endeavor and in every walk of life. Failure to let politics take command would ultimately undermine China's revolutionary spirit and lead her down the path of modern revisionism—this was the "universal lesson" of the emulation campaign of 1964.[14]

Following closely on the heels of the learn-from-the-PLA movement came the initiation, in the summer of 1964, of a campaign to "cultivate revolutionary successors." Worried lest the mantle of leadership of the Chinese revolution pass to a generation of younger leaders who, because they lacked direct experience in the revolutionary struggles of the 1930's and 1940's, might be expected to relax their vigilance against "class enemies" at home and abroad, the CCP launched the cultivation-of-successors campaign with the following warning:

[8] *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), Jan. 1, 1964.

[9] *Peking Review*, No. 49, December 6, 1963, p. 8.

[10] There is a certain similarity between the CCP's use of "model workers" and "model units" and Stalin's use of *Stakhanovites* (shock workers) after 1928, but with the important difference that whereas Soviet *Stakhanovites* were encouraged by sizable material incentives, the more egalitarian Chinese have relied largely upon "spiritual" incentives such as peer-group recognition and public commendation.

[11] See also Ralph L. Powell, "Commissars in the Economy: 'Learn from the PLA' Movement in China," *Asian Survey*, Vol. V, No. 3 (March 1965), pp. 125-38; and John Gittings, "The 'Learn from the Army' Campaign," *The China Quarterly*, No. 18, April-June, 1964, pp. 153-59. On the increased use of the military metaphor during 1964, see James R. Townsend, "Communist China: The New Protracted War," *Asian Survey*, Vol. V, No. 1 (January 1965), pp. 1-11.

[12] The "three-eight work style" was a slogan calling for correct political orientation, hard work, austere living, tactical and strategic flexibility, unity, vigor, seriousness of purpose, and liveliness. The "four firsts" referred to the primacy of the human factor over weapons, political work over all other work, ideological work over routine work, and practical learning over book learning.

[13] Although these claims were undoubtedly exaggerated for propaganda purposes, the fact that they could be made at all must be treated as *prima facie* evidence that by early 1964 the PLA had succeeded in overcoming the crisis in military discipline which it had experienced during the "three hard years" of 1959-61. On this crisis, see the special survey of Chinese military affairs in *The China Quarterly*, No. 18, April-June, 1964; and J. Chester Cheng, Ed., *The Politics of the Chinese Red Army*, Stanford, Cal., Stanford University Press, 1965.

[14] *E.g.*, see *Survey of the China Mainland Press* (U.S. Consulate General, Hong Kong; hereafter cited as SCMP), Nos. 3154, 3164, 3183, and 3247 (1964); and Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If, through our neglect of education and cultivation, we were to allow those young people who have been influenced and corrupted by bourgeois ideology or revisionist ideology to succeed us, then this would mean abandoning the revolution in midstream and would cause socialism to "evolve peacefully" into capitalism . . .[15]

The drive to cultivate revolutionary successors was the elitist counterpart of the mass-oriented socialist education movement. It was above all directed at those party cadres and members who had joined the revolution after 1949—a group which comprised upwards of 80 percent of the total membership of the party.

A second objective of the "cultivation" movement was to impress upon senior party cadres the necessity of "actively fostering and promoting newborn forces." Many veteran cadres had assertedly become "bureaucratic," "conservative," and formalistic" in the discharge of their duties. They had ignored the abilities of their younger comrades and had failed to promote outstanding young activists to positions of leadership and responsibility. Consequently, a generational gap had arisen between the "long-tested old hard-cores" and the "newborn forces." It was in order to heal this breach that the party called upon its veteran cadres to take the lead in cultivating revolutionary successors.[16]

Throughout the remainder of 1964 and down to the end of 1965, the doctrinal themes of the preceding eighteen months were constantly reiterated and expanded upon. The attack on revisionism was intensified, as was the campaign to prevent the bureaucratic ossification of the party apparatus; politics continued to "take command;" and the cult of Maoism was systematically propagated in all sectors of Chinese society. This was but a small sample of what was yet to come.

Cult and Culture

By the end of 1965, Communist China's crusade against revisionism, bureaucratism, instrumentalism, and a whole host of other ideologically noxious "isms" was already in high gear, but in the first half of 1966 it reached truly monumental proportions.

The theme of spiritual regeneration virtually dominated the life of the country; doctrinal hallelujahism, heresy-hunting, and evangelistic faith-healing flourished in a frenzied climate of affirmation and inquisition; and the myth of Maoist infallibility was elevated, amidst the blare of Red Guards' trumpets, to the status of canonical law.

In this latest, most militant phase of Communist China's ideological revival, two notable developments occurred. First, workers, peasants, soldiers, and "people in all walks of life" were exhorted to creatively study and apply the thought of Mao Tse-tung and to write testimonials on the subject of "how Chairman Mao's thinking inspired me to overcome difficulties in my work." In one such testimonial, a woman table-tennis player described, in allegorical fashion, how she and her fellow team members utilized Mao's thought in devising a winning strategy for a major international tournament:

Our women's team won the Corbillon Cup . . . because they were armed with Mao Tse-tung's thinking. By this I mean that they had learned to look at problems from all angles and, as a result, were able to raise their morale and go all-out to win. . . .

In meeting difficulties the correct approach is both to despise them and take full account of them. . . To defeat a strong rival, we have to learn how to return the strokes which are his specialty. . . .

Dialectics is no mystery, and we can find plenty of it in playing table-tennis. . . In studying Chairman Mao's works, we must concretely analyze our actual problems and solve them in a scientific way [by using the method of "one divides into two"]. This will enable us to continue to make progress.[17]

In another extreme instance, it was claimed that all the patients in a certain municipal hospital had miraculously recovered from their illnesses as a result of the hospital staff's having "gained a firm grasp of Chairman Mao's thinking and put politics in command." [18]

Testimonials of this sort proliferated rapidly and were given widespread publicity in the mass media.[19] Everyone, from the lowliest "night-soil" collector to the most distinguished scientist, was exhorted to bear witness to the "material force" of Mao Tse-tung's thinking. In seeking to demonstrate the relevance of ideology and politics to the solution of problems encountered in everyday life, the CCP hoped to combat the growing tendency toward "alienation from politics." What was sought was

[15] *Hung Ch'i*, No. 14, 1964, p. 35.
[16] See *Jen-min Jih-pao*, May 20, 1964; see also *SCMP* No. 3235.
[17] *Peking Review*, No. 10, March 4, 1966, pp. 12-14.
[18] *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* (Peking), April 4, 1966. See also *China News Analysis* (Hong Kong), No. 610, May 6, 1966.
[19] See, *e.g.*, *Che-hsueh Yen-chiu* (Philosophical Studies), No. 2, 1966; and *Peking Review*, Nos. 21 through 25, May-June, 1966.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a nation of workers who were both politically "red" and vocationally "expert." [20]

A *Jen-min Jih-Pao* editorial of April 14, 1966, spelled out once again the nature of the "correct" dialectical relationship between politics and vocational proficiency:

What is the correct way to understand and handle the relationship between politics and the particular work one does? Some comrades, because of the influence of bourgeois ideas or lack of clear understanding, often put blind faith in bourgeois specialists and professors, put work above politics, and consciously or unconsciously develop a purely technical viewpoint. . . .

It must be understood that politics and work form a contradiction and that politics is the principal aspect of this contradiction. . . . This means that being "red" gives the impetus to becoming expert, that we must be both "red" and expert.

It was precisely under the slogans of "putting work first," "putting technique first," and "putting specialists first" that the Khrushchev revisionist clique usurped leading positions in all spheres of work and, under the pretext of "building communism," diverted work in all spheres to the path of capitalist restoration. . . . To put politics and work on an equal footing amounts to eclecticism in philosophy and opportunism in politics. Some comrades erroneously maintain that politics is a means for accomplishing their work. They only pay attention to politics when they have time. . . . This is a pragmatic attitude. The mistake is that these people do not consider that putting politics in first place is a fundamental thing. . . . Some other comrades pay equal attention to everything and every aspect of their work, giving priority to nothing. They pay lip service to putting politics in command but actually are trapped in a quagmire of routinism. . . .

It was precisely as a corrective to such heterodox tendencies as "eclecticism," "pragmatism," "opportunism," and "routinism" that the party intensified the mass movement to "creatively study and apply the thought of Mao Tse-tung" in the spring of 1966. If by so doing politics could be made to "take command," if workers could be made "both red *and* expert" (with primary emphasis on the former), then revisionism could presumably be effectively combatted.

The second major development on the political and ideological front in 1966 was the institution of a "great proletarian cultural revolution" (read: purge) among high-level intellectuals and party officials in Peking and elsewhere. Such prominent figures as P'eng Chen, Lo Jui-ch'ing, Lu Ting-yi, Wu Han, and Chou Yang, among others, were dismissed from their posts—or even arrested—on the grounds that they had followed an "anti-party, anti-socialist black line." By the end of 1966, public criticism had extended as high as party Secretary-General Teng Hsiao-p'ing and even Chairman of the Republic Liu Shao-ch'i himself.[21]

What had these "anti-socialist elements" been guilty of? Primarily, they were charged with having championed such poisonous ideas as "putting work first," "putting technique first," and "putting specialists first," as well as with having advocated the "open exchange of different opinions without regard for the class struggle." They had also allegedly been hostile to the mass movement for the creative study and application of the thought of Mao Tse-tung, and had acted as "wolves in sheep's clothing" and "tigers with smiling faces," surreptitiously seducing the unsuspecting masses with their "sugar-coated bullets" of bourgeois ideology and revisionist ideology.[22]

As of this writing, the "socialist cultural revolution" continues unabated. Already the most profound purge in three decades of Maoist leadership, the upheaval has destroyed the carefully preserved myth of a unified and solidary party elite and has tended to confirm previous speculation concerning the likelihood of an intra-party power struggle as Mao approaches the end of his career.[23] The main lines of such a struggle now seem to be taking clearer shape: the puritanical, militant, anti-Soviet "reds" *versus* the more pragmatic and conciliatory "experts." [24] In the discussion which follows, we shall undertake a theoretical analysis of the "red and expert" controversy in order to link China's

[20] On the genesis of the "red and expert" concept, see the author's article, "'Red and Expert': Politico-Ideological Foundations of China's Great Leap Forward," in *Asian Survey*, Vol. IV, No. 9 (September 1964), pp. 1048-57.

[21] For an intensive analysis of the Cultural Revolution, see Harry Gelman, "Mao and the Permanent Purge," *Problems of Communism*, No. 6 (November-December), 1966, pp. 2-14; also, the survey presented in *The China Quarterly*, No. 27, July-September 1966.

[22] *Chieh-fang Chün Pao* (Liberation Army News), June 7, 1966. See also *Peking Review*, No. 24, June 10, 1966, for a series of editorials and policy statements relating to the purge.

[23] Although the present analysis is weighted in the direction of the socio-economic determinants of China's internal crisis, the high visibility of the ideological conflict between "reds" and "experts" should not be allowed to obscure the important role undoubtedly played by personal and organizational rivalries, as well as by considerations of foreign policy, in the genesis of the cultural revolution. See, *e.g.*, Franz Schurmann, "What's Happening in China?," *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. VII, No. 6 (Oct. 20, 1966), pp. 18 ff. Also, Ross Terrill, "The Siege Mentality," *Problems of Communism*, No. 2 (March-April), 1967, pp. 1 ff.

[24] As is true of most dichotomous schemes of classification, the distinction between "red" and "expert" is a matter of degree rather than of mutual exclusiveness. It is highly improbable that there are any *pure* "experts" in the leadership circles of the CCP, and the question of who is more red than whom is made difficult for the outsider by the customary use of Aesopian language in party publications and speeches. Nevertheless, the distinction is a highly useful one, as will subsequently be shown.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ideological revival to the broader processes of social change which presently confront the Peking regime.

Routine, Ritual, and Survival

Earlier the question was raised whether there might not be a functional nexus between revisionism and modernization. What this notion implies is that, far from being merely fortuitous, the appearance of certain heterodox tendencies in developing Communist societies—tendencies such as bureaucratism, instrumentalism, and so on—may actually be causally related to the historical transition of these societies from the relatively undifferentiated stage of radical social mobilization and revolution to the more organizationally complex stage of economic rationalization and technological innovation.[25] This notion is, of course, a familiar one to students of comparative communism and has served as a theoretical underpinning for several interpretive studies of the ostensible "erosion of ideology" in the Soviet Union.[26]

According to this view, which may be termed the generational hypothesis, revisionism is the ideological reflection of the declining relevance of revolutionary norms and values to the solution of qualitatively new, post-revolutionary socio-economic problems. Translated into the language of contemporary social science, the generational hypothesis holds that as a value-oriented social movement becomes institutionalized—or "routinized"—with

[25] For the purposes of this discussion, we shall adopt Professor Benjamin Schwartz's limited, non-teleological definition of modernization as "something approximating Max Weber's conception of the process of rationalization in all those spheres of social action—economic, political, military, legal, educational—which lend themselves to the application of *Zweckrationalität* [*i.e.*, instrumental rationality]. It involves the sustained attention to the most appropriate, 'rational,' and efficient methods for increasing man's ability to control nature and society for a variety of ends. . . . It tends to involve the notion of a highly developed division of labor of 'functional specificity' with the corollary that men should have a degree of autonomy and authority within their various spheres of competence. It also involves a stress on norms of universality rather than ascription, and thus should involve social mobility —the opening up of careers to talent. . . . It may also involve a sober respect for objective conditions. The technocrat and, for that matter, the professional bureaucrat will be very conscious of the limits imposed by his materials and by the imperatives of the situation in which he operates." See Schwartz, "Modernization and the Maoist Vision," *The China Quarterly*, No. 21, January-March, 1965, pp. 3-19.

[26] See, *e.g.*, Leopold Labedz, "Ideology: The Fourth Stage," in Abraham Brumberg, Ed., *Russia Under Khrushchev*, New York, F. A. Praeger, 1962, pp. 46-66; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?," *Problems of Communism*, No. 1, 1966, pp. 1-15.

The Story of a Book

The combined 15th and 16th issue of *Red Flag* magazine, which will come off the press on August 1, carries Comrade Liu Shao-ch'i's famous work: "How to Be a Good Communist." This article is the text of a speech made by Comrade Liu Shao-ch'i in July 1939 at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Yenan. It was first published in 1939 in the 81st, 82nd, 83rd and 84th issues of the *Liberation* magazine. In the course of the rectification campaign of the CCP in 1942, this article was listed as one of the rectification documents which all party cadres must read. It played an important role in the history of the building of the CCP, in educating the broad masses of party members to strengthen their own steeling and cultivation, and in guiding them to foster the proletarian ideology.

. . . To a Communist it has an extremely important significance. . . .

—New China News Agency (Peking)
July 31, 1962

On the question of cadres, Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line and the bourgeois reactionary line are poles apart. . . .

Never be tricked by the book "How to Be a Good Communist." This book is eyewash, departs from the actual class struggle, from the revolution, and from the political struggle. It says nothing about the fundamental questions of revolution and political power, nothing about the dictatorship of the proletariat. It propagates idealistic cultivation of personality, obliquely advocating bourgeois individualism and enslavement, and it opposes Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought.

If one cultivates himself according to this book, the more he follows it, the more rapidly he becomes a revisionist. This book must be thoroughly criticized and repudiated in order to cleanse away its pernicious influence. Criticism and repudiation of this book play an important role in the repudiation of the bourgeois reactionary line.

—Hung Ch'i (Peking), No. 5,
March 30, 1967.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the passage of time, a certain amount of cultural strain is generated between traditional ideological prescriptions and new social structures and cognitive perspectives.[27] As this cultural strain (as, for example, between the contradictory imperatives of a fundamentalist religion and a maturing industrial order) becomes more intense, there is a natural tendency for traditional doctrines to lose much of their positive content—a situation which is manifestly favorable to the emergence of new behavioral norms and cognitive perspectives.[28]

When viewed in this light, the phenomenon of revisionism becomes readily explainable as a latent function of the modernization process itself. But to say this is not to imply that revolutionary doctrines, once they have become functionally anachronistic, will be automatically and voluntarily discarded. For doctrines have a way of resisting social change, and doctrinaires alter their beliefs only with the utmost reluctance. This is all the more true if the doctrine in question happens to serve the ancillary function of legitimating the special status and authority of a particular social group or stratum—such as a Communist party.

The distinguished French political philosopher Raymond Aron, commenting on the ideological dilemma faced by the CPSU, remarked that while it is difficult to maintain a faith, it is more difficult still to do without one. The truth of this maxim is nowhere better illustrated than in the characteristically ambivalent attitudes of Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders toward the modernization process. On the one hand, modernization is positively valued as a social goal, for modernization means economic development and economic development means national power. On the other hand, however, modernization entails bureaucracy, instrumentalism, and the consequent attenuation and ritual sterilization of ideological principles. Damned if they do and damned if they don't, the leaders of the CPSU and the CCP have thus been forced to steer a not altogether happy course between the Scylla of modernization-cum-revisionism and the Charybdis of atavism-cum-orthodoxy.

Faced with such a heads-you-win, tails-I-lose proposition, it is little wonder that Communist elites have been unable to resolve satisfactorily the fundamental contradiction between the values of "red" and those of "expert." The prototypical "red" is the mass-oriented cadre, the combat leader, the highly indoctrinated jack-of-all-trades. He is the "line" officer whose task is to unify and lead the masses to implement predetermined policies and directives. His goal is human solidarity; his vision is of a spiritually-integrated *Gemeinschaft;* his forte is the manipulation of human relations; his outlook is typically utopian and fundamentalist. The prototypical "expert," on the other hand, is the management-oriented technocrat, the professional administrator, the highly skilled specialist. He is the "staff" officer whose task is to specify operations, to allocate available resources efficiently, and to ensure the effective coordination of the division of labor. His goal is technical rationality; his vision is of a functionally-integrated *Gesellschaft;* his forte is scientific management; his outlook is typically secular and pragmatic.[29]

Ideally, of course, party leaders would like to combine the best qualities of each of these prototypes into a single individual (the so-called "new Communist man") who would be both red and expert. But since the weight of accumulated evidence indicates that ideological fervor tends to diminish in proportion to the acquisition of technical and administrative skills, such a goal would appear, in the long run, to be unattainable.[30]

In the short run, however, there are at least three ways in which a party that monopolizes the instruments of coercion, the channels of social mobility, and the media of mass communications can attempt to control, if not the causes, then at least some of the more undesirable consequences of social change. The first of these involves the atomization and intimidation of potentially unreliable groups and strata through the systematic application of terror. The problem with this method, which was used by Stalin to consolidate his control over the Soviet *apparat* in the 1930's, is that it may have

[27] See Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia,* New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1936, pp. 100-01, for an early formulation of the generational hypothesis.

[28] On the subject of the situational determinants of normative and cognitive orientations, particularly in the context of social change, see Talcott Parsons, *The Social System,* New York, Free Press, 1964, Chapter XI and *passim.* See also Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change,* Boston, Little, Brown, 1966, esp. Chapters III and IV.

[29] These ideal-typical profiles of the "red" cadre and the "expert" technocrat are adapted from Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization . . .,* pp. 69-70, 99-100, 231-34.

[30] "Once [a society] 'takes off' in social development, the social justification for an essentially ideological political system decreases, . . . while such social groups as the new industrial elite or the new technological intelligentsia may begin to crave for the stability inherent in a more instrumental political system. . . . The almost parallel development of industrial economy and technology has produced a degree of social complexity which is now reducing the appeal of purely doctrinal programs in the more developed countries. . . ." (Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR,* New York, Viking Press, 1965, p. 73.)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

certain unintended consequences that are ultimately counterproductive.[31]

A second instrumentality available to Communist elites involves the principle of cooptation—the exercise of social control through manipulation of incentives and deprivations. By establishing political and ideological criteria for the career advancement of upwardly mobile individuals—particularly the "new class" of engineers, managers, and administrators—the party can discourage deviant behavior and ensure at least a modicum of "redness" among those who, by virtue of their educational and vocational backgrounds, are most likely to be influenced by heterodox ideas.[32] But the victory thus gained must ultimately prove to be a Pyrrhic one. For despite the outward manifestations of political loyalty on the part of upwardly mobile individuals, and despite their ostensible acceptance of the dominant ideological ethos, a certain displacement of goals will occur. That is, those values which are *consummatory* for the party will tend to become merely *instrumental* for the ambitious careerist.[33]

If the technique of co-optation, like that of terror, thus proves to be an insufficient guarantee against the "erosion of ideology," a third instrumentality is available to a totalitarian party. This method, which involves a spiritual regeneration of the masses, lies at the heart of the phenomenon which I have termed "ideological revivalism."

Populism vs. Professionalism

One of the more striking differences in the respective approaches of Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders to the problems of economic and social development is the markedly greater commitment of the Russians to the goal of professionalism, to the creation of a rational, highly differentiated bureaucratic apparatus, and to a degree of operational autonomy for "expert" hierarchies, particularly in the industrial, state-administrative, and military spheres. By contrast, the Chinese have increasingly demonstrated a profound distrust of vertically-integrated bureaucracies, highly trained professionals, and narrow economic specialists, and have instead adopted a "populist" approach to social change which calls for the horizontal integration of society on the basis of subjectively mobilized masses under the direct, combat-style leadership of "red" cadres.[34]

Among the various reasons which have been advanced to account for this divergence, two are particularly relevant to our present discussion. The first is the more highly developed scientific, technological, and industrial resource base of the Soviet Union in contrast to the relatively "backward" or "underdeveloped" economic structure of Communist China (a contrast which, incidentally, helps to explain the many difficulties encountered by the CCP in attempting mechanically to emulate the Soviet model of industrialization in the early 1950's). The second is the deeply ingrained revolutionary romanticism of the present Chinese leaders —the so-called "spirit of Yenan"—which is intrinsically hostile to excessive reliance on material resources and technical hierarchies, and which instead stresses the developmental potential of the "human factor"—*i.e.*, subjective leadership, conscious activism, moral rectitude, and *esprit de corps.*[35]

The point to be made here is that, given the similar desires of the Soviet and Chinese elites to maximize economic development while at the same time minimizing the ideologically corrosive effects of social change, the technique of co-opting upwardly mobile technological and administrative personnel is, *ceteris paribus,* more apposite to the highly differentiated, highly bureaucratized Soviet system, while the contrary technique of ideological revivalism is manifestly more congenial to the less differentiated, "massified" Chinese system.[36]

The term "revivalism" is defined in Webster's as "the tendency or desire to restore religious prin-

[31] "The endless belt of irresponsible denunciation begins to destroy the nation's treasury of needed skills. The terror apparatus grows on the stuff it feeds upon and magnifies in importance until it overshadows and depresses all the constructive enterprises of the state. . . ." (Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963, p. 441.) There are some indications that the recent Red Guard movement has precipitated a similar demoralization in China.

[32] For a further discussion of the co-optative technique, see Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and Soviet Case," in J. Palombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 233-67.

[33] Since positive identification with the manifest goals of the party increases his chances for professional advancement, the careerist will be motivated to conform to officially prescribed norms of conduct and communication. However, since the official ideology may be *substantively* irrelevant to the performance of his professional duties, his demonstrations of faith will tend to become mere hollow incantations. On the appearance of this phenomenon in the Soviet Union, see Alfred G. Meyer, "The Functions of Ideology in the Soviet Political System," *Soviet Studies*, No. 3, January 1966, pp. 273-85.

[34] For an elaboration of this contrast, see Schwartz, *loc. cit.*

[35] For a discussion of the historical roots of this "man over material" syndrome, see Baum, *loc. cit.*

[36] This is not to say that co-optation and revivalism are necessarily exclusive techniques. Indeed, the Soviet as well as the Chinese leaders have utilized both methods at times. The question is simply one of relative structural suitability.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ciples following a period of relative decline or indifference." The three critical conditions of a revival, then, are *religiousness, relative decline,* and a desire for *restoration.* In the preceding pages, we have dealt at some length with the latter two elements. In order to complete the circle and establish the relevance of the revivalist metaphor to the present inquiry, it is now necessary to turn to the concept of religiousness itself.

Parallels between communism and religion have frequently been drawn, and it has become commonplace to refer to Marxism-Leninism (-Stalinism-Maoism) as a "secular religion" or "political religion."[37] This convention rests on the (often unarticulated) assumption that all fundamentalist ideologies, whether transcendental or humanistic in perspective, may be treated as "value-oriented beliefs"—and hence as functional equivalents—so long as they envision a regeneration of self and society and provide a comprehensive hierarchy of values and behavioral norms.

A recently published study in the field of the sociology of religion employs the term "value-orientation" to denote those special kinds of all-encompassing perspectives which make an absolute claim upon the allegiance of all who partake of their vision of reality.[38] In a similar vein, the author of a major work on the theory of collective behavior argues that all value-oriented beliefs have in common a preoccupation with the moral bases of social life and an overriding concern with nature, man's place in nature, and man's relation to man.[39] In this sense, then, the Communist *Weltanschauung* would seem to fall within the same category of beliefs as the other great cosmic doctrines of history, both religious and secular.

Sects and Secularization

But there is an even more immediate sense in which the religious metaphor is appropriate to the present analysis, and this relates to the propensity of value-oriented movements to become routinized over time. In this connection, students of religious organization have frequently noted the near-universal tendency for protest-oriented *sects* to evolve into establishment-oriented *denominations.*

Sects, which are the characteristic organizational form of value-oriented movements in their initial, enthusiastic stage, are identified by the following traits: They are voluntary associations, and membership is by proof to sect authorities of some claim to personal merit—such as knowledge of doctrine or affirmation of a conversion experience. Their self-conception is one of an elect, a gathered remnant, possessing special enlightenment. Exclusiveness is emphasized, and sects are usually organized around a charismatic leader to whom is attributed a "gift of grace," and from whom the inner circle of disciples receive spiritual inspiration. The disciples, in turn, are expected to live austere lives, shunning worldly possessions and material perquisites. And finally, sects accept, at least as an ideal, the egalitarian priesthood of all true believers.[40]

For a variety of reasons, some of which have already been mentioned in another context, fundamentalist sects are seldom able to maintain their original values and their pristine character in the face of changing external or internal social conditions. As the sect begins to encounter the exigencies of sustaining itself over long periods of time, it gradually loses its exclusiveness and egalitarian character and increasingly displays the characteristic traits of an established church, or denomination. It begins to employ formalized procedures of entry; breadth and tolerance are emphasized. Its self-conception becomes unclear, and its doctrinal position unstressed. It begins to accept the standards and values of the prevailing culture. A hierarchically organized, professional priesthood arises. Personal charisma is attenuated and progressively replaced by the "charisma of office." The evangelism of the outsider declines; denominational services become formalized, and spontaneity disappears. Finally, individual commitment grows weaker as the intimate community of *believers* evolves into an impersonal society of *members.*[41]

The obvious point to be made here is that many of the major elements of the Chinese Communist Party's "Yenan style" of social organization and leadership correspond rather closely to the domi-

[37] See, *e.g.,* Raymond Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals,* New York, Norton, 1962; Jules Monnerot, *Sociology and Psychology of Communism,* Boston, Beacon Press, 1960; and David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1965.

[38] Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, *Religion and Society in Tension,* Chicago, Rand McNally, 1965, p. 9.

[39] Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior,* New York, Free Press, 1963, pp. 120-22.

[40] Adapted from Bryan R. Wilson, "An Analysis of Sect Development," *American Sociological Review,* Vol. XXIV, February 1959, pp. 13-15. A similar list of attributes appears in the pioneering work of Joachim Wach, *Sociology of Religion,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1944, pp. 196 ff.

[41] Wilson, *loc cit.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nant ethical imperatives of the sectarian *Gemeinschaft,* while the organizational and leadership principles of the CPSU bear more than a superficial resemblance to the ethos of the denominational *Gesellschaft.* Moreover, the various factors which tend to cause sects to evolve into denominations are of precisely the same etiological order as the factors which we have identified as being among the major sources of revisionism—*i.e.*, the internal differentiation, bureaucratization, and professionalization of the *apparat;* the ritual sterilization of doctrinal prescriptions; and the gradual acculturation of the movement to prevalent external norms and values.

Herein, then, lies one possible key to understanding the phenomenon of ideological revivalism in Communist China. For if our analogy is at all relevant, the CCP now stands at the threshold of denominationalism. Its pristine sectarian values have already begun to suffer dilution from the "corrupting" influences of its secular environment; the party itself has become increasingly bureaucratized and differentiated; and its charismatic appeal and sense of mission have faded along with memories of its past revolutionary heroics.

With the example of Soviet revisionism confronting them as an augury of the future, the Chinese Communists have, in the past three years, been engaged in a desperate race against time, a frantic struggle to "sectarianize" the society before the society can "denominationalize" the party. And what lends this sectarian revival an even greater sense of urgency is the fact that the process of routinization coincides with the historical epoch of the "changing of the guard"—the period of declining health and activity of the charismatic founder and the maturation of a second generation of "professional" clerics.[42]

The Road Ahead

The People's Republic of China, barely seventeen and a half years old, now faces squarely the universal crisis of adolescence: the crisis of *identity.* The twin forces of modernization and denominationalism seem destined to attenuate many of the more radical tenets of the Maoist faith. The social structure of the Chinese nation likewise seems destined to evolve further in the direction of bureaucratic professionalism, secularism, and instrumental rationality—ideological revivalism notwithstanding.

It is a primary axiom of cultural anthropology that when the behavior enjoined by ideal value-patterns departs too radically from that which is suitable under actual socio-economic conditions, the value-patterns themselves will change. There is no small irony in this, for it is the very success of the Chinese Communists in overcoming the inherited conditions of economic backwardness and social disintegration that spells the ultimate doom of the party's "Yenan spirit" as an operational ethos. It has rightly been observed that "what they [the Chinese Communists] call 'revisionism' is here to stay, for it is the essence of the industrial society they have sought to mold." [43]

The CCP has, in the past, demonstrated a remarkable ability to assess pragmatically its successes and failures and to alter its policies accordingly. This is one of the built-in advantages of Mao's dialectical conception of society, which views everything in terms of the fluid interplay of contradictory principles. If today the party leadership chooses to emphasize one particular social contradiction (*e.g.*, the contradiction between "red" and "expert"), and to give major stress to one particular aspect of this contradiction (*e.g.*, "red"), then certain strains and imbalances are likely to arise—as indeed they have arisen. But such strains and imbalances can be—and have been in the past—reduced by a subsequent shift of policy in the direction of the golden mean. Hence, what appears in the short run to be a fanatical and irrational outburst of political and ideological violence may in the long run appear as merely a single episode in the pendulum-like dialectic of social development. Assuming that Mao and his colleagues are not utterly mad, we may thus anticipate that the present tense mood of revivalism will likely be followed by a relatively calm period of reassessment and readjustment.

But to what extent can this developmental dialectic continue to operate on the fundamental sociological assumptions provided by "the thought of Mao Tse-tung"? To what extent is the Maoist vision of the "good" society reconcilable with the structural and normative imperatives of the "modern" society? The thrust of our analysis has been that there remain a great many unresolved (if not unresolvable) contradictions between the two. Mao is undoubtedly correct in anticipating troubled times for the second generation of leadership in Communist China.

[42] On the subject of succession crises faced by charismatic sects upon the death of the founder, see Wach, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-41.

[43] Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Struggle for Power

By Franz Michael

What is going on in China today is clearly a power struggle between the rival exponents of what are in essence two divergent Communist lines: one representing a pragmatic, rational communism moving forward or retreating within the confines of stages of development as hitherto understood by most Communist leaderships; the other, Mao's radical, utopian communism, which preaches the attainment of the same Communist goals by means of a short cut replacing economic and political rationality with blind belief in doctrine and reliance on force and the power of human will. This battle for supremacy began in 1958 when Mao Tse-tung abandoned all previously accepted principles of Communist development and started the "Great Leap Forward" as an all-out effort to achieve China's rapid advance toward communism. Manpower, organization and whipped-up enthusiasm were to take the place of normal methods of economic development and create the increase in production necessary for the transition to the ultimate Communist social order. Communal living and distribution of goods were to initiate this transformation.

This departure from previous Communist practice was designed as much to advance China's position within the Communist world as to speed up the revolution at home. After the death of Stalin, Mao had aspired to a share in the leadership of world communism but had been snubbed by Khrushchev on the premise that Soviet superiority in development entitled the USSR to supreme leadership. Only a dramatic achievement at home could provide Mao with a solid base from which to speak back. The "Great Leap Forward" and the commune system of 1958 were thus designed not only to accomplish the rapid communization of China, but also, in the fantastic Chinese boasts of the time, to enable her to "bypass the Soviet Union on the way to communism."

We know today that this double-edged attack was virtually the product of Mao's own lone-handed scheming, and that it was forced upon a reluctant and to some extent divided Chinese Communist party leadership. In three meetings called between December 1957 and March 1958 at Hangchow, Nanning and Chengtu, Mao had informed a group of party leaders of his plans for the "Great Leap Forward," adding at the third meeting the proposal

---

Dr. Michael is Associate Director and Chairman of the Research Colloquium on Modern China, Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University (Wash., D.C.), and author of, among others, The Origin of Manchu Rule in China *(New York, Octagon Press, 1965). He recently returned from an extended tour of the Far East where he interviewed numerous persons, including ex-CCP officials, with firsthand knowledge of current developments in Communist China.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to set up the commune system.[1] Mao's plans, however, immediately encountered opposition, the most outspoken objections coming, we are told, from the top military leaders. Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, a leading military member of the Politburo and Minister of Defense, supported by Huang K'o-cheng, Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), are understood to have strongly resisted Mao's proposals with the argument that they were economically unfeasible and contrary to established Communist concepts of staged development. Other party leaders, however, did not openly voice their opposition, and Mao went ahead with his program without seeking any formal endorsement by the official party organs. Only in August 1958 was the new policy officially adopted by an enlarged Politburo meeting at Peitaho, by which time the commune movement was already spreading over the country.

Rise of the Opposition

Mao's "Great Leap Forward" and the commune system proved catastrophic failures, causing famine and economic disaster in China. This disaster in turn led the more rational of China's leaders to come to the fore in order to salvage the situation. Thus, what had started as Mao's challenge to the Soviet leaders resulted in the reluctant emergence of an internal opposition to Mao.

The conflict began with a serious defeat for Mao. The failure of the "Great Leap" and the communes quickly became apparent, and the reaction set in at the end of 1958. On December 10 a Central Committee meeting decided on an initial retreat from the commune system. The exorbitant claims of the summer were abandoned. No longer were the communes said to be ushering in the first stage of communism. Payment was to be, in the main, according to work and in cash instead of according to need and in kind; some of the peasants' private property was restored; and families were again permitted to live together.

At the same time, however, another, even more crucial decision was officially announced: Mao Tse-tung—the author of the utopian "Great Leap"-communes program—was stepping down from his post as Chairman of the Republic. As Mao had held this highest government position since the founding of the Communist regime in 1949, his resignation inevitably raised questions. The official explanation given was that Mao wished to relinquish his duties as chief of state in order that he might devote all his time to leadership of the party, of which he remained Chairman. Nevertheless, it was widely suspected abroad even then that Mao's surrender of the chairmanship of the Republic was not voluntary, that it represented a demotion, and that it occurred as a result of strong pressures from within the party leadership.[2]

Disclosures recently made by Mao's supporters in the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" tend to confirm these suppositions and to show that Mao did in fact suffer a drastic loss of personal power in December 1958. Red Guard "wall posters" put on display in Peking in early January 1967 quoted Mao as having told the party Central Committee in October 1966 with regard to his 1958 removal as Chairman of the Republic: "I was dissatisfied with the decision, but I could do nothing about it." The posters further quoted Mao as stating that on this occasion the opposition, headed by the newly-designated Chairman of the Republic, Liu Shao-ch'i, and party Secretary-General Teng Hsiao-p'ing, "treated me as if I were their dead parent at a funeral" and thereafter "never bothered to consult me on vital matters." [3]

It may well be that Mao's colleagues, in engineering his demotion, were influenced by more than just their concern for the stability of Chinese development. There is no reason to exclude the possibility that Khrushchev, who had reacted strongly to the challenge to Soviet primacy implied in the "Great Leap" and commune programs, may have exerted pressure in China on the side of the opposition. Indeed, the events that followed provide at least circumstantial evidence that Khrushchev was involved. In January 1959, immediately after Mao had been eased out as head of state, Chou En-lai hastened to Moscow and obtained another

[1] This résumé of developments within the CCP in 1957-58 is based mainly on an article written by Ting Wang, a former CCP official now living in Hong Kong, and published in the independent Hong Kong Chinese-language newspaper *Ming Pao* (Oct. 23-24, 1966) under the title "I-chiu-liu-i nien ti chung kung tang-nei chan cheng" (The Communist Internal Party Struggle of 1961). The author, who had personal knowledge of the events described, corroborated the substance of his published account in a personal interview with the present writer. The account is also consistent with what was officially reported at the time concerning Mao's whereabouts and activities.

[2] See Franz Michael, "Khrushchev's Disloyal Opposition: Structural Change and Power Struggle in the Communist Bloc," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Spring 1963, pp. 64-65.

[3] Tokyo dispatches published in *The New York Times*, Jan. 6, 1967 (pp. 1-2), based on Japanese press correspondents' reports from Peking.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agreement for Soviet economic aid, which could have been a *quid pro quo* for a change of course in Peking and Mao's removal from practical policy direction.

There is stronger evidence for believing that Khrushchev also had a hand in the new assault on Mao's policies that developed in the summer of 1959. This attack was led by Defense Minister Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, who reportedly had already expressed opposition to Mao's "Great Leap" policy when it was first discussed the year before. At the Central Committee meeting at Lushan in August 1959, P'eng again attacked this policy and its effects on the army, which Mao wanted to use as a political weapon to put pressure on the communes. In P'eng's view, the army should remain a professional force and should rely on the nuclear cover and military equipment provided by China's Soviet ally. The attack was mounted with the apparent foreknowledge of Khrushchev, whom P'eng had met in the Crimea prior to the Central Committee meeting, and seems to have been directed not merely against Mao's policies but against his very position of leadership. According to an authoritative study of the Lushan proceedings, Mao answered the threat against him awith an emotional speech in which he declared that if the army deserted him he would go back to the villages, recruit another army, and fight all over again.[4] In view of recent events in China and the formation of the Red Guards for the purpose of purging a Communist Party accused of being no longer obedient to Mao, this statement of 1959 now appears in retrospect rather prophetic.

At the Lushan meeting, Mao managed in the end to carry the day when a majority of the Central Committee stood by him. P'eng Teh-huai and Army Chief of Staff Huang K'o-cheng, were purged, and with them fell some forty other high-ranking military figures and a number of lesser party leaders. Mao not only won the fight but gained—in the newly purged army under the leadership of Lin Piao (who became Defense Minister)—an instrument for his attempt to regain full power.

P'eng's failure and Mao's victory also severed the link between Khrushchev and the Chinese opposition to Mao. Those party leaders who were inwardly opposed to Mao's reckless internal policies nevertheless stood by him in his crucial fight against the army opposition backed by Khrushchev, and from then on the opposition at home parted ways with the opposition abroad—at least for the time being and for the official record.

Mao's Program Dismantled

But the internal battle over Mao's policy continued. Removed from practical control of state affairs, Mao had to stand passively by as, step by step, his grandiose programs were dismantled. His successor as Chairman of the Republic, Liu Shao-ch'i—who is regarded today as Mao's chief opponent in the party leadership—was a reluctant dragon who never directly attacked Mao's prestige or claim to leadership. But, without abandoning its slogans, Liu led the retreat from Mao's extreme program through a series of practical measures. That there was a continuing battle could be conjectured from such incidents as that which occurred in the fall of 1959 when Liu Shao-ch'i, in his new capacity as chief of state, called together the Supreme State Conference, a body of uncertain composition that was convened irregularly, to discuss highest policy matters under the Chairman of the Republic. Mao, who did not appear at Liu's meeting, shortly thereafter convened a meeting of similar composition with virtually the same program, obviously intended to reassert his power.[5]

But Mao's countermove did not stop Liu from gradually stripping down the radical programs instituted with such disastrous consequences by Mao. In January 1961, Liu issued a "12-point emergency directive regarding rural work," which restored the peasants' right to cultivate private plots and to sell their produce in "free" markets, and which stipulated that labor should be given more rest than they had been allowed under the frenzied mobilization of the "Great Leap Forward."[6] In the same month, the Central Committee endorsed a so-called "8-character charter" designed to adjust the economy to the growing crisis, which by that time had reached extreme proportions.[7] In

[4] See David A. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai," *The China Quarterly* (London), Oct.-Dec. 1961.

[5] See *Survey of the China Mainland Press* (US Consulate-General, Hong Kong—hereafter cited as *SCMP*), No. 2086, Aug. 28, 1959, citing New China News Agency (hereafter NCNA) radio report of Aug. 24 from Peking; also *SCMP* No. 2100, Sept. 22, 1959, citing NCNA Peking report of Sept. 15.

[6] See Ting Wang, *loc. cit.*; also, *Kung Fei "Jen Min Kung Shih" Tze-liao Ch'uan-chi* (Taipei), Vol. V, October 1961.

[7] The charter stressed the need to increase agricultural production and outlined a "three-level" (commune, production brigade, and production team) ownership system for the communes. See Ting Wang, *loc. cit.*, and *Peking Review*, Jan. 27, 1961, pp. 3-5.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

May 1961, Liu issued a number of regulations that signified a general retreat from Mao's 1958 policies. Sixty articles provided for a drastic decentralization of the communes, restoring production authority to the smaller-size collectives; and seventy dealt with the reestablishment of normal procedures in industry.[8]

Mao's fanciful internal program, with its short cut to communism, was thus abandoned—and with it the claim to overtake and pass the Soviet Union on the way to the ultimate Communist society. But Mao's challenge to the Soviet leadership was not given up; rather, it took on a new form. In 1961, the very year of the final retreat from the commune system, Moscow attempted to give new doctrinal expression to the leading role of the Soviet Union in the advance toward communism, and at the 22nd Soviet Party Congress the conflict between Moscow and Peking entered a new phase. On the surface it was Khrushchev's renewed attack against Albania which precipitated the open protest and premature departure of the Chinese representative, Chou En-lai. But the basic conflict went deeper. Khrushchev's new party program, with its blueprint for early Soviet entry into the final stage of communism, was clearly intended to reemphasize the Soviet lead. This was supplemented by an additional doctrinal construct—also intended to place distance between the USSR's advanced position and that of its struggling Chinese competitor—which claimed that in the Soviet Union classes had already disappeared and that consequently the CPSU, founded as the party of one class, the "vanguard of the proletariat," had become the "party of the entire people." Communist China, which continued to maintain the fiction of four classes participating, through a multi-party system, in the government of the "New Democracy" established in 1949, was thus by implication in a less advanced stage of development. The fury of the Chinese reaction to this Soviet ideological claim proved that it had hit home.[9]

The new Chinese argument against the Soviet leadership consisted in denying altogether that the USSR, under Khrushchev, was any longer on the road to communism. Far from leading the advance along that road, the Soviet leaders had strayed from it and become "revisionists" who were leading the USSR down the primrose path back to capitalism. Indeed, the label of "revisionism," which the Chinese first applied to Tito, then implicitly to the Soviets, and now directly and openly to the Khrushchev leadership, became Mao's new chief weapon in his battle with Moscow for ideological leadership of the Communist world. If the Soviets could be counted out, then Mao could claim himself to be the only true leader of Marxism-Leninism for the whole Communist bloc and movement—as indeed he did.[10]

"Revisionism" has, however, been used by Mao and his supporters as a label for condemning all those opposed to his program, whether at home or abroad. The curtailment of his political power at home after 1958 prevented him from continuing to press the radical program of communization which he hoped would justify his claim to supreme leadership of the Marxist-Leninist world movement. If, in Mao's view, his domestic program was related to his claim for world leadership, the question urgently arises as to the connection, if any, between Mao's external and internal opposition, all indiscriminately denounced as "revisionists" by Mao and his followers.

Moscow and the Chinese Opposition

What contact or cooperation has there been between the Soviets and Mao's domestic opposition? That there was some connection at the beginning of the internal and external conflict has already been indicated. Mao's demotion in 1958 and P'eng Teh-huai's attack on Mao in 1959 were, at least in some ways, related to the Soviet opposition to Mao's line. But after Mao had survived P'eng's challenge to his position and continued in party control—though reduced in political power—the other party leaders seem to have closed ranks behind him, at least *vis-à-vis* Moscow. Of those Chinese leaders recently affected by Mao's purge, only a very few are on record as having opposed the conflict with Moscow. Aside from some minor figures, the only important victim of the current purge who can be regarded as having leaned toward Moscow is Lo Jui-ch'ing. (Although Lo became Army Chief of Staff after the purge of 1959 and was therefore presumably loyal to Mao, there are

[8] Ting Wang, *loc. cit.*

[9] See "Ninth Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU, July 14, 1964," in *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1965, pp. 415-17.

[10] See Franz Michael, "Who is Ahead on the Way to Communism?", *Communist Affairs* (Los Angeles), Vol. IV, No. 6 (November-December 1966).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at least some indications that he may later have come to view the conflict with Moscow as prejudicial to the Chinese military.[11]) Mao's principal opponents within the party leadership, Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, on the other hand, are certainly on record as having attacked Soviet "revisionism" as bitterly as Mao himself.[12] If Liu and Teng, on the one hand, and the Soviet leaders, on the other, were on common ground in opposing Mao's utopianism, why has there been no sign of cooperation between them, but rather hostility?

Two explanations seem possible. One is that even if Liu and Teng and their followers were opposed to the recklessness of Mao's domestic policies, their organizational solidarity and patriotism impelled them to support him once he was under fire from Moscow. Khrushchev's highhandedness in dealing with the Chinese may well have helped to solidify the Peking leadership and nullify Soviet efforts to gain the support of Mao's opposition. A willingness to share power rather than to dominate might have served Khrushchev better than his stubborn claim to exclusive world Communist leadership based on the USSR's vaunted head start on the way to communism. If so, it appears all the more significant that, at the 23rd Soviet Party Congress of March 1966, Khrushchev's successors quietly dropped his 1961 doctrinal innovation designed to emphasize the Soviet lead over China in the advance to communism, thereby opening the door to a reconciliation with those Chinese leaders who might be willing to accept a partnership.[13]

Another possible explanation of the absence of any overt rapport between Mao's Chinese opponents and Moscow could be that, if such collusion did exist, it would obviously have been foolhardy and dangerous to let it become known publicly; rather, it would have been all the more necessary for the Chinese oppositionists to pay lip service to the doctrinal attacks against their actual or potential supporters in Moscow. The problem at hand was to keep Mao from rocking the boat at home. An open division within China would endanger not only Mao's opponents but also the very stability of party rule, as indeed it has in the present struggle.

The absence of any known collusion between Mao's chief opponents and Moscow has not, however, deterred Mao's supporters in the current internal struggle from voicing such accusations against the opposition. Recent Red Guard wall posters have accused by name General Yang Shang-k'un, a member of the central party Secretarist; Lu Ting-yi, purged chief of the party's Propaganda Department; P'eng Chen, purged Politburo member and Peking party first secretary; Lo Jui-ch'ing, purged Army Chief of Staff; and finally the son of Liu Shao-ch'i, of having conspired with the Soviet Ambassador in Peking. Yang Shang-k'un was even accused of "placing listening devices behind Chairman Mao's back and handing secret information to the Soviet Ambassador."[14] True or not, this accusation probably reflects Mao's conviction that his battle against "revisionism" both in Moscow and at home is one and the same.

The deterioration of Mao's position in his basically interrelated struggles against Moscow and against the opposition at home was aggravated by the setbacks sustained in recent years by his adventurous policies abroad. While Mao's propagation of Communist revolutionary aggressiveness and of "wars of national liberation" in the Afro-Asian world was no theoretical deviation from the established Communist line as maintained by Moscow, the special emphasis and priority given by him to this theater of operations and his promise of quick results made him highly vulnerable to the reverses which these tactics suffered in India, in Vietnam, in Indonesia, and on the African continent. These reverses weakened Mao's position among the world's Communist parties and helped Moscow to regain the upper hand. They may well have been the decisive factor that moved Mao to stake all his remaining sources of support and the symbolism of his leadership on an attempt to reconquer, against all odds, the power he had lost in China, and from there to reestablish his position in world communism, before it was too late for him.

Mao's Counterattack

After weathering the attack from P'eng Teh-huai and his associates at the Central Committee meeting in the summer of 1959, Mao began his come-

[11] See article by Lo Jui-ch'ing, "Carry the Struggle Against the US Imperialists Through to the End in Memory of the Victory over the German Fascists," in *Hung Ch'i* (Peking), May 10, 1965; also, Lo's statement at the Chinese People's Republic anniversary celebrations on October 1, 1965.

[12] It should be noted, however, that Liu, at a Peking rally on July 22, 1966, in support of the Vietnamese Communists, made a speech in which, unlike all the other speakers, he omitted any attack on Soviet "revisionism." See *Jen-min Jih-pao*, July 22, 1966; *Peking Review*, July 29, 1966, p. 6.

[13] See Franz Michael, *loc. cit.* (footnote 6).

[14] See story in *The Washington Post*, Jan. 20, 1967 (p. 1), citing Reuters and Yugoslav news agency reports.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

back by building up the myth of his ideological leadership. In the years immediately after destalinization, his personal role had been less emphasized in Chinese party pronouncements in line with the general Communist tendency to stress collective leadership. But, by the end of 1959, Mao's personality cult was again on the rise, eventually coming to surpass anything that Stalin, or for that matter Hitler, had practiced at the height of their power. Mao became not only the "greatest Marxist-Leninist theorist of the epoch" but also the prophet in whose writings could be found the answer to all problems. "Mao's thought" was claimed to provide the solution to anything from complicated engineering problems and the quandaries of medical surgeons trying to save lives by difficult operations to the correct strategy for winning ping-pong matches and how to promote the sale of watermelons. More and more, Marxist-Leninist doctrine in China was identified with the

The cartoon reproduced above, depicting a procession of 39 persons who have been either purged or denounced as "revisionists" or "bourgeois reactionaries" since the start of China's Cultural Revolution, appeared in the Peking Red Guard newspaper *Tung Fang Hung* (The East is Red) on February 22, 1967. Copies were reportedly put on sale at Peking post offices and were quickly sold out. The cartoon is titled "Portrait of a Group of Shameful Figures" and carries, across the top, slogans reading "Never Forget the Class Struggle!" and "Mop Up All Ghosts and Demons!" Moving clockwise from the lower right, the most prominent of those pictured are: purged CCP propaganda chief Lu Ting-yi (leading procession); purged Peking party first secretary and Politburo member P'eng Chen (large-faced man seated in cart and holding up scroll, at left); purged army Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing (man with broken leg, being carried in basket); Wang Kuang-mei, wife of Liu Shao-ch'i (wearing Western-style hat and riding bicycle); Military Affairs Committee Vice-Chairman Ho Lung (smoking cigar top center); Chairman of the Republic Liu Shao-ch'i (riding in palanquin); CCP Secretary-General Teng Hsiao-p'ing (man with crew-cut, being carried on litter); and T'ao Chu, who succeeded Lu Ting-yi last year (on horseback, upper right).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

homilies of Mao's sayings. At all the endless discussion meetings of mass organizations, educational institutions, industries, collectives, and the government and party itself, Mao's writings were read, quoted, and memorized.

This personal adulation of Mao as the greatest leader and helmsman, propagated through stories, songs and plays, made Mao into a deity likened to the sun rising in the east. More and more he became surrounded by legends that stressed the superhuman qualities of his person. After he had disappeared from public view for several months and was rumored to be weakened by age and illness, his image was restored through the vastly-publicized performance of a seemingly miraculous physical feat—his alleged swim in the Yangtze River in the summer of 1966. Characteristic of the rhapsodic treatment given this event in the press, *Jen-min Jih-pao* reported that workers, immersing themselves in the river after Mao's swim, found the water "incredibly sweet"—a transformation that must strike anyone familiar with the Yangtze as miraculous indeed! [15]

Why did the opposition in China tolerate and even participate in this cult of worship, which to sophisticated Chinese must have been rather nauseating? The fact is—as the Maoists themselves have acknowledged—that there were many who did not accept the cult and even tried to combat it in subtle and devious ways. In China, political attacks have traditionally been carried out on several levels and through resort to hidden meanings and allusions. Satire, symbolism, and double meanings have been used to express ridicule or opposition which, if stated directly, would not only appear crude but would also be dangerous for the speaker or writer. Careful students of Chinese Communist literature have felt for some time that writings which ostensibly catered to the adulation of Mao were composed with tongue in cheek by authors known for their skill in political satire.[16] Hence, it is not surprising that Mao's current drive to stamp out the opposition began in late 1965 with accusations against the writers and key figures of the Wu Han group,[17] and later was extended to editors of newspapers and propaganda officials—all accused of using or permitting the use of symbolism and allegory in plays and essays to denigrate Chairman Mao's thought. If many of these charges were trumped up, some unquestionably contained a measure of truth.

But the principal political leaders of the opposition—Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and others—played along with the Mao cult, at least on the surface. To indulge Mao's appetite for personal glorification may well have appeared to them a minor concession as long as they could keep practical matters of policy in their own hands.[18] Yet it was precisely this hero cult that Mao used as a major weapon for his reconquest of power. Without it Mao could scarcely have exploited the authority of his "thought" to revive the radical utopian revolution of the "Great Leap," with the added feature of a cultural revolution that was to eliminate all remnants of the past and bring China close to the intellectual climate and institutional setting of the Communist millenium.

Attempt to Reconquer the Party

The name given to this movement was the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." In its essential aspects, it can be traced back at least to the "socialist education" campaign of 1962 (reaffirmed at the National Work Conference of January 1965), but the new designation was formally initiated and introduced only in April 1966.[19] Ch'en Po-ta, Mao's personal secretary and confidant, who since Yenan days had been a ghost-writer of Mao's speeches and essays, emerged as the key figure in this movement, the real purpose of which was to use the cult of Mao as a weapon for the reconquest of the party organization. The "Cultural Revolution Group" of the Central Committee, established in August 1966 under the direction of Ch'en Po-ta and Chiang Ch'ing, Mao's present wife, set about organizing, in each of the party committees from the center down to the provinces, an inner core of loyal Maoists who were to take over controlling authority and

[15] July 26, 1966; also, *Peking Review*, July 29, 1966.

[16] *E.g.*, Vincent Shih, "Satire in Communist Literature," unpublished manuscript scheduled to appear in book form in 1967 or 1968.

[17] Yao Wen-yuan, "On 'Hai Jui's Dismissal,'" *Wen Hui Pao* (Shanghai), Nov. 10, 1965; also, *Peking Review*, No. 18, pp. 5-10. For details of the attacks on Wu Han, Teng T'o, and others, see Harry Gelman, "Mao and the Permanent Purge," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1966.

[18] It may be noted that Liu, though never the object of a personality cult such as that built up around Mao, nevertheless enjoyed a visible share of personal popularity. According to information received from foreign eye-witnesses, cheers for "Chairman Liu" were interspersed with those for "Chairman Mao" at the CPR anniversary celebrations in Peking on Oct. 1, 1965, and eye-witnesses also saw placards for Liu as well as for Mao in a procession at Soochow as late as September 1966.

[19] See *Peking Review*, June 17, 1966, p. 7.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

purge those officials suspected of oppositionist tendencies. The members of these Maoist groups were partly selected from within the committees and partly sent out from headquarters in Peking.

This attempt at a Maoist takeover within the party, based on nothing but Mao's claim to ideological infallibility, did not, however, carry sufficient weight to dislodge the entrenched party opposition. It therefore had to be supplemented by Mao's group with a resort to outside force, namely, the army.

Under the leadership of Lin Piao, the PLA has in recent years become Mao's main support. The 1959 purge of its leaders was far-reaching, encompassing not only P'eng Teh-huai and Huang K'o-cheng but also the Army Inspector-General (Hsiao K'o), the head of the Political Department (Tang Cheng), the head of the rear services department (Huang Hsueh-chih), and over forty other leading military men.[20] Further purges have since taken an additional toll of high-ranking army officers.[21]

Since the early 1960's, the purged army has been held up as an example of revolutionary virtue for the entire nation to emulate. Mao himself proclaimed at a Central Committee meeting in 1962 that the PLA should serve as the model for cultivating the correct spirit of the revolution, and since early 1964 the party press and official statements have repeatedly emphasized that "the whole country must learn from the People's Liberation Army."[22] This campaign was soon followed by concrete steps to extend military control. At the end of 1964 army officers were placed in political departments, in government ministries, in communications, in industries, in the People's Bank, and in educational institutions, for the avowed purpose of spreading the spirit of the PLA. Thus the army gained a strong foothold in crucial departments and agencies, to be used later in the battle for power.

The revolutionary spirit in the army itself was strengthened by the regulations of May 1965, which abolished titles and insignia of rank for officers. In the same year, according to an official announcement, "hundreds of thousands of distinguished recruits and basic-level cadres of the PLA were admitted into the party," and by the end of 1965 one-third of all army personnel were party members.[23] In the army itself, the study of "Mao's thought" and indoctrination against "revisionism" continued to receive high priority. In September-October 1965, young men recently "retired" from the army made their appearance in educational institutions. Of proper small-peasant origin, they enrolled as students, often with doubtful qualifications, and at the same time received minor jobs in the school administrations. These young students of army background later emerged as leaders of the student "work groups" which last summer established Red Guard units in educational institutions throughout the country.[24]

In spite of these careful preparations, the first of the work groups, established on the Peking University campus on May 23, 1966, appears to have been a plant of the opposition and reportedly had to be removed through the personal intervention of Ch'en Po-ta, Chiang Ch'ing, and Chou En-lai. Only after the elimination of this false work group did the proper organizers establish a reliable Maoist student group which, on a signal from Radio Peking on June 2, attacked the president of the university and then went on to assail the Mayor of Peking and head of the Peking party committee, P'eng Chen, the first top-ranking Communist leader to fall victim to Mao's drive.[25]

Before moving on from the initial purges of P'eng Chen, Lu Ting-yi and others to a general offensive to regain mastery of the entire CCP organization, Mao and his supporters seem to have felt that some formal party acceptance of the program of the Cultural Revolution was necessary. For this purpose the Central Committee was called into plenary session from August 1 to 12, 1966, and the events of the meeting provided further proof of the battle within the party. Of the full Central Committee membership, only 80 were present (47 regular members and 33 candidate members), with 101 absent (44 regular and 57 candidate members); and some of those attending seem to have been newly appointed by Mao's group without proper procedure. After eight days of deliberation, the Committee adopted a 16-point resolution outlining the further prosecution of the Cultural Revolution. From the officially published text of the resolution,

[20] For a partial listing of those purged, see *Fei Ch'ing Yen Chiu* (Taipei), July 31, 1966, pp. 32 ff.

[21] Early this year Japanese press correspondents in Peking reported the appearance of wall posters attacking two of Communist China's most distinguished military figures—Marshals Ho Lung and Chu Teh—for having "plotted" against Mao. See *The Evening Star* (Washington, D. C.), Jan. 21, 1967, and *The Washington Post*, Jan. 20, 1967, p. 1.

[22] *E.g.*, *Jen-min Jih-pao* editorial, Feb. 1, 1964; *Jen-min Shou Tse*, pp. 522-47.

[23] NCNA report from Peking, Jan. 1, 1966.

[24] Information furnished the author by foreign educators who recently left Communist China after teaching in Chinese institutions.

[25] Same source as above.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which reveals certain obvious omissions,[26] as well as from reliable information regarding the meeting itself,[27] it seems clear that the proposed program encountered serious opposition.

Enter the Red Guards

But if Mao found it extremely difficult to muster sufficient backing in the Central Committee to pass his resolution, he must have realized that it would be even more difficult to implement it through the use of the existing party machinery, where the opposition was widely entrenched. Hence a broader attack was now unleashed against the party organization itself. The instrument of this assault was the Red Guards, first formed by the student work groups and then organized, provided with uniforms, and directed in their general movements by the army.

Chinese secondary schools and colleges had already been closed down since June 1966, and in August the students were told to join the Red Guards and "make revolution." Aside from the excitement of participating in a "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" that was to destroy all vestiges of the old order and introduce a new era, students from all parts of China were offered the added inducement of a trip to and holiday in Peking at public expense. In a series of rallies staged in Peking's vast Tien An Men square between August and December 1966,[28] the necessary enthusiasm was whipped up among the millions of adolescent revolutionaries who, after their Peking holiday, were to be sent out to overcome the opposition in the regional and local party organizations and spread the Cultural Revolution throughout the land. The logistics of the vast flow of Red Guards to and from Peking, and of the mass demonstrations in Peking itself, were handled by the army.[29]

Throughout the country, however, the movement encountered resistance from the entrenched party bureaucracy. Moreover, the denunciations hurled by the Red Guards against many incumbent party leaders and officials, both national and local, opened the gates to popular expressions of discontent directed against Communist party policy altogether. Control broke down, some collectives were dissolved, communal property was privately distributed, and warehouses were looted. Local party leaders under Red Guard attack sought to regain the support of workers and farmers in their localities by increasing wages and distributing communal funds, and in turn were denounced by the Maoists for committing the sin of "economism." [30]

Once the massive effort to purge the party of opposition elements was forced to a halt, a situation of near anarchy developed. By openly claiming Maoist victories over continued resistance in various parts of China, the news media in fact confirmed the confused and shifting status of the fighting. In December 1966, Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing, already second-in-command of the central group directing the Cultural Revolution, was designated Counselor of the Cultural Revolution Department of the PLA, which was to become more and more the final resort in the struggle for power. Amidst the mounting chaos, Chou En-lai tried on several occasions to counsel moderation in order to avert too great a disruption of the economic functioning of the country, repeatedly warning the Red Guards not to carry the struggle into the factories and the collective farms. These warnings, however, went unheeded, and the support found by the opposition among the factory workers and peasants—originally organized by the very opposition leaders now under Maoist attack—forced Mao's supporters to dissolve the existing Communist trade union organization and attempt to establish their own revolutionary workers' and peasants' organizations. The Cultural Revolution was extended to industry on December 9, and to collective farms on December 15, 1966.

Situation and Outlook

In January and February 1967, Mao's group claimed to have gained the upper hand in Peking, Shanghai, and other major cities.[31] In various places

[26] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Aug. 9, 1966.

[27] Obtained from authoritative official sources in Tokyo.

[28] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Dec. 21, 1966, p. 1. According to the *Peking Review* (Dec. 2, 1966, p. 6), Mao was seen at these rallies by a total of more than 11 million Red Guards.

[29] Of special interest in this connection is a Communist film, shown recently in Hong Kong, depicting the Red Guard rally in Peking on August 18, 1966. The film not only shows the mass hysteria generated by the rally, but also documents the military direction, formation and discipline of the Red Guards as they marched to and from the rally and paraded in review. The film also provides interesting glimpses of the Chinese leaders reviewing the parade from the balcony of the T'ien An Men. Mao appears greatly aged and strongly handicapped, seeming at times to be almost unaware of his surroundings. Besides showing the main speakers—Lin Piao, Ch'en Po-ta and Chou En-lai—the film briefly picks out Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing standing by with expressionless faces.

[30] *E. g.*, see *Peking Review*, Jan. 20, 1967, pp. 12-14, and Jan. 27, 1967, pp. 5-6.

[31] See *ibid.*, Jan. 20, 1967, and *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Jan. 9, 11, 16, and 25, 1967.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

experiments were attempted with new forms of communes and revolutionary councils to supplant the existing party and governmental structure, but in practice the Maoists proved incapable of replacing the experienced party administrators, many of whom continued to function on a day-to-day basis. In some regions, notably in western China, the Maoists lost control, and some of their Red Guard forces came under violent attack, the excesses of the Red Guards calling forth their counterpoint in what Mao's supporters denounced as a "white terror." In January the army was called in to back up Mao's drive, but the response of local army units was not uniformly loyal, military commanders in some areas even going so far as to defy their orders from Peking and intervene on the side of the existing authorities against the Maoists.[32]

By March there were signs of at least a temporary retreat by Mao's faction. Statements attributed to Mao and those around him virtually acknowledged that neither the Red Guards nor 1871 French-style communes (such as that set up at Shanghai) nor revolutionary councils had succeeded in replacing the party-government structure they had set out to destroy.[33] Premier Chou En-lai, while skillfully maintaining his position close to the Maoist group, continued his efforts to restore a working political structure and to prevent the political chaos throughout China from further disrupting the economy. He was the key speaker at meetings held to organize "representative conferences" composed of representatives of workers, peasants, and Red Guards, which were to serve as a provisional replacement for the existing party committees pending the development of new revolutionary committees based on "three-way alliances" combining existing party officials of proven reliability with representatives of the PLA and of the new Maoist revolutionary organizations.[34]

Looking back over the course of events in Communist China since 1958, the present spectacle of madness and chaos appears as the natural climax to Mao's losing battle to impose his brand of radical, utopian communism at home and to assert his claim to world Communist leadership abroad. Having built up his power in China as a trained Communist who knew better than his rivals how to achieve Communist ideological goals in the context of Chinese conditions, Mao eventually became a maverick in his own party and in the world Communist movement. In his last stand, he had to rely on his own sycophantic court clique, on his presumably loyal but politically ambitious followers in the army leadership, and on the excitable young members of the Red Guard, who represent the roughest elements of the adolescent and post-adolescent student youth.[35] Against Mao stood some of the party's most seasoned leaders, men who had been his close associates through decades of revolutionary struggle, and who had sought after the Communist victory of 1949 to keep China on a reasonable course of socialist development but were forced by Mao's own scheming into a position of resistance that finally led to open conflict.

Mao's battle appears, then, as the desperate comeback attempt of an aging and mentally declining man who could not accept the loss of his real political power in China and the defeat of his grandiose ambitions for world Communist leadership. Rather, he would himself lead the attack to tear down the very structure of which he had been the chief architect. Even if his utopian schemes of Communist development at first seemed to produce results, they could scarcely support, in the long run, a working form of government, Communist or any other.

Most logically, Mao's eventual defeat at the hands of the opposition forces within the party would seem likely to lead to "de-Maoization" by the succeeding leadership in an effort to restore China's Communist system to a more normal and rational pattern. This way could very possibly result in China's reconciliation with Moscow and the rest of the Communist fraternity. On the other hand, Mao's attack against the party organization may have opened a fissure for the outpouring of a vast tide of popular discontent which, in conjunction with the fall of the idol, could conceivably turn against communism itself if, as in Hungary, an alternative leadership were to emerge from within. Then the present chaos may well have been but the first act of a larger crisis with far-reaching consequences for the future of China and of the world.

[32] See, *e. g. The Washington Post*, Feb. 1, 1967, citing Peking radio reports claiming a Maoist victory over a dissident army group at the port city of Tsingtao, also reports of an "anti-government army rebellion" in the western Chinese province of Sinkiang, bordering on the Soviet Union. There have also been reports of army resistance to Maoist control in Tibet and Inner Mongolia.

[33] See series of articles by Stanley Karnow, "Cultural Revolution in Perspective," in *The Washington Post*, March 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1967.

[34] See dispatches by David Oancia, Peking correspondent of the Toronto *Globe and Mail*, in *The New York Times*, March 28, 1967, and *The Washington Post*, April 1, 1967.

[35] See *China News Analysis* (Hong Kong), No. 26, Nov. 11, 1966.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Politics in Flux: III

EDITORS' NOTE: Following on the articles about Czechoslovakia and Hungary in our last two issues, we present here a study of a country that thus far has successfully resisted the pressures for political pluralism manifested throughout the rest of Eastern Europe. Heretofore largely ignored by foreign observers—as much because of its size as its retrograde social and economic structure—Albania has now placed itself firmly on the political map with a strident challenge to its onetime Soviet master and a passionate embrace of pristine, revolutionary Marxism-Leninism. Yet even in Albania, as Mr. Logoreci points out, the Communist leadership has been forced to take cognizance of the evolutionary tendencies that are slowly transforming the Communist world. Our series will continue in the next issue with reports on pluralistic developments in Poland and East Germany.

Albania: The Anabaptists of European Communism

By Anton Logoreci

When Khrushchev stopped the flow of economic and technical aid to Albania in 1960-61 and finally broke off diplomatic relations with that country, it was widely believed that Enver Hoxha's Communist regime would not long survive. Although Peking had decided several months earlier to do all it could to help and support the Albanians, China was very far away and in no position to come to Hoxha's immediate rescue. Five years have gone by since Khrushchev's final decree of excommunication, and Hoxha's regime continues to thrive, screaming fierce defiance against all opponents, real and imaginary.

How does one account for this feat of survival? The usual explanation is that the Albanian regime has grimly held on by sheer Stalinist terror. There is of course a good deal of truth in this explanation, yet it is not the whole truth. Another argument is that the Albanian leaders are hardly Marxists at all, but simply old-fashioned nationalists who have been able to appeal to the deepest nationalistic instincts of their own people. Although valid up to

Mr. Logoreci is a British political writer specializing in East European affairs. He has contributed to various British and American publications, including The Times Literary Supplement (*London*) *and* The Guardian (*London*).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a point, this explanation also oversimplifies the situation. The point is that the Albanian leaders have created a world of their own: living in largely self-imposed isolation and ignored by the rest of the world, they have been free to do what they want at home, where their power since 1948 has rarely been in serious question. Curiously, however, the regime has derived much of its internal strength from its international alienation.

The Yugoslav domination of the Albanian Communist Party from 1944 to 1948 was an acute traumatic experience for the Albanian leaders. During this period the Albanian Communists had to hold in check their own personal ambitions as well as their national aspirations. Not only Albania's historic claim to Kossovo-Metohia province in Yugoslavia, which has a large Albanian-speaking population, but also her posture as the champion of this minority had to be modified to conform to the political realities of the moment. Relations between the Albanian and Yugoslav Communist parties were further aggravated by a number of personal factors, chiefly the Yugoslavs' distrust of Enver Hoxha. The Yugoslavs were never quite sure where they stood with him and suspected him of intriguing with the Russians behind their backs.[1] When the final break between Moscow and Belgrade came in 1948, these personal, political and national resentments broke loose, providing the motive power for Tirana's virulent anti-Yugoslav campaign, which has continued, except for occasional short intervals, to the present day. A good deal of this bitter, self-righteous propaganda was meant for home consumption. It was designed to persuade the Albanian people, first, that Hoxha and his associates had saved the country from permanent Yugoslav domination; and secondly, that they were the only staunch defenders of the political and human rights of the Albanian-speaking population of Yugoslavia.

With the removal of Yugoslav tutelage, the Albanian Communists asserted their identity as leaders in their own country and hastened to establish direct links of allegiance with Moscow. One of the first things they did to dramatize their freedom was to purge not only those party members who had supported Yugoslav policy but also many potential supporters of Tito. The chief victim of these purges was Koci Xoxe, the former head of the secret police. Another aspect of Tirana's new independent policy was the forceful rejection of the Greek claim to Northern Epirus. The Albanians had always opposed this claim vigorously, and after the break with Belgrade this policy sharpened the regime's ultra-nationalist propaganda.

The Quarrel with Moscow

During Stalin's life-time the Albanian leaders did his bidding with enthusiasm not merely because they had to, but also because the Soviet dictator's policies and methods of rule were in harmony with their own personal interests as well as with their view of Albania's national interests. This state of relative equilibrium was gravely disturbed when, after Stalin's death, Khrushchev sought to mend relations with Yugoslavia and urged the Albanians to fall into line with this new policy. Among other things, Tirana was expected to cease its anti-Yugoslav propaganda, to rehabilitate the leading pro-Yugoslav Communists who had been purged since 1948, and to establish reasonably friendly relations with Belgrade. Hoxha made a number of half hearted attempts to comply with some of these demands, but he refused to restore the good name of Koci Xoxe, whom he considered to have been justly sentenced to death as a traitor to his country and to the party.

The fact is that the Albanian leaders were utterly opposed to Khrushchev's policy because it clearly undermined and contradicted their own position. The Soviet leader made a final attempt to persuade them to alter their attitude when he visited Albania in May 1959. We know from subsequent events that he failed. In addition to his demand that the Albanians should improve their relations with Yugoslavia, Khrushchev wanted them to abandon the persecution of pro-Soviet elements,[2] and to pay more attention to agriculture than to industrial development.[3] Over the next two years the Albanians' refusal to accommodate Moscow led to a growing coolness between the two capitals. It became clear the USSR would rather sacrifice Albania than lose the chance to heal the breach with Tito.

By the end of 1961, Hoxha knew that he could no longer count on the Kremlin for economic,

[1] See V. Dedijer, *Tito Speaks*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1953, p. 313.

[2] See Khrushchev's speech to the 22nd Party Congress, Oct. 27, 1961, in *Pravda*, Oct. 29, 1961.

[3] For a recent statement on Khrushchev's views of Albanian industrial and agricultural development, see Hoxha's speech to the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Workers' Party, *Zeri i Popullit*, Nov. 2, 1966.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

technical and military aid. As he himself declared a few months ago, this period was the most difficult that the party had to endure since the war of national liberation.[4] Totally isolated from both its former friends and its enemies (its only ally, after all, was thousands of miles away in the Far East), the leadership was suddenly confronted with a twofold task of immense magnitude: 1) to restore the self-confidence and militancy of the party rank and file; and 2) to build a bridge between the party and the population at large.

The problem of party morale was both more important and more complex, for it involved recasting the hitherto accepted image of the Soviet Union as the unquestioned leader of the Communist world and the fountainhead of theoretical and practical wisdom into that of an enemy of an Albanian regime that boasted its faithfulness to the pristine ideals of Marxism-Leninism. How could this sudden transformation be explained? What was particularly embarrassing to Hoxha and his associates was the fact that the Soviet Union could certainly not be portrayed in traditional hostile terms—that is, as just one other rapacious capitalist bully. The only solution, then, was to denounce Khrushchev and his associates as corruptors and defilers of communism. Accordingly, a violent attack on the Soviet leaders was unleashed. At the same time, Hoxha went out of his way to reaffirm his party's ideological purity and historical glory. This was done principally by emphasizing the nebulous left-wing ideas of primitive communism and the fierce peasant radicalism which had essentially characterized the Albanian party since its foundings. Fusing these notions with a blatantly nationalistic appeal to the population at large—*e.g.*, resurrecting the name of long-forgotten Albanian heros, evoking the memory of past national grievances and frustrations, and acclaiming old victories and successes—Hoxha produced the crude, blunt, insolent, turgid and apocalyptic language of the diatribes which the Albanian Communists have hurled at the Soviet leaders and other "revisionists" ever since.

A Modern Reformation

For a historical parallel to the social and ideological circumstances which gave rise to such an uneven conflict, one would have to go back to 16th-century Europe, when the Reformation spawned a number of radical sects, known under the collective name of Anabaptists, which became in time its radical "left wing." One of the most curious figures in this movement, though he was not in fact a member of any of its many sects, was Thomas Müntzer, who began his career as a devoted follower of Luther but later became one of his bitterest enemies. Müntzer has been described as "a *propheta* obsessed by eschatological phantasies which he attempted to translate into reality by exploiting social discontent" [5]—the social discontent of the peasantry of Germany and Central Europe, which finally erupted in the Peasants' War of 1525. Müntzer believed that Luther had betrayed the ideals of the Reformation, just as Hoxha accuses Khrushchev (and Tito) of having betrayed the ideals of communism. The German, convinced that he was one of the elect charged with the divine mission of bringing about the Millennium, preached hatred and violence against all those who impeded the triumph of the "true" Christian faith. In the same manner the Albanian leader preaches hatred and violence against all "revisionists," whose ideas and power threaten the very existence of his regime. The tone and virulence of both men is oddly similar.

Lest it be thought that the analogy is rather farfetched, let me cite just one example. In one of his addresses, Müntzer accused Luther of claiming that poor people had their own faith and should be content with it:

Doesn't he [Luther] see that usury and taxes impede the reception of the faith? He claims that the Word of God is sufficient. Doesn't he realize that men whose every moment is consumed in the making of a living have no time to learn to read the Word of God? The princes bleed the people with usury and count as their own the fish in the stream, the birds in the air, and the grass of the field, and Dr. Liar says, "Amen!" What courage has he, Dr. Pussyfoot, the new pope of Wittenberg, Dr. Easychair, the basking sycophant? He says there should be no rebellion because the sword has been committed by God to the ruler, but the power of the sword belongs to the whole community.[6]

And here is Hoxha in one of his numerous outbursts against the man who embodies what he fears and despises most:

After Stalin's death, the pseudo-revolutionaries of the Soviet Communist party, led by N. Khrushchev, began organizing themselves and plotting to assume power.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] N. Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, London, Mercury Books, 1962, p. 271.

[6] R. H. Bainton, *Here I Stand, A Life of Martin Luther*, London, Mentor Books, pp. 215-16.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lacking in forethought and revolutionary power of decision, the Soviet Marxist-Leninists were soon caught in a web of intrigues spun by such revisionists and renegades as Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Brezhnev, etc., who were thus able to carry out their counterrevolutionary putsch. The leaders of the party behaved like apathetic and frightened men when they faced the rising tide of revisionism. Having no real faith in the party or the masses, they were carried away by a series of bargains, compromises and illusions . . . until they finally surrendered to . . . N. Khrushchev, the greatest counterrevolutionary charlatan and clown the world has ever known.[7]

Hoxha has made the Albanian Communist Party into a militant anabaptist faction of the world Communist movement. The party thus reflects his own political and ideological frustrations, as well as the national, social and economic frustrations of the people whom he rules. Had he relied on purely Stalinist methods alone to maintain his position, he would have risked a dangerous explosion sooner or later. The survival of his regime has depended on the employment of a potent mixture of Communist anabaptism, nationalism, and Stalinist ruthlessness.

The Chinese Phase

If the Chinese leaders in the early 1960's ever hoped that Albania would become a convenient base from which to spread their influence in Eastern and Central Europe, they have obviously been disappointed. The only country which appeared at one time to be at all receptive to Chinese blandishments was Rumania, but it became evident within a short time that the Rumanians were only playing their own game. Still, China's extension of technical, economic and other aid to Albania and her commitment to support the regime in Tirana have produced some rewards from the Chinese point of view.

For example, in the early stages of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Peking was able to attack Soviet policies via Tirana, for the Albanian leaders were expressing themselves more forthrightly and offensively than the Chinese were prepared to do at the time. More important, Albanian representatives to many international Communist conferences all over the world have supported Chinese policies during the past six years, often attacking Russia and her allies with jack-in-the-box alacrity. The Albanians have also rendered China faithful service at the United Nations. In addition to becoming her spokesmen on every possible occasion, they (together with Cambodia) have raised the question of Chinese representation at every autumn session of the General Assembly since 1963. Another service that is often underestimated and largely unnoticed is the publication of Albanian anti-Soviet newspaper articles and speeches in China. Peking uses this propaganda on its own people—there are many Chinese who have no accurate idea of the size, resources and strength of their country's sole ally in Europe—to persuade them that another Communist power besides China has wisely renounced the false Communist doctrines of the Soviet Union. Tirana's vehement black-and-white propaganda may even have a similar impact on other parts of Asia under Peking's influence.

The amount of economic and technical aid that China has given to Albania is something of a mystery. The only concrete information provided so far was contained in a Chinese official announcement, issued in Febuary 1961, to the effect that China had granted Albania a loan of 125 million dollars. The loan, originally supplied to make up for the withdrawal of Soviet aid during the third five-year plan (1961-65), was to be used for building 25 chemical, electrical and metallurgical plants. But it seems that Chinese economic assistance either was not prompt enough, or was used for unproductive purposes. Albanian Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu has recently admitted that construction on a number of these industrial enterprises has been delayed by nearly three years.[8]

Over the past several years Peking and Tirana have held a series of talks on the financing of Albania's fourth five-year plan (1966-70). The most important of these took place in April 1965 when Spiro Koleka, then Deputy Prime Minister and now Chairman of the Albanian Planning Commission, went to China at the head of a large delegation. A communiqué issued at the end of the talks indicated that China had agreed to provide all the economic aid Albania required, but no details or figures were published.

However, from the statements made by Hoxha and Shehu at the party congress in November 1966, it became obvious that the Chinese did not offer any large-scale aid that would effectively make up for what the Soviets had withdrawn. The Albanian

[7] *Zeri i Popullit*, Nov. 2, 1966.

[8] *Ibid.*, Nov. 6, 1966.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leaders stressed that industrial and economic development would have to depend largely on the country's own efforts and resources. The new five-year plan envisages a higher rate of growth in agriculture than in industry, with priority given to grain and potato production. Shehu was also quite explicit on the question of foreign aid, claiming that this had been a factor of secondary importance when the leadership had drawn up the plans for "building socialism." After thanking the Chinese for their "brotherly and internationalist aid," he went on to assure Peking that "this would be used with revolutionary care for the purpose of strengthening the material and technical bases of socialism, to develop our productive capacity and increase the prosperity of socialist Albania." This passage seems to imply that there had been some hard bargaining between the Chinese and the Albanians on the scale of economic aid and on the use to which it should be put.

One might deduce from all this, as well as from certain recent developments within Albania, that even if the Chinese had been able to be lavish with their gifts, they would have opted for restraint. The Chinese leaders believe (and they appear to have induced the Albanian Communists to believe) that rapid economic progress without proper ideological control would breed the kind of revisionist and bourgeois ideas which, in their view, are now rampant in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and the other countries of Eastern Europe. Should such developments ever take place in Albania, Peking may have reasoned, Albania would eventually veer again towards Moscow.

Such an argument, if indeed the Chinese ever presented it, would appeal to Hoxha and his associates on two grounds. First, they are faced with the perennial problem of preventing any dangerous weakening of the foundations of their regime. Secondly the policy of relying more and more on the country's own efforts and resources allows them to claim, at least internally, that they are not anyone's satellites, and that the kind of overlordship that Khrushchev and Tito had exercised over Albania can never return.

Peking's Long Shadow

The Albanian leaders, in fact, began a serious control-tightening operation several years ago. Although the inspiration was probably Chinese, the party took great pains to show that the inspiration came from Lenin's works, and to a lesser extent from Stalin's. For example, a report on literature and the arts submitted by Ramiz Alia, who is in charge of ideological affairs, to the October 1965 plenary meeting of the Politburo [9]

[9] *Ibid.*, Oct. 26, 1965.

PRESENT-DAY REVISIONISTS

For a long time now the clique of Khrushchevite revisionists has set as one of its chief goals liquidating the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . [in order] to transform the USSR into a bourgeois-type state. The social basis for this change is the new aristocracy which has been born and developed like a poisonous mushroom throughout the body of Soviet society. . . .

As soon as he arrived in power, Khrushchev made people like Sholokhov and Ehrenburg his "personal" friends. He stroked the long hair of hooligans like Yevtushenko and put them on a pedestal. And among them there were some who put all their "talent" to work in order to soil the Soviet Union and the heroic past of the Soviet people. These revisionist flunkies spend all their money buying abstract paintings, antique furniture, and porcelain objects, and on a life of debauchery.

—Zeri i Popullit *(Tirana), March 8, 1967.*

Through the so-called "new economic reform" presently being implemented in the Soviet Union, Khrushchevite revisionism is trying to give a free hand to capitalist tendencies in the Soviet economy in order to advance more rapidly toward the restoration of capitalism. The substance of this "reform" is masked by frantic demagogy about the "well-being of the workers," by insults and curses . . ., by underestimating the scientific data and the "subjectivism" of their predecessor and teacher, that clown, Khrushchev, in whose tracks they are rapidly following. In place of the "great chemistry" and the numerous "reorganizations" of their predecessor, the present revisionists, who have usurped the leadership of the Soviet party and state, have proclaimed that the "new reform" and the material stimulation will save Soviet society from all the evils that are gnawing away at it.

—Zeri i Popullit *(Tirana), March 11, 1967.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was one of the most comprehensive and thoroughly repressive documents ever to appear in a Communist country. What Alia's report seemed to imply was that unless certain drastic measures were taken in the fields of education and the arts, revisionist and liberal ideas might take root in Albania as they had done elsewhere, placing the existence of the regime itself in danger.

In early February 1966, 12 Communist leaders (five of them members of the Politburo) were sent to different parts of the country, in order to supervise party and government ideological, political and economic activities.[10] In March the Central Committee addressed an open letter to the people in which it announced that steps would be taken: 1) to eliminate some of the evils of bureaucracy; 2) to revise and simplify certain laws and regulations in consultation with the people; 3) to place local government executive committees under the direct control of their respective elected people's councils; 4) to do away with nepotism and arrogant methods of ordering people about.[11]

At the party congress in November, Hoxha reported on the implementation of some of these measures: The reorganization of the party and state bureaucracy, he said, had resulted in the transfer of 15,000 people from administrative to productive work. The salaries of high party and state officials had been trimmed down (no figures were given) to bring them in line with the workers' average wages. Party cadres, government officials, intellectuals, students and schoolchildren in large numbers had been sent to work on farms and in factories. Finally, Hoxha announced that the decision (published in March 1966) to abolish all ranks in the army and to set party committees in all its units had been carried out. The main object of these measures, he emphasized, was "to pull out by the roots all plants which could bear revisionist or capitalist fruit." [12]

There has also been some direct evidence that certain cautious and controlled reforms in economic planning and organization have been set in motion. This is a sphere in which the Albanian leadership is obliged to move with extreme caution, lest it be accused of carrying out the very revisionist reforms which it attacks so fiercely in its propaganda. In December 1965 and during the early months of the following year, the Albanian press made a number of suggestions for better economic planning, more efficient administration, and less centralization. These suggestions were made by economists and technical experts. Within a short time (in March 1966), Spiro Koleka, one of the country's leading technical experts and planners, was appointed Chairman of the Planning Commission. It is not quite clear whether he was given this job in order to block the new economic ideas altogether, or to try them out under strict party guidance and control. In view of the efforts that have been made to render the country's bureaucracy generally more efficient, the second surmise seems more plausible.

The problem of keeping the country's cultural development under control is certainly one of the most serious and complex which the party now faces. Powerful and sometimes opposing forces press hard on the regime from all sides. As elsewhere, the educated members of the postwar generation have become impatient with their elders, whose ideas they reject; they demand greater freedom in their personal lives, as well as a faster rate of economic development. Hoxha recently described these aspirations from the party's standpoint as follows:

Bourgeois and revisionist influences are affecting our young people in several, often indirect and subtle, ways: through books, films, fashions, etc. Under these conditions, young people, particularly those attending schools and universities, may develop bourgeois illusions; a desire to lead a soft life; intellectualist tendencies, and a kind of detachment from the great mass of the ordinary people and their troubles. All this could lead to excessive demands on the community, to conceit, and to a lack of respect for the revolutionary experience of the older generation.[13]

Chinese pressure in this area, obviously of a very different nature, has been hardly less troublesome. During the summer months of 1966, China's "Cultural Revolution" was mentioned only occasionally and perfunctorily in the Albanian press. No attempt was made to explain that this campaign was being carried out by the Red Guards. More or less the same studied vagueness was maintained during the Fifth Party Congress. When in November and December an Albanian delegation visited Peking and a number of other Chinese cities and towns and was greeted by thousands of Red Guards, the Al-

[10] *Ibid.*, Feb. 11, 1966.
[11] *Ibid.*, March 4, 1966.
[12] *Ibid.*, Nov. 2, 1966.
[13] *Ibid.*, Nov. 2, 1966.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

banian press mentioned the Red Guards for the first time but gave only the barest account of their activities.

The Albanian leaders' reluctance to grapple with these highly complex and mysterious developments in China was understandable. They must have been as puzzled by them as most other observers. But the Albanians had an additional good reason to be circumspect: fear that the future of their own regime could one day be decided by the outcome of the political struggle that lay behind the cultural revolution.

The Albanians, however, were not permitted to speculate very long on the outcome. In January of this year the Chinese invited Beqir Balluku, the Albanian Minister of Defense,[14] Hysni Kapo, member of the Politburo, and Behar Shtylla, Central Committee member, to Peking.[15] Drawn into the vortex of the great upheaval of China, they visited several cities and provinces of the country, and took part in numerous meetings of the Red Guards as well as in other events of the "cultural revolution."

During their travels in China, the Albanian visitors dutifully produced all the praise expected of them in support of Mao Tse-tung and his campaign of political and ideological agitation. The Albanian statements were duly reported by the official Chinese news agency, by the Chinese national and provincial press, as well as by the home and external broadcasts of the radio networks of Peking. The service thus rendered by the Albanian Communists to the "cultural revolution" is not a mean one, especially when one remembers that they are the only foreign Communists who have said anything remotely quotable in its favor. During one month's frenetic stay in China the Albanian delegates were also received by Mao and photographed with him.[16] But whether they themselves were able to learn anything worthwhile about the real significance of the Chinese turmoil is another matter.

Finally, there are the less mysterious forces of cultural and political change, coming from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and particularly Yugoslavia—forces which have been knocking on Albania's closed doors for a number of years. The Albanian regime has, up to now, been able to resist most of the demands for change and reform. Its leaders appear to have taken to heart the lesson embodied in Alexis de Tocqueville's celebrated judgment on the conditions that existed in France a few years before the outbreak of the Revolution of 1789:

For it is not always when things are going from bad to worse that revolutions break out. On the contrary, it more often happens that when a people which has put up with an oppressive rule over a long period without protest suddenly finds the government relaxing its pressure, it takes up arms against it. Thus the social order overthrown by a revolution is almost always better than the one immediately preceding it, and experience teaches us that, generally speaking, the most perilous moment for a bad government is one when it seeks to mend its ways.[17]

[14] New China News Agency, Jan. 10, 1967.
[15] New China News Agency, Jan. 13, 1967.
[16] New China News Agency, Feb. 3, 1967.
[17] A. de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (transl. by S. Golbert), New York, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1955, pp. 176-77.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Economic Reform: A Tentative Appraisal

By Theodore Frankel

EDITORS' NOTE: We present below the first of two articles assessing the results of the Soviet industrial reforms, which, after a three-year period of debate and hesitant experimentation, were formally inaugurated by Premier Kosygin at the September 1965 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Mr. Frankel confines himself to a detailed examination of how the reforms were first implemented in 43 industrial enterprises. In the next issue, Mr. Keith Bush will trace the further course of the reform program (by now extended to over 2,000 enterprises), weighing its impact on the Soviet economy at large.

The Soviet Union is currently winding up the first stage of a major reform of its industrial economy. When the reform was originally announced, it seemed to many a potential turning point in Soviet economic history—one that could well effect a revolutionary change from the Stalinist model of planning and operating the economy by administrative fiat to a system in which the national planners would exert indirect guidance through influencing the incentives of managers and labor. Sufficient time has now elapsed to offer a preliminary evaluation of how the reform has fared.

The reform program was first outlined by Premier Kosygin at a plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee on September 27, 1965, in the form of "proposals" advocating a number of changes in the planning and operation of Soviet industry.[1] In early October these proposals were partially implemented with the abolition of the Economic Councils (*Sovnarkhozi*) that had directed Soviet industry since 1957, and the transfer of their responsibilities to newly created industrial ministries.[2] Later in the same month a "Statute on the Socialist State Production Enterprise" (henceforth referred to as

Mr. Frankel's essays on cultural and economic developments in the USSR have appeared in, among others, Commentary *(New York) and* Yale Review *(New Haven, Conn.).* *The author wishes to acknowledge the counsel offered by Dr. John P. Hardt.*

[1] See *Pravda*, Sept. 28, 1965.

[2] "Law of the USSR on Changing the System of Agencies for the Management of Industry and Transforming Certain Other Agencies of State Management," *Izvestia*, Oct. 3, 1965.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Statute) was promulgated which considerably changed the ground rules for the operation of Soviet enterprises.[3] In February 1966, extensive methodological instructions were issued on what by then was universally called "the new system of planning and economic incentives." [4]

In January 1966, out of the Soviet Union's approximately 45,000 industrial enterprises, a pilot group of 43 enterprises from 17 industries, with a total of 300,000 employees, was placed under the new system (22 were machine-building plants, 5 were in ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, 3 in chemical and petrochemical production, 6 in light industry, 4 in the food industry, and 3 produced building materials.) [5] It is the experience of these 43 enterprises during the first quarter of 1966 that will be examined in this paper. Additional enterprises were transferred to the new system in April and July 1966, and by the end of the year 673 enterprises with 2,000,000 employees were participating.[6] Originally all of Soviet industry was slated to be changed over by the beginning of 1968, but as we shall see, this target date has been postponed.

It might be useful at this point to take a look at the conditions which prompted the reform. In broadest terms, it has been clear for some time that Soviet industry is in the grip of profound economic malaise, the most visible symptoms of which have been a downturn in Soviet economic growth rates and an accumulation of unsold inventories. The tempo of economic growth, according to Soviet figures, declined from an average of 8.2 percent for 1956-60 to 6 percent for 1961-65.[7] Official US sources estimate that the average annual growth rate of the Soviet Gross National Product fell from 6 to 4 percent in these two periods, with industrial growth dropping from 8 to 6 percent and agricultural growth from 3.5 to a measly 2 percent.[8]

There has also been a marked decline in the return from Soviet investment and in the productivity of labor. A comparative study shows that whereas "prior to 1958 the USSR was enjoying, along with West Germany, the highest return on investment [of all industrial nations], since 1958 the return has been the lowest except for the United Kingdom"; in all, returns on Soviet investment dropped by almost 50 percent.[9] Average growth of labor productivity fell, according to a Soviet source, from 8.2 percent in 1951-55 to 4.6 percent in 1961-64.[10]

At the same time, an enormous loss has accrued to the Soviet system as a result of the underutilization of capital and labor resources. This loss has been endemic for years and has provoked extensive campaigning under the slogan, "utilizing enterprise reserves"; the cause of the waste is to be found primarily in the incentive structure of Soviet industry—on which more presently. Suffice it to say at this point that to the Soviets this is perhaps the most vexing and immediate of their problems.

It seems paradoxical in light of the decelerating growth rates that the Soviets also suffer from unsold inventories, most visibly in the consumer goods field but also in producers' goods. Soviet sources have revealed that "in recent years above-norm balances of commodities and physical assets almost doubled and that the total volume amounted to about 2 billion rubles"; in light industry alone, the 1965 plan and budget valued unsold surplus in warehouses and stores at 1.3 billion rubles.[11] The reason is not difficult to fathom. Under Stalinist conditions of scarcity, the assortment and quality of consumer goods were of no concern to planners and producers; however, once a number of irreducible consumer demands were met in the course of the post-Stalin relaxation, consumer preferences began to have an effect on sales—though not on planning and production. In turn, the neglect of consumer demand has adversely affected the incentives of the labor force, thus contributing to the waste of capital and labor and to the fall in labor productivity.

The deeper causes of Soviet economic difficulties constitute an issue that has, of course, long agitated economists on both sides of the Soviet

[3] Text of The Statute appears in *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 42, Oct. 1965.
[4] See *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, Nos. 6 and 7, February 1966.
[5] "The Economic Reform in Action: Enterprises Work Under New Conditions," *Dengi i Kredit*, September 1966.
[6] M. Zotov, "The New System in Action," *Dengi i Kredit*, September 1966.
[7] N. K. Baibakov, cited in *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966, Part I, p. IX.
[8] Cited in R. V. Greenslade, "The Soviet Economic System in Transition," *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, *supra*, Part I, p. 4.
[9] Stanley H. Cohn, "Soviet Growth Retardation: Trends in Resource Availability and Efficiency," *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, *supra*, Part IIA, pp. 119-120.
[10] S. Kheinman, "Tempos and Effectiveness of Industrial Production," *Kommunist*, No. 16, 1965.
[11] V. E. Dymshits, "Production, Plan, Supplies," *Pravda*, Dec. 1965, and Ye. I. Kapustin, "A New System of Material Incentives at Light Industry Enterprises," *Vestnik Moskovo Universiteta*, January-February 1966.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

border.[12] In this paper we must restrict ourselves to discussion of those causes which found official recognition in the formulation of "the new system of planning and economic incentives": the shortcomings of central planning and the disfunctionalities of the incentives system.

The prime fault of the central planning system, from the Soviet point of view, is that it fosters a discrepancy between the goals of the central planners and those of individual enterprise managers.[13] The latter are quite properly interested in earning the largest possible bonus for themselves, while the former are interested in a whole range of national objectives, including economizing on scarce resources and, lately, satisfying consumers' preferences.

In their attempt to integrate these two different sets of objectives, the central planners had recourse to two kinds of "stimulation." One was to issue a plethora of detailed, administrative directives over every aspect of enterprise operations, bolstered by direct resource allocations; this turned out to be self-defeating since the very multitude of directives made it certain that a good many of them could not be fulfilled and could therefore be disregarded with relative impunity. The other was a system of incentives which tied the manager's bonus primarily to the size of production—with the result that the manager disregarded, as much as he dared, all directives and factors (including cost considerations) which stood in the way of overfulfilling the production target. Here is where the old incentive system bred its waste; in the single-minded pursuit of their personal bonuses, managers employed excess labor, padded input requests, asked for production targets below their real capacity (overproduction of targets yielded higher bonuses), lowered production quality, hoarded machinery and raw materials, faked production reports, and engaged in other wasteful practices. It is to be noted that workers' incentives were doubly neglected under this scheme: not only were their on-the-job bonuses quite small, but the inadequate quality and assortment of consumer goods on the market offered little inducement to increase their productivity and earnings.

The reform set out to remedy these problems in a very practical manner. The major cause of friction between central planners and enterprise managers was to be diminished by reducing—but not abolishing—direct administrative interference from the top. The number of plan targets assigned to each plant was to be reduced from some 30 to eight, and managers were to be given additional authority in the operation of their plants.

The job of integrating the priorities of central planners and enterprise managers was to be accomplished by a radical change in the incentive system. Basically, it consisted of a shift from the link-up between incentives and production to a link-up between incentives, sales, and profits. Henceforth the manager's bonus would depend not on the volume of his production but on how much of it he could sell and how much profit he could show. Incentives for workers would be restructured both by improving bonuses on the job and by making the production of consumer goods more responsive to market demand. Hopefully, the effort to increase profits would keep operational costs down and reduce the waste of labor and capital, while the effort to increase sales would remedy the neglect of consumer preferences. Applied on a large scale, the reform was expected to reverse the falling rates of labor productivity and return on capital, and thus to pull the economy out of the doldrums. The personal objectives of the managers would at last be harnessed to the national objectives of the central planners—or in words often repeated by Liberman: "What is advantageous for society must become advantageous for every enterprise and for each of its workers." [14]

This was the theory. How well has it worked in practice?

Managerial Autonomy

The enhancement of managerial authority—part one of the reform's two-pronged attack—was intended to affect a variety of plant operations:

1) *Product assortment.* Both Kosygin's proposals and the Statute provided for considerable enlargement of the managers' power to determine product assortment. Kosygin proposed not only a drastic

[12] For a discussion of Soviet views, see J. P. Hardt, D. M. Gallik, and V. G. Treml, "Institutional Stagnation and Changing Economic Strategy in the Soviet Union," *New Directions in the Soviet Economy, supra,* Part I, pp. 19-62.

[13] The *locus classicus* is still J. Berliner, *Factory and Management in the USSR*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957.

[14] *Cf.* Ye. Liberman, "The Plan, Direct Ties and Profitability," *Pravda,* Nov. 21, 1965, and "The Plan, Profits and Bonuses," *ibid,* Sept. 9, 1962.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reduction in the number of targets assigned to each plant, but also the elimination of the index for gross value of production, the chief cause of waste in the old system, and its replacement by two rather broad indexes—the volume of sales and a list of the main categories of production (*nomenklatura*). The Statute went even further: enterprises were given the responsibility for preparing their own quarterly and monthly production plans (covering technical, industrial, and financial activity), and for initiating annual and long-range plans in conformity with central norms; enterprises were also to act independently in setting quantitative and qualitative plan indices for their own production and administrative units. Plan assignments approved by the enterprises were to be reviewed by superior agencies only in exceptional cases.

How rigorously have these measures been implemented in the pilot group? The number of indexes has indeed been reduced, and the new indexes are less detailed than the old ones. It seems too early to judge how enterprises have fared in the formulation of their short-term plans, but it might be noted that in at least one case a ministry felt it necessary to change a factory's plans for assortment.[15]

In general, it seems doubtful that the managers of the 43 enterprises are enjoying anything like the full extent of the new rights promised them. In the first place, they went into the reform with their 1966 plans still binding and with contracts arranged by the Economic Councils still controlling output.[16]

Secondly, both the main list of production categories and the index for the volume of sales constitute firm, if elastic, limits upon the producers' freedom of decision.

Thirdly, there has been from the beginning considerable opposition on the part of ministries and supervisory agencies to the full exercise of managerial authority. The worst offenders are the financial agencies, which on occasion have demanded reports on the abolished index for gross value of production and have attempted to fine enterprises for failure to report.[17]

Fourthly, there is considerable hesitation on the part of management personnel to accept the new order. Writes one director:

The personnel think that the index for gross value of production has not really been abolished but rather that an additional index has been decreed in the shape of the index for volume sold. It is necessary to get rid of the psychology of "produce, produce."[18]

Fifthly, a rigid supply system—now more than ever removed from the influence of the enterprise managers since it has come under the domain of the powerful State Committee for Technical and Material Supplies—leaves managers relatively little room for maneuver regarding inputs and disposal of outputs.

[15] V. Nikitin, "Is this Plan Well-Founded?," *Pravda* Sept. 20, 1966.

[16] "The Results of the Work of 43 Enterprises: Facts and Figures," *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 19, May 1966.
[17] Editorial in *Pravda*, May 16, 1966.
[18] V. Firsov, "Innovation," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, Feb. 1, 1966.



FITTING COMMENT

Director: "And this is what we produce in our factory!

—From *Krokodil* (Moscow), No. 11, 1966.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A final obstacle is the inflexibility of centrally-administered prices. A graphic illustration is the case of the S. M. Kirov Turbine Plant, which in the first quarter of 1966 fulfilled its sales plan by 117.7 percent but its profits plan by only 109.1 percent. This discrepancy arose from the fact that the quality of the turbines had been improved and that costs had gone up concurrently—but the factory could not recoup its inputs because the ministry did not permit an increase in prices. What was, in effect, a change in product assortment penalized the producer via lower profits and lower bonuses.[19]

2) *"Direct links" between enterprises.* Contractual relations between producing and purchasing enterprises—established directly rather than through the ministries—have long been demanded by liberal Soviet economists, on the grounds that such relations would adjust production to demand and also enhance managerial authority. But while direct ties were established in fairly widespread experiments both in trading and in the consumer goods industries, they are not clearly a part of the current reform. Kosygin's proposals were notably indefinite about establishing direct contractual ties "in the future," and the Statute qualified its endorsement of direct ties by a clause which "permitted changes in the existing contractual relations in necessary cases, with observance of the procedures established in existing legislation."

By contrast, Kosygin proposed in very unambiguous terms the establishment of Chief Directorates of Supply and Marketing (Glavsnabsbyty) and of the aforementioned State Committee for Technical and Material Supplies. These bodies were duly set up, and they seem to exercise considerable influence over wholesale trading. V. Dymshits, the director of the State Committee, has listed among its functions: establishing long-term links between suppliers and consumers; executing material and equipment plans by ministries, departments and enterprises. According to Dymshits, the Glavsnabsbyty play an important role in creating contractual relations among consumer enterprises, suppliers, and sales organizations in matters of volume, product lists, dates and conditions of delivery.[20] Under these circumstances it is difficult to visualize much free exercise of managerial authority in wholesale trade.

3) *Disposition of Capital.* Both Kosygin's proposals and the Statute stipulated considerable expansion of managers' control over capital. Kosygin proposed giving enterprises more of a say in the disposition of turnover funds, depreciation deductions, and returns from the sale of unnecessary equipment. The Statute stipulated that wornout equipment could be written off, up to certain amounts; work could be subcontracted; buildings and fixed equipment might be transferred to other enterprises; surplus equipment could be sold to other organizations; and the like.

Overall, the experience of the 43 enterprises in this matter seems to have been unsatisfactory. According to one source, the amount of depreciation deductions left at the free disposal of the enterprises amounted to less than one-half of the combined goal for all enterprises in the first quarter; and one-quarter of the 43 enterprises did not utilize depreciation funds at all because they were not compensated by the ministries.[21]

While the same source claimed that proceeds from the sale of leftover or extra property did meet the plan goals for the quarter, there are more specific indications that in a number of situations managers were severely restricted. At the Kirov Turbine Plant, only 400 out of 700 thousand rubles worth of unused supplies and equipment could be sold because of opposition from the ministry.[22] The Izensk Diatom Combine was not permitted to write off obsolete equipment, and the A. N. Kuzmin Dneprospetstal Plant was not permitted to subcontract work.[23]

4) *Disposition of new investment capital.* The promise of discretionary managerial powers over new investment had seemed one of the more exciting features of Kosygin's proposals. A new fund for the development of production was to be formed at every enterprise, to be derived partly from enterprise profits and partly from depreciation allowances. These funds were to grow rapidly, reaching 4 billion rubles in 1967.

Actually, the production funds generated by the enterprises seem surprisingly small. In the first quarter they reached only 17 percent of the annual goal and amounted to only 5.7 million rubles—less than a third of the 19.7 million rubles transferred

[19] Ye. Liberman and A. Rudkovski, "Plant Works in the New Way," *Pravda*, April 20, 1966.
[20] Dymshits, *op. cit.*
[21] L. Rotshtein, "The Fund for the Development of Production," *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 25, June 1966.
[22] Liberman and Rudkovski, *op. cit.*
[23] "The New Statute on Rights and Responsibilities of Enterprises," *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 24, June 1966.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from the enterprises to the State budget.[24] Moreover they amounted to only a fraction of centralized capital investment of enterprise profits: in the Kirov Turbine Plant, the production fund was 16 percent of centralized capital investment.[25] The share of enterprise profits going to the production fund in the chemical industry was estimated by *Pravda* as 7 percent.[26]

Moreover, disbursement is still strictly supervised. In the Kirov Plant blueprints and estimates had to be submitted to various financial agencies,[27] while the Odessa Sugar Refinery was informed in May 1966 that a plan for capital modernization, submitted in January 1966, had not been approved and that another plan had been substituted by the Ukrainian Ministry for Food Industry.[28]

It should be kept in mind that the production fund may not be used for the expansion of productive capacity—that is to say, disbursements from this fund do not allocate resources to the manager for investment in the fullest, capitalist sense of the word. Only the maintenance and modernization of present equipment and the introduction of innovations and new technology may be so financed.

5) *Control over labor.* Very considerable extension of managerial rights was to take place in wage determination, bonus distribution, hiring and firing, and staffing. Only the sum total of wages for each enterprise was to be designated, leaving enterprises to fix wage rates, establish job ratings and determine hazard pay. Enterprises were also to establish their own bonus indices, with authorization to change bonus rates by as much as 25 percent or, in certain cases, to withdraw bonuses completely. The Statute gave enterprise directors considerable power to hire and fire and authorized enterprises to draw up their tables of organization without approval from the financial agencies.

How were these measures implemented? In the matter of wage rates it appears that the central planners changed their minds rather quickly. Largely because of afterthoughts on a pilot study conducted in May-August 1965,

. . . it was determined that it was not advisable to establish wage rates and salaries locally by every individual establishment. To safeguard uniformity of wages of workers in identical professions and specialties requires that wage rates and salaries be established by the state in a centralized fashion.[29]

From discussions in the Soviet press, it has become clear that in fact wage rates are fixed by the State Committee on Labor and Wages, working with the individual ministries and the Central Council of Trade Unions.[30]

By contrast, there seems to have been no retreat from the privileges granted management with respect to distribution of bonuses, and there have been numerous reports of enthusiastic and uncurbed experimentation. For example, the specialists of the Volgograd Metallurgical Factory introduced eight supplementary indices to encourage bonus-earning in January 1966; in February the number had increased to 20, and at the end of the first quarter it stood at 30.[31] Apparently such actions are being encouraged. Quite recently A. P. Volkov, Chairman of the State Committee on Questions of Labor and Wages, urged management to be bolder in the selection of indices and conditions for bonus distributions.[32]

Hiring and firing is another area in which more power has accrued to managers. Reports of fairly drastic lay-offs by the 43 enterprises have been common; thus the Uglich Watch Plant released 200 employees as a result of the introduction of automation associated with the new system; at the Moscow Automobile Depot about 7 percent of the personnel were dismissed in quick order, and elsewhere figures went even higher.[33] Indeed, the First Secretary of the Moscow Oblast party organization conjured up the spectacle of unemployment as a national problem.[34]

Managerial jurisdiction over staffing is less clear-cut. Two officials of the Norilsk Kombinat have stated that their enterprise chiefs had the right to determine the staff organization of engineer-technical workers and employees.[35] However, the Chief Inspector of the State Committee on Problems of

[24] Rotshtein, *op. cit.*; and "The Results of the Work of 43 Enterprises . . . ," *loc. cit.*
[25] Liberman and Rudkovski, *op. cit.*
[26] "At the Right Moment," *Pravda*, Jan. 8, 1966.
[27] Liberman and Rudkovski, *op. cit.*
[28] "The Ministry and Reform," *Radianskaia Ukraina*, Aug. 27, 1966.
[29] S. Shkurko, "Material Encouragement for Workers," *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 8, February 1966.
[30] N. V. Ksenofontov, "Questions of Labor and Wages," *Sakharnaia promyshlennost*, No. 4, 1966.
[31] N. Drogichinski, "Another Twenty," *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 18, May 1966.
[32] A. P. Volkov, quoted in *Trud*, April 27, 1966.
[33] See N. Platohov, "By Efforts of the Collective," *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 9, March 1966. Also, T. Sosnovy, "The New Soviet Plan: Guns Still Before Butter," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1966.
[34] V. I. Konotop, quoted in *Leninskoe znamia*, April 3, 1966.
[35] L. Vid and A. Toporovski, "The First Step Has Been Taken," *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 21, May 1966.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Labor and Wages seems to have had a different idea. She wrote:

The Statute pertaining to the Socialist Production Enterprise indicates that the administrative structure and staffs of the enterprises are determined and adopted by their directors using *the typical structure* for the purpose. If the latter, however, does not exist, the directors will be deprived of that right.[36]

The emphasis here is added; presumably "typical structure" refers to the model tables of organization established for various industries on the basis of proposals made by research organizations attached to the ministries.

6) *General Climate.* A word should be said about certain attitudinal factors that influence the implementation of the reform program. First, there seems to prevail a tenacious opposition to the delegation of power from the middle levels of the ministries and the planning and supervisory agencies (it must be remembered that a considerable portion of the personnel in these agencies are transferees from the dissolved Economic Councils and, in many cases, the pre-1957 industrial ministries, and are thus used to the exercise of power). *Pravda* has issued repeated editorial warnings of petty tutelage on the part of the ministries and control agencies; and Professor L. Leontiev has stated bluntly:

The personnel of agencies of industrial management will have to rid themselves of the prejudice that supposedly no questions concerning the lives of enterprises can be solved without their sanction.[37]

There is also considerable reluctance on the part of individual managers to assume their new powers. Again, Professor Leontiev supplies an appropriate warning:

The new system requires major changes in psychology. The personnel of the enterprises will have to be freed from the habit of waiting for or requiring instructions from above on the questions which now come within their competence.[38]

Adding up all of these factors, it can be said that for the pilot group of 43 enterprises the enhancement of managerial authority was considerably less than envisaged by the framers of the reform.

In production assortment, in disposition of existing capital equipment, and in control over new investment, the gains have been minor. It seems unlikely that direct contractual relations have been established between plants in the pilot program, even though certain trading and consumer goods enterprises that are not under the reform have been negotiating direct contracts. The initial grant of authority to managers to determine wages has been completely withdrawn. It is only in the area of labor controls, including bonus distribution, hiring, firing, and possibly staffing, that the managers' powers have been significantly enhanced under the reform.

The result is that in most areas economic guidance by direct administrative orders has continued, even if that guidance is somewhat less detailed. It should be noted, however, that the one aspect of managerial authority which has increased is likely to have a dramatic effect on productivity figures. Large lay-offs of surplus labor will improve statistics for labor productivity per man-year immediately. And with the substitution of modern equipment for marginal labor, genuine improvements in productive capacity are bound to occur over a period of time.

The Incentives System

The purpose of the proposed change in the system of incentives was to cut the linkage between incentives and volume of output and to establish a new link-up between incentives on one hand and efficiency of production (*i.e.*, reduction of labor and capital costs) and satisfaction of the market demand on the other. This double purpose was to be achieved by tying the size of the bonus not, as formerly, to the index of volume of production, but to indexes for profitability and for volume of sales.

Each enterprise under the new system was to establish two new bonus funds: a fund for "material encouragement," which was to be distributed in the form of personal bonuses to workers and managers; and a fund for social-cultural measures and housing, which was to be distributed collectively for enterprise achievements. The following discussion will concentrate on the fund for material encouragement, since it is by far the more important of the two—in the case of the 43 enterprises, it was six times as large as the fund for social-cultural

[36] N. Izvolskaia, "Scientific Norms for Managerial Labor," *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 51, December 1965.
[37] L. Leontiev, "The Plan and Economic Initiative," *Pravda*, April 29, 1966.
[38] *Ibid.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

measures and housing.[39] Also, the composition of the two funds is similar.[40]

1) *Profits.* In the case of profits, the theory has been stated simply by the economist V. Gelbras:

The better an enterprise works, the higher the profits, the greater the deductions into the enterprise funds, the more the funds receive for awards of bonuses.[41]

However, in practice it quickly became clear that the double equation between efficiency and profits, and between profits and bonuses, was far less clear-cut than originally expounded. Indeed it broke down rather quickly.

Let us first look at the relationship between efficiency of operation and profits. Two things must be noted about the calculation of profits: (1) There are actually two profit indexes, one pertaining to the growth of enterprise profit (measured against the previous year's profit sum) and the other, which is the more important, the index of profitability, expressing enterprise profits as a percentage of the enterprise's fixed and operating assets (for the 43 enterprises the index of profitability was 4.9 percent).[42] (2) These indexes are *assigned* to the enterprise, and the manager's objective is to attain the targets rather than to maximize profits—for only in the former case will he obtain maximum bonus rates.

There are two main obstacles in the way of a direct relationship between efficiency of operations and the index of profitability. The first is that profitability of Soviet enterprises is radically affected by factors which have nothing to do with efficiency, such as differential rents, interest payments, subsidies and taxes. Soviet economists have illustrated the impact of these factors by pointing to profitability rates which vary enormously from one industry to the next, between enterprises of the same industry, and between the shops of one enterprise.[43]

In order to screen out these extraneous factors for the various branches of industry, the Council of Ministers has set up varying standards which determine for each industry separately what portion of enterprise profits is to remain within the enterprise for bonus distribution and what portion is to be paid into the State Budget. The differences in profitability between the enterprises of one industry are apparently being equalized by means of intra-ministry accounting prices, and the intra-enterprise differences in profit level are apparently being neutralized by means of artificial intra-factory prices established on the basis of normative costs and profits.[44] As implemented at the Norilsk Kombinat, basic production shops—but not service departments—were placed on the new system; each shop was given intra-combine "accounting prices" for supplies entering the shops and for products leaving them. These prices permitted the combine to isolate its units from distorted outside prices and to establish the net value contributed by each production unit.[45]

The second and fatal problem in measuring plant efficiency by profits is that the Soviet system of rigid, centrally-fixed prices cannot reflect fluctuating costs (not to speak of fluctuating demand), and without accurate costing there can be no true efficiency calculations. As long as Soviet prices remain centrally fixed, an air of make-believe will continue to hang over the use of profitability as a measure of efficiency.

No less problematical is the second part of the equation: the relationship between profits and the size of bonuses. Here a host of distorting factors enter in.

In the first place, enterprise profits are channeled into the bonus funds in varying proportions that are related to efficiency only in rather roundabout ways. As mentioned above, the proportion of enterprise profits going into the funds differs from industry to industry. Moreover, if an enterprise requests a profit target above the planned target, it may retain up to 90 percent of that profit; however, if enterprise profits exceed the assigned or accepted profit targets, the portion retained for bonus distribution may drop by 30 to 40 percent—this, in order to discourage artificially low profit targets.[46]

---

[39] "The Results of the Work of 43 Enterprises . . . ," *loc. cit.*

[40] See A. A. Arakelyan, *Printsipi upravleniia promyshlennostiu SSSR* (Principles of Directing the Industry of the USSR), Moscow, Znanie Publishing House, 1966, p. 29.

[41] V. Gelbras, "Economic Reform in the USSR and the Non-Validity of its Criticism," *Sotsialisticheskii trud*, No. 3, 1966.

[42] "The Results of the Work of 43 Enterprises . . . ," *loc. cit.*

[43] *E.g.*, A Miliukov, "Problems of Incentive Funds and Group Production Norms," *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 24, June 1966.

[44] See Ye. Liberman, "Profit as the Servant of Communism," *The Economist* (London), Feb. 26, 1966; and V. Khorosh, "Intra-Enterprise Economic Accounting Under the New System," *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, May 1966.

[45] Vid and Toropovski, *op. cit.*

[46] See A. Karpov and V. Pokrovov, "Plant Requests a New Plan," *Pravda*, May 13, 1966; and N. Drogichinski, *op. cit.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A SOVIET THESEUS

Will I ever manage to get out of this labyrinth?

—From *Krokodil* (Moscow), No. 5, 1967.



— Удастся ли мне выбраться из этого лабиринта!

Рисунок Ю. ЧЕРЕПАНОВА

Second, the incentive fund is not formed from enterprise profits alone but from enterprise profits plus a portion of the wage fund. In the case of the 43 enterprises, the wage fund contribution in the first quarter amounted to 47.5 percent.[47] The result is to dilute the influence of profits on bonus distribution—at least for the workers at large. However—and this is a major qualifying clause—*bonuses for managerial personnel come exclusively from the profit portion of the material encouragement fund*,[48] meaning, of course, that managers have a much more direct interest in profits than workers.

Third, the portion of the fund for material encouragement which is derived from enterprise profits does not depend upon the amount of the profits which remain with the enterprise. Rather, it is calculated on the basis of the planned profit level and the planned and above-plan growth of the volume of sales (or growth of profits) in comparison with the previous year's figures. Each enterprise receives norms for each percent of growth in volume of sales (or growth of profits) and for each percent of profitability. A simplified calculation provided by the Soviet press goes as follows:

An enterprise is assigned in the plan a profit amounting to 8 percent above last year's sum and a profitability index of 20 percent. Suppose the ministry gives the following normatives for the formation of the material encouragement fund: for each percent of profit growth, 0.5; and for each percent of profitability, 0.25. In that case, the fund for material encouragement is calculated as follows: (0.5 × 8) plus (0.25 × 20) = 9 percent of the Wage Fund for Productive Personnel.[49]

(Incidentally, this calculation—like most cited in the Soviet press—shows the index for volume of sales replaced by the index for growth of profits. This sort of substitution is permissible where the volume of sales may not constitute a fair index—*e.g.*, in industries where growth of sales is limited by factors beyond enterprse control. In the case of the 43 enterprises, 33 used the normatives for the volume of sales. The specific weight given to the two indexes changes, depending upon the circumstances.[50])

Note as the final limiting factor that the dimensions of the fund for material encouragement are not given in absolute numbers, but are tied to the workers' payroll.

Obviously then, the efficiency of enterprise operations is related only indirectly to enterprise profits, and profits in turn have a rather roundabout effect on bonus distribution.

Does this mean that profits exert no influence whatsoever on efficiency of operations? Paradoxi-

[47] "The Results of the Work of 43 Enterprises . . . ," *loc. cit.*

[48] S. Shkurko, "New System of Awarding Bonuses to Workers." *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, July 1966.

[49] F. Gorin, "Fund for Material Encouragement," *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 27, July 1966. For a more detailed description of actual enterprise figures, see P. Krylov, L. Rotshtein and D. Tarev, "On the Order and the Conditions of the Transition to the New System," *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, April 1966.

[50] See Krylov, Rotshtein, and Tarev, *ibid.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cally, not; indeed, a good case can be made that within the limits set by varying deductions from profits into the State budget, by the regulations tying bonuses to the wage funds of productive personnel, and by the distorting effects of the price system, the new profit incentives exert a general downward pressure on costs. The clue here is the fact that managers' bonuses derive entirely from enterprise profits and that (as will be shown below) these bonuses constitute a considerable portion of the take-home pay of managers, which is not the case with the rest of the work force.

In consequence, managers do have a personal incentive to maximize—not enterprise profits—but bonus funds, by attaining the targets for profitability and volume of sales and by requesting the highest profitability targets consonant with the long-range productive capability of their plants. In so doing they are bound to reduce a number of capital and labor-wasting practices prevalent under the old system.

Previously, managers would request low initial production targets, backed by deliberate understatements of true production capability; overfulfillment of the initial targets netted large bonuses for the managers—even though a large percentage of plant capacity remained idle in order to retain some slack for the years ahead. Under the present system, which pays higher bonus rates to managers for 100 percent fulfillment of profit targets than for overfulfillment, enterprise managers have a monetary incentive to ask for high profit targets to begin with. There is ample evidence that this is happening—though with lots of room for improvement. Unutilized production reserves made it possible for the 43 pilot enterprises to accept an increase of 25 million rubles over the original 1966 production target, and an increase of 11.4 million rubles in the 1966 profit plan. What is more, they fulfilled these annual obligations in only four months [51]—which led S. Balbekov to remark somewhat caustically that even under the new system the enterprises had underestimated their full production capability.[52]

Formerly, another source of waste was the retention of excess labor because labor costs did not affect managerial bonuses. Now that wages do affect profits and bonuses, surplus workers are being dismissed.

Other wasteful practices of the past, such as hoarding and illegal barter of surplus equipment, may be at least partially counteracted by considerations of enterprise revenues and profits. The new statutory right permitting the sale of surplus equipment has, as shown above, resulted in some such sales, even though much less than the possible maximum.

There is also some statistical evidence that the reform is effecting reductions in capital and labor costs. Labor productivity for the 43 enterprises in the first quarter of 1966 rose by 6.4 percent over the corresponding period in the previous year, whereas the rise for industry as a whole was 4.6 percent.[53] Data on improvement of capital utilization show that in the case of 17 enterprises under the jurisdiction of the RSFSR, for each ruble of basic equipment, production amounted to 1.709 rubles in 1965, while in the first quarter of 1966 the figure rose to 1.738 rubles—an improvement of 1.7 percent which, if not exactly enormous, is a step in the right direction.[54]

All in all, it seems reasonable to assume that profit calculations do increase efficiency—though not as much nor in as direct a manner as desired by the advocates of these measures.

2) *Volume of sales.* Under the reform, volume of sales was to be second only to profits as a managerial goal. By substituting the index of volume of sales for the index of gross value of production, and by linking the new index to the bonus system, it was hoped to reorient production to market demand. Initial Western evaluation of Kosygin's proposal was favorable. One observer, commenting shortly after Kosygin's speech, thought that this shift constituted "the major reform [measure]." [55]

Volume of sales has indeed become a major enterprise goal, as indicated by its utilization in the calculation of the bonus funds.

However, it is quite difficult to establish how effective the new index is. On the minus side, there have been demands to drop the index because of its complexity [56] (one can easily imagine the complications involved in applying the index to the

[51] "The Results of the Work of 43 Enterprises . . . ," *loc. cit.*

[52] S. Balbekov, "A Million in the Avant-Guard," *Pravda*, May 27, 1966.

[53] Unsigned article in *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, July 16, 1966.

[54] Unsigned article in *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, July 13, 1966.

[55] Herbert S. Levine, in "Soviet Economic Performance and Reform: Some Problems of Analysis and Prognosis" (A Round Table Discussion), *Slavic Review*, June 1966.

[56] "Four Hundred Enterprises are Converting to the New System of Planning and Economic Incentives," *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, July 16, 1966.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

performance of individual shops within factories). Moreover, while the 43 pilot enterprises overfulfilled their sales plan during the first quarter by 3.6 percent, a number of enterprises seem subsequently to have missed their targets.[57] Ironically, even the overfulfillment of sales targets has come under fire on the grounds that it has violated the principle of planning, disrupted the work of supply agencies, and put scarce resources to less than optimal use.[58]

A practical problem is that the index can be calculated only on the basis of customers' acceptances; since it frequently takes as long as a month for notifications of acceptance to come in, enterprises miss their targets for volume of sales and lose bonuses, causing quite a morale problem.[59]

On the plus side, the volume of sales indexes are bound to get crucial attention from managers since the size of the bonus funds depends—at least partially—on the fulfillment of the sales target and the growth of the sales volume over the previous year. It is also reasonable to assume that the emphasis on sales will put a curb on past managerial practices involving simulation, such as the submission of faked production figures and the lowering of product quality. Since calculations for fulfillment of the sales index must be backed by consumers' acceptances, and since consumer agencies may reject unacceptable merchandise, these wasteful practices are probably being reduced.

This supposition is supported by a slight downturn in inventories in June 1966. In the case of 25 enterprises of the pilot group, the ruble value of stocks on hand was 4.1 percent lower than the year before.[60]

All in all, it seems likely that linking managers' bonuses to volume of sales has resulted in some cost reduction and in additional attention being paid to consumer demand.

3) *The effect of the bonus system on income.* In the last analysis, the impact of the bonus system on productivity depends on how much bonuses affect incomes. It is at this point that the difference between workers and managers is most obvious. Profits provide only half the money in the part of the bonus fund allotted to workers—52.5 percent in the case of the material encouragement fund in the pilot group.[61] Moreover, bonuses play a very small part in workers' take-home pay—anywhere from 4 to 7 percent of annual wages. In the case of the 43 enterprises, bonuses to workers out of profits rose from 9 rubles to 12.7 rubles per quarter. For the year, this makes 51 rubles, or a little above 4 percent of an average yearly salary of 1200 rubles. A similar figure was given by the manager of a textile factory who stated that end-of-the-year bonuses would average 14 days' earning per worker—or something less than 5 percent of the annual wage.[62] Since one of the avowed goals of the bonus system was to spread benefits and incentives as widely as possible, the reform obviously falls short in this respect.

By contrast, managerial personnel—as stated above—get all of their bonus payments from enterprise profits; nor are these bonuses small. One source mentions that bonuses for engineer-technical workers and office workers, paid from the material encouragement funds of the 43 test enterprises, amounted to 35 percent of official pay rates, and it is hardly likely that bonuses to management were smaller.[63] This is confirmed by the chief economist of the S. M. Kirov Watch Plant, who states that the plant administration gets bonuses amounting to 35 percent of monthly salaries for the fulfillment of the planned targets for profits, sales, and the most important products. For each percentage in overfulfilling the plan they get 0.5 percent of salary.[64] Thus, there seems to be little doubt that managerial personnel does indeed have a strong incentive to meet targets for profits and volume of sales.

4) *Interest charges and fines.* A reform measure intimately connected with profits and the economizing of scarce resources is the imposition of an interest charge on capital assets, formerly acquired through interest-free transfers of state budget funds. Both Kosygin's proposals and subsequent discussions by the heads of the State Bank and the Ministry of Finance[65] expressed the expectation

[57] "The Results of the Work of 43 Enterprises . . . ," *loc. cit.*; and N. K. Baibakov, cited in *Izvestia*, Oct 30, 1966.
[58] V. Nikitin, *op. cit.*
[59] See unsigned feature article in *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 17, April 1966; and Konotop, *loc. cit.*
[60] Zotov, *op. cit.*
[61] "The Results of the Work of 43 Enterprises . . ."
[62] Iosif Joffee, "Reform at the Kosino Factory," *The Economist* (London), June 11, 1966.
[63] S. Shkurko, "New System of Awarding Bonuses . . . ," *supra.*
[64] "Evaluate According to Merit. The System of Material Incentives as Worked Out at the First Moscow Watch Plant imeni S. N. Kirov," *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 38, September 1966.
[65] V. Garbuzov, "Finances and Economic Stimuli," *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 41, October 1965; A. Poskonov, "Economic Reform and Credit," *Pravda*, Nov. 19, 1965.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the impact of interest payments would tighten the supply of money and induce economizing of capital resources. It appears, however, that so far this measure has not been applied with sufficient rigor to show much result. For enterprises under the new system, the rate of interest on fixed and working capital varies between 3 and 8 percent, with the majority of rates set at 6 percent.[66]

Under Soviet conditions of capital scarcity, these interest figures are artificially low and are recognized as such by at least one Soviet expert. Noting that for the 43 enterprises, payment on capital constitutes only a quarter of their total payments into the budget, and that for light and food industries these payments do not, at times, exceed three percent of total budget payments, he comments wryly: "The payment on capital is essentially pushed into the background." [67]

A related measure is the imposition of stiff fines for failure to deliver contract assignments; these fines now amount to 14 percent of the value of the commodity as compared to 2 percent under the old system.[68] The system of fines was designed to increase efficiency of production and tighten up the supply of money available to enterprises. It is unknown how well the fines have fulfilled these purposes. Quite certainly, however, the measure has been demoralizing to the management of the 43 enterprises, since when guilty they pay fines according to the new schedule, while when injured they are usually reimbursed at the old rate by suppliers who have not yet been transferred to the reform program.

All in all, for the pilot group of 43 enterprises the change in the incentives system seems to have been implemented rather more successfully than the grant of managerial autonomy. It is true that minor measures, such as interest charges and fines for failure to fulfill contract deliveries, have been applied too timidly or too inconsistently to achieve their purposes; likewise profitability has turned out to be a poor measure of efficiency. However, as a major success indicator of managerial behavior, profits have clearly acted to depress the general level of costs by reducing waste in the utilization of capital and labor; and the volume of sales, as the second major index, is bringing about a reorientation toward market demand. The bonus system apparently fell short in spreading incentives widely throughout the work force; but as a means of achieving a turnaround in managers' orientations to efficiency and consumer demands, the bonus system has no doubt fulfilled the major task set for it.

Summary

Let us now recapitulate: The current industrial reform was triggered by a deep-seated malaise in the Soviet economy, the most disturbing symptoms of which were declining economic growth rates, neglect of consumer demand, and the ubiquitous waste of labor and capital resources. The underlying causes of this malaise (or rather those recognized by the central Soviet leadership as susceptible to reform) were, first, defects in the planning system—primarily excessive administrative intervention from above in routine decision-making at the enterprise level—and second, an incentive system which set managers and central planners at cross purposes.

The proposed reform measures were intended to remedy these faults by shifting considerable operational control to enterprise managers while maintaining the principle of central planning, and by reorienting the incentive system from production to efficiency and the satisfaction of demand.

The reform in action, as it affected the pilot group of 43 enterprises, turned out to be uneven. The extension of managerial authority could not be satisfactorily implemented in most areas, partly because of second thoughts on the part of the central leadership, partly because of opposition from the middle levels of the ministries and the supervisory agencies, and finally because of the timidity of the managers themselves. There was, however, one area in which additional decision-making authority clearly devolved to the managers: the control and manipulation of labor.

The shift to the new incentives system was more successful, at least in terms of the reform's explicit tasks. Managers' incentives were shifted—if in a general and rather imprecise way—away from production for production's sake and toward cost-cutting and selling to the market.

However, implementation was severely handicapped by the top planners' tendency to carry out

[66] Cited in Keith Bush, "The Progress Made in Industry," *Bulletin for the Study of the USSR*, Oct. 1966.
[67] Nikitin, *op. cit.*
[68] P. Zhibarev, "The Realization of Production and the Servicing of Sales," *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 25, June 1966.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their post-Stalinist goals with the old Stalinist means. In the first place, the retention of the centrally-fixed pricing system prevented the managers from introducing true operational efficiency; and since central prices reflected planners' preferences (or simply confusion in the pricing agency) rather than consumers' preferences, the managerial response to market demand could not go beyond stopping the production of unsalable commodities and trying to increase the overall volume of sales. This, to be sure, was a marked improvement over the old system, but not exactly the model of a responsive demand-supply relationship.

In the second place, even in the circumscribed area where direct administrative controls were replaced by economic instrumentalities, the latter were so closely controlled and regulated that they lost a great deal of their effectiveness. It was a very large step forward to establish profit as the chief criterion of enterprise operations, but it was quite a step backward to tie managerial bonuses to profitability rates assigned in advance; it was real progress to orient production to sales, but much ground was lost by equating a centrally-determined target for volume of sales with the free play of consumer preferences.

The final sticking point was the failure to extend the changed incentives system to the bulk of the work force, since neither the income effect of bonus distribution in the enterprises nor the nature of the consumer goods supply radically improved the ability of the average worker to satisfy his consumption needs.

Does all this mean that the reform has been a failure? One's judgment depends on whether the reform is evaluated in terms of the tasks set for it by the Soviet leadership, or in terms of the observer's view of what is needed.

In terms of announced Soviet intentions, the reform was a modest success. To be sure, it is running considerably behind schedule: while Kosygin proposed that by the end of 1966 nine million workers would be working under the new system, only two million were so employed; the date for the completion of the reform has been quietly moved from the beginning of 1968 to the end of the year, and very probably will be further postponed.[69] However, the reform did fulfill the single most important task set for it by reducing waste in the utilization of capital and labor. Both the extension of managerial authority and the restructuring of the incentive system, however deficient in other respects, have resulted in significant savings in labor costs; and economizing on capital resources has also been spurred, though with less visible effect.[70] A good beginning has been made on cutting down consumer goods inventories. It is, of course, much too early to judge the reform's impact on the national growth rates—whatever the Soviet claim in this respect.

These accomplishments are all the more noteworthy since the improvements in the actual mechanisms of the planning and incentives system have been so circumscribed. It is perhaps not surprising that the Soviet leaders seem well committed to the new system in the belief that somewhat more rigorous implementation of its provisions will turn the trick; apparently great attempts will be made to extend more benefits to the workers, to encourage managers to use their new autonomy, to give even more weight to economic (as opposed to administrative) mechanisms, and to use these mechanisms—particularly credit and interest—with greater finesse. Basically, the reform model will retain central planning of the basic matrix of the economy, guidance by a mix of administrative measures (including centrally-fixed prices) and economic measures, and a slow improvement in the incentive system.

Will the cure be sufficient to remedy the malaise as well as the symptoms? To at least one observer it seems dubious, in view of the retention of the centralized planning system, the continued predominance of administrative directives in the economy, and the implicit neglect of true incentives for the bulk of the work force. However, though the reform may not produce the right kind of answers to the long-term problems of the Soviet economy, it has raised the right kind of questions—and has done so in the broad forum where Soviet economists, planners and managers meet. It is here, perhaps, that the current reform's best potential lies, for when the present limited measures are exhausted, the way may be cleared to a more radical approach to the ills of the Soviet economy. At that point the present reform may open up into a true economic revolution.

[69] N. Baibakov, "Application of Economic Reform is a Most Important Task," *Pravda*, Nov. 4, 1966.

[70] A. V. Bachurin, in *Trud*, Jan. 17, 1967.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Marxist in Ghana

By Jon Kraus

The attempt to modernize along socialist lines poses vast problems to the political leaderships of the newly-independent developing countries. This was particularly true in the case of Ghana, where Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention People's Party (CPP) sought to create a "socialist society." The political, economic and international problems inherent in such a transformation brought Ghana into a complex set of relations with the Communist world that were further complicated by the ambitious goals and manifest militance of Nkrumah's leadership.

Ghana's story, however, is less one of the growth of Communist ties and influence than of the tenuousness of new political authority and the tension between the needs for order *and* change. It is an illustration of the preoccupation of new leaders with political control—an elusive phenomenon in the new states of widely diverse peoples with varying allegiances. Their insecurity sponsors impulsive and arbitrary, if unsystematic, displays of authority to render organized opposition impotent. It is an example of the conflict between the need for a coherent approach to economic and social modernization and the need for ideological indulgence, between real social and political participation and the shell of pseudo-participation and mere phrase-mongering.

Nkrumah's overriding devotion to Pan-Africanism was grounded in a comprehension of the tragedy of Africa's ludicrous fragmentation and in personal ambition animated by the need for African dignity and power. Feeling Ghana's independence meaningless without Africa's liberation and the formation of a political union, Nkrumah believed "socialism in one country" impossible and that an anti-imperialist "permanent revolution" was necessary. Seeing neo-colonialism and international capital behind the reluctance of other African leaders to share his goals, he devoted his efforts to the erosion of his opponents' power and the decline of Western influence in Africa. The latter was a venture in which,

Mr. Kraus, whose area of specialization is African political affairs, is a Ph.D. candidate at the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (Wash., D.C.). He has appeared in Africa Report *(Wash., D.C.) and* World Affairs *(Wash., D.C.).*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not unnaturally, the Communist countries were enthusiastic supporters, and their help was warmly regarded.

Inside Ghana

Nkrumah's Convention People's Party was formed in 1949 as a radical populist, anti-tribalist and anti-professional "common man's" movement, extra-parliamentary in origin and spirit, but populist in vocabulary and intent. It was a mass party, a nationalist coalition, with strong rural roots. The only qualification for membership was a two-shilling fee. When it came to power in 1951, the party tempered its behavior and collaborated with the British in order to gain independence, yet its vital concern was maintaining its political control, which was challenged by a number of vigorous, parochial-based parties.

From the beginning, the CPP's avowed goal was a program of socialist development, although before independence this issue was given no prominence. The ideological content of the party's program was low and diffuse, the "road to socialism" poorly defined. The political thought of Nkrumah and a small group of militants, although influenced by Lenin's theory of imperialism, was extremely eclectic. While organization was emphasized above all other considerations, the CPP was a democratic party during this early period and sensitive to constituency demands. A small core of militants flourished in the National Association of Socialist Students Organization, founded in 1953 to work on ideological education, but they held no posts in the government and only a few in the party itself. Nkrumah encouraged the small left wing in the party, but kept it under close control, partly in response to British sensibilities.[1]

Preoccupied with the opposition, the CPP did not launch its socialist program until 1959-60, a decision which, coming as late as it did, posed a number of problems. First, there was the need to reinvigorate the party, which after almost ten years in power had grown indolent. Both the higher and middle echelons of leadership had grown comfortable and accustomed to power; they had to be revitalized and oriented toward new goals. The old guard leaders had received the prestige posts in the party and the government and in public corporations. For many the party had been merely a vehicle of opportunity; some had acquired large commercial interests while others simply enriched themselves. What was needed were new militants, socialist puritans who could provide the required drive to undertake far-reaching changes in the polity and economy. A new formulation of aims was necessary, a prescription for a new social and economic order that would infuse a new spirit in the ranks.

Although the public had expected active government participation in creating economic growth, before independence (1951-57) government intervention in the economy was slight. It did, however, control cocoa prices, thus preventing inflation and gaining needed investment funds. Foreign private investment was welcomed, and Ghanaian merchants and entrepreneurs were a vocal group within the CPP. The Five Year Plan (1952-57) was primitive, and the measures employed to stimulate the rapid growth of 1951-60 were pragmatic.

"Capitalism is too complicated a system" for new states, concluded Nkrumah in 1957, and "hence the need for a socialist society."[2] This reflected great faith in the possibilities of rational control and economic planning and the conception of socialism as both a means and an end. Deliberate direction answered to the felt need for speed.

With a pre-industrial, colonial economy tied to a rather fixed trade pattern, Ghana suffered from a shortage of skilled manpower and venture capital. The country was dangerously dependent on a single crop (cocoa) for 60 to 70 percent of hard currency earnings necessary for imports. With cocoa prices falling due to a greatly increased supply and inelastic demand on the part of the Western cocoa-buying countries (the average annual price per long ton was $1,002 in 1953-54, a high, and only $633 in 1959-60), new markets had to be found. Development to the impatient CPP leaders meant industrialization, requiring directly productive investments, capital imports (public and private), increased domestic savings, and technical training and assistance.

Problem-Solving, Ghanaian Style

Nkrumah and the CPP groped for solutions to these problems in a rather impulsive manner, and

[1] The stimulus was the 1953 British dismissal of the Cheddi Jagan government in British Guiana. In February 1954 Nkrumah announced that active Communists would not be employed in important government agencies, and propaganda materials were banned.

[2] Kwame Nkrumah, *Autobiography*, London, Nelson, 1957.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the period following 1960 was marked by considerable experimentation. To revitalize CPP organization and reeducate its leadership posed problems concerning the nature and role of the party. If the CPP now needed a militant elect, a "vanguard," it also needed its mass base, its claim to legitimacy. As Nkrumah and the CPP moved to pre-empt all prerogatives in the political arena, it had to identify itself with the nation. This was done by fiat, Nkrumah's announcement in 1959 that "the CPP is Ghana and Ghana is the CPP."

Nkrumah's admonition that "we cannot build socialism without socialists" stemmed from the need for new militants. The broad, disparate organization that had struggled for independence was no longer adequate for the next phase, as Nkrumah himself noted in 1959: "The composition of the party has become socially quite heterogeneous, and there is a danger that our socialist objective may be clouded by opportunistic accommodations and adjustments . . ." [3] But there were no clear definitions for "socialist" or "socialism."

Those who sprang forward as "socialists" came from extra-parliamentary associations and institutions such as the Trade Union Congress (TUC), the United Ghana Farmers' Council (UGFC), the press, the Socialist Student Association (NASSO) and the Bureau of African Affairs, established in 1959 to conduct relations with parties in colonial African territories. They were the "outs," the militants kept under wraps until now, when they were encouraged (but not completely controlled) by Nkrumah. Their weapon was ideology, their *raison d'être* socialist purity and party supremacy. Their targets were the old guard, vulnerable because of corruption, who dominated government positions where formal authoritative power resided. The new militants attempted to assert the primacy of the party over the government and the civil service. Beginning in 1960, there was a strong, if only partially successful, effort to oust these men, particularly Nkrumah's long-time lieutenants. Thus began a factional conflict with innumerable sub-conflicts. It was essentially a power conflict, in part genuinely ideological and institutional, but personal as well.

The old guard, firmly entrenched in Parliament, counterattacked the new militants, however, and the party base remained resistant to change. New "socialist" structures were set up, or old ones reformed. Nkrumah had reorganized and expanded the CPP Secretariat in 1960. He appointed a new General Secretary, Tawia Adamafio, the London NASSO branch leader, who was also given a seat in the Cabinet as were the General Secretaries of the TUC (John Tettegah) and the UGFC (Martin Appiah-Danquah). Both of these organizations were now functioning as party ancillaries. In 1961 Adamafio was elected to Parliament and was assigned the most important ministerial posts (Presidential and Establishment Affairs). He and Tettegah led the fight against the old guard, encouraged by Nkrumah who in April 1961 denounced the MP's as "self-seekers and careerists.'

The first of the new socialist "institutions" to be created within the party were the Study Groups which replaced NASSO as the ideological arm of the party. During their large meetings in 1960-61 harsh, if not wholly unfair, attacks were made on the old guard CPP Ministers and MP's, while radical measures were suggested for stimulating economic development and social change. The Study Groups caused severe party factionalism, however, and they were abandoned early the following year when Nkrumah announced that ideological education had to be brought to the people through the establishment of Special Party Branches, an effort pursued only sporadically. The TUC and the UGFC also made plans to develop cooperatives and to instill new production orientations. Although the manifest personal ambition of the TUC leader resulted in effective opposition to all TUC programs, the UGFC took over a lucrative cocoa marketing monoply in 1961 and a year later, with a large staff of civil servants, began to develop a program of agricultural mechanization and producer cooperatives.

At the same time, the militants attempted to broaden their potential base by calling for mass participation in party affairs. The party was regrouped at the district level around reformed local government units to which development grants were given and in which local dialects were permitted to allow the participation of those unable to use English. Keeping former opponents from entering the party was also denounced. As Nkrumah observed: "We cannot talk loudly of building a one-party state and yet drive away persons who would want to join the party and help to realize that objective." [4]

The downfall of Adamafio in August 1962 after an attempt on Nkrumah's life (in which he was not

[3] Address on the CPP 10th Anniversary, June 12, 1959.

[4] Speech of March 24, 1962, in *Osagyefo in Kumasi*, Accra, Government Printers, 1962, p. 2.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

involved) prompted the return to power of some old guard leaders. Nkrumah apparently felt that he needed them to maintain control of the party. From this point on, as far as one can tell, the old guard was left in charge of party organization. The socialist militants who survived Adamafio's fall remained in control of ideological education whose partial divorce from organizational matters underscored its growing irrelevance to public problems.

The ideology of the CPP was closely related to Nkrumah and his role as a militant national leader of the "common man." It was designed to buttress authority and found expression in a leadership cult. The socialist content of the CPP ideology emerged only gradually. Endowing it with his own name, Nkrumah cited it in 1959 as a specifically African attempt to deal with public issues, while at the same time explaining Ghana's policy of nonalignment.[5] Between 1959 and 1961, it was pragmatic and all-inclusive. Officially defined in 1961 by Kofi Baako, a trusted lieutenant and "young" member of the old guard, "Nkrumaism" was a "non-atheistic socialist philosophy which seeks to apply current socialist ideas to the solution of our problems." It was "socialism adapted to suit the conditions and circumstances of Africa," with "no boundaries" and a "flexibility of application." It renounced nationalization, but sought to replace the social power of private capital with that of the "people." [6]

As a non-coercive instrument of change and a force in eradicating deep-seated remnants of colonial mentality, however, this formulation became increasingly unsatisfactory to Nkrumah and to the socialist militants. First, Nkrumah had never concealed the fact that he considered himself a Marxist socialist, yet "Nkrumaism," as defined by Baako, made little pretense in this direction. Second, even those resisting change within the CPP could easily identify with Nkrumaism, attaching, as they did, various meanings to an ideology with "no boundaries" and thus no committments. Something had to be done to relate it to Marxian socialism or to "scientific socialism"—something similar to the ideology of those countries which were said to be "building socialism." The link was made only tenuously at first, beginning in 1962.

Building a Socialist Economy

To mobilize resources for economic development, the CPP relied primarily upon the government structure, although some ancillary organizations also sought and were assigned economic responsibilities. It also experimented with methods of channeling domestic savings. A compulsory savings law was introduced in July 1961 (on the suggestion of the British socialist economist, Nicholas Kaldor), but it gave rise to great opposition, including a politically disruptive strike, and was later repealed. New sources of revenue were provided by larger taxes and "voluntary" contributions by cocoa farmers, which actually had begun in 1959.

This was a period of considerable innovation, at once economic, political, and administrative, in which the CPP borrowed freely from all sources. The socialist militants were particularly impressed by the achievements of the Communist countries and urged that the party pay more attention to their example in developing its own socialist structure. Following Nkrumah's 1961 tour of the USSR and Eastern Europe, the primitive Second Five Year Plan (1959-64) was scrapped in favor of a more integrated Seven Year Plan.[7] The development of state enterprises was stepped up markedly, but particular Communist influences were not readily apparent.[8] Western contractors certainly appear to have talked Nkrumah into as many state ventures as the Communists did. A mixed economy was foreseen for some time to come, and ten percent of the Seven Year Plan's investments were sought from (initially uninterested, now alienated) foreign private capital. Another 25 percent was to be provided by foreign loans and grants. With Western financing for the Volta River project secured, Nkrumah in turn sought aid commitments from the Communist world, whose interest rates were prefer-

[5] In June 1959 Nkrumah spoke of "an African socialist ideology" and a "welfare state based upon African socialist principles, adapted to Ghanaian conditions" (address on 10th anniversary of the CPP).

[6] Nkrumaism featured social unity (rather than class conflict), compatibility with religion, anti-colonialism, pan-Africanism, democracy without a formal opposition but with the right of criticism, and the division of the economy into state, joint state-private, private, and cooperative sectors. A. Baako, in *Ghanaian Times* (Accra) March 25-April 6, 1961.

[7] A first draft was prepared, at Nkrumah's invitation, by a Hungarian, Dr. Joseph Bognar. The final product, however, owed little to Bognar's efforts; it was completely Ghanaian-produced.

[8] Soviet assistance was given for three model state farms. The inspiration for the establishment of other stemmed from a sudden, large unemployment problem with the reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture in mid-1962. Farm land was not that which had been previously cultivated, and farms were actively sought as a source of rural wage employment.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

able and whose willingness to finance factory construction was readily appreciated.

Some $212 million was offered to Ghana by the Communist world: the USSR, $90 million; Eastern Europe, $80 million; China, $42 million. About $107 million had been drawn by 1966. With rapid development a priority, Accra obtained the bulk of its foreign loans in short-term high-interest supplier's credits from the West. These as well as the Communist world's loans were inefficiently allocated for productivity and created a debt repayment structure that crippled growth prospects for the immediate future. During this period the Communist countries also became important markets for Ghanaian cocoa, especially since Accra was willing to conduct this trade on a barter basis. From a low in 1960-61, cocoa exports to the Communist world tripled in 1961-1962 and had almost tripled again in 1964-65, accounting for more than 27 percent of Ghana's cocoa exports,[9] and bringing about a significant change in Ghana's foreign trade patterns as follows:

% of Trade with Sino-Soviet Area[10]

Year	*Exports*	*Imports*
1959	2.0	3.3
1960	7.7	4.2
1962	8.9	7.5
1964	11.8	15.8
1965	21.3	26.3

Increases were slow but steady through 1964 and then jumped dramatically in 1965, due to Ghana's inability to obtain further credits in the West and the extremely low price of cocoa. As a result of agreements signed in December 1965, two-way trade with the Communist world would have certainly increased, had the coup d'etat not intervened.

The International Context

Continental African politics undoubtedly had a decisive influence in shaping Nkrumah's attitude toward the Communist and Western worlds. His inability to promote an African political union and the continued influence and interference of the Western powers ("neo-colonialism" [11]) clearly frustrated but never caused him to abandon his goals.

Nkrumah's views can perhaps be best understood in the context of the Congo crisis. The collapse of Lumumba (with whom he had special ties and hopes for an African Union), the role played by the great international cartels (Union Minière), and the Belgian and American intervention clearly convinced him that Africa's enemies were in the West. The Balkanization of the Congo, Tshombe's rise to power in 1964, the recruitment of mercenaries from Rhodesia and South Africa to end the widespread provincial rebellions, and the US-supported Belgian "rescue mission" to Stanleyville were all of a pattern to Nkrumah and to a number of other African leaders, as the West soon discovered.

Nkrumah's orientation toward the Communist world did not, however, occur overnight, for it was more directly tied to his decision to transform Ghana into a socialist society. A 1957 Soviet offer to establish diplomatic ties had not been accepted with any alacrity; it was 1960 before ambassadors were exchanged after the drive for a "socialist society" had begun. By 1961 the socialist militants around Nkrumah had risen to prominence and could point meaningfully to support given Ghana's position in African affairs by the Communist capitals, notably in the All-African Trade Union Federation. Expressions of solidarity and support concerning various African issues, especially the repeated denunciations of "Western imperialism," were something more than rhetoric, and after 1960-61 ties developed rapidly between Accra and Moscow. Economic need and international frustrations thus helped to stimulate a relationship which, on Ghana's side, was partly romantic and partly based upon the magical appeal of the word "socialism" and upon significant political preferences.

Some socialist militants in Accra took advantage of this relationship to promote their own radical views with Nkrumah. *The Spark*, a weekly newspaper which appeared first in December 1962 (and owed its name to Lenin's *Iskra*), was the aggressive voice of a small group of "scientific socialists." The paper had a minuscule circulation and was virtually unread in Ghana, but it did constitute a new ideological orientation towards the Communist world view. Editorially more disciplined and ideologi-

[9] *West Africa* (Accra), Sept. 18, 1965.

[10] *Ghana, Economic Survey, 1965*, Accra, Government Printers, 1966, p. 39; *Direction of Trade, Annual, 1958-62*, IME/EBRD, p. 287.

[11] Neo-colonialism—when a country has nominal independence but is politically influenced or subservient due to the maintenance of foreign economic control.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cally more coherent than the other CPP newspapers, it insisted that "scientific socialism" was the only socialism and that African socialism was bogus, a "tool of the imperialists." [12] It called for a new ideology, stronger party machinery, and the training of political cadres whose class origins and ideological commitment had to meet certain requirements. Any denial of the relevance of class struggle in Africa was regarded as a neo-colonial trick.

These ideas were considerably in advance of Nkrumah's and in fact found little echo in the government's program at home, while far surpassing any official expressions of affinity with the Communist world. Yet the group that expressed these ideas was completely dependent on Nkrumah's patronage. His sponsorship was based partly on tactical considerations (Communist aid) and partly on his own vision of himself as a great revolutionary, an African successor to Lenin. The chief members of the faction were "scientific socialists" in the proper sense: Kofi Batsa, the editor of *Spark*, and C. A. "Kodwa" Addison, Director of the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute and prominent in Ghana press services.[13] Amoako-Atta, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Ghana and Finance Minister (1964-66), was also a socialist and favored closer economic ties with the Communist countries. Addison and Batsa gained an ally at the head of the Ghanaian Trade Union Congress when a change occurred there in favor of Kwaw Ampah in 1964.

[12] A large number of articles were by foreign Communists. We refer here to editorial comment.

[13] *Both had ties to Communist organizations in the early* 1950's and studied in Eastern Europe. K. Batsa, a journalist, was elected to the WFDY Executive Board in 1957; Addison, a trade unionist, was expelled as General Secretary of the Maritime Union in 1954. Both became active in the CPP in the late 1950's and rose to numerous prominent positions, Addison to the CPP Central Committee.

THE VOICE OF AFRICA



The illustration at left and the quotation below are reprinted from The Spark *(Accra), May 17, 1963.*

In the early flush of independence, some of the new African states are jealous of their sovereignty and tend to exaggerate their separatism in a historical period that demands Africa's unity in order that their independence may be safeguarded. I cannot envisage an African union in which all the members, large or small, heavily or thinly populated, do not enjoy legal equality under a constitution to which all have laid their hand.

But the insistence on not wanting to cede certain functions to a central unifying political authority in which all the members will have an equal voice is unrealistic and unfounded. On the other hand, an association of a confederate or even looser nature, which does not give effective powers to a central authority and determine those to be left to the sovereign states, can leave the way open for the domination of the smaller and weaker members by larger and stronger ones.

Ghana has declared her stand in no uncertain terms. We have provided in our republican constitution for the surrender of our sovereignty, in whole or in part, in the wider interests of African unity. Guinea has made the same provision. So have Mali, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic. Every African must judge for himself which view is more progressive and realistic; which is dedicated fully to the practical needs and interests of Africa, unrestrained by fear of external pressures; and which reflects the true voice of Africa—KWAME NKRUMAH.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Some militants in Accra, socialists of an indigenous hue, took their cues from Nkrumah and copied the vocabulary of the "scientific socialists."

A Growing Dependency

The political consequences of the growing ties between Ghana and the Communist world were difficult to assess, as was the impact of the many programs in the cultural and economic field. Certainly the accords signed after 1961 were implemented in the fullest fashion. On the propaganda level Accra was flooded with imported Communist literature. A number of scholarships for short and long-term study projects were offered Ghanaian students by the Soviet bloc, and Accra actively discouraged those who wanted to study in the West. Contacts between parallel party organizations in Ghana and the Soviet bloc (party officers, trade union leaders, Young Pioneers and journalists) increased tremendously between 1961-66. But with the exception of the journalists, the ideologues and a few party bureaucrats, the desired effects did not filter down to those party members engaged in more mundane pursuits. Many students became quickly disillusioned,[14] while a number of party members found such close contact distinctly uncomfortable and disadvantageous to Ghana. The most cordial relations developed between the Ghanaian and Communist journalists and ideologues. By 1962 the Ghanaian press, now completely dominated by the CPP, spoke with clear admiration of the exploits and policies of the "socialist countries." While the press was not totally uncritical of some Communist practices, particularly as they concerned Ghana, there was increasingly unadorned sympathy for the "socialist countries."

When Nkrumah opened the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute in February 1961, he referred to the previous lack of anything but "patch-up nationalist political education" and to the CPP's socialism as being "based on the conditions, circumstances and peculiarities of our African life." [15] To develop some ideological militants, a regular two-year course was established in 1962. It drew primarily men who saw in it a chance to raise themselves, men whose average age was 30, but who had not even been to secondary school. By 1964, the Institute, which then had 475 students, had recruited Russian and East European teachers to conduct courses in history, philosophy and political economy from a Marxist-Leninist perspective. Despite their presence, however, the Institute never did succeed in presenting anything resembling ideological purity. Ideological factionalism persisted until the coup. The new ideologues could be used to pressure the old guard and link Ghana's socialism to Marxian socialism. The old guard, in a power fight with the new ideologues, struggled for an explicitly national identification for Ghana's socialism (thus supporting the personality cult and Nkrumaism).

There appeared to be an even greater rapprochement between Nkrumah and the Communist countries by 1965. The most significant reasons for this change seem to have been his increasingly intense distrust of Western activities in Africa, which included a deep fear of the CIA, and the support he was able to elicit from the Communist world for the Ghanaian economy, internal security and his pan-African activities. Nkrumah related the latter closely to the former, for he had come to adopt a world view of aggressive Western neo-colonialism which required the "solidarity of all the anti-imperialist forces" and which was identified with Ghana's inability to obtain Western economic assistance.[16]

After the August 1962 attempt on his life, Nkrumah accepted the services of a Soviet security officer, and during 1963 and 1964 more security specialists were recruited. Shortly thereafter he sought to develop an intelligence network in Africa to replace the rather crude and inefficient political agitation movement he had started earlier.[17] To put the network on its technical feet, he turned again to the Soviet Union and East Germany for assistance, both of whom willingly responded. East

[14] *E.g.*, in February 1952 there was strong criticism of racial discrimination in Bulgaria and of Bulgarian clashes with Ghanaian and other African students. In July there were acid criticisms of Russian intentions to carry out a new series of nuclear tests.

[15] *Laying the Foundation Stone of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute*, Accra, Govt. Printers, 1961, p. 1.

[16] See Nkrumah's 1965 May Day speech in *West Africa*, May 15, 1965, p. 547. He added that "we are not ignorant or unmindful of the causes of the ever-widening gap between the cost of exports and imports, between our credit needs for development and the amount which is being allotted to us by those who control the world's credits. . . . Shall we say to our children—you belong to a generation which will have to remain illiterate and unskilled because certain bankers in Washington, London, Paris, Brussels, and Geneva think that we are spending too much on education?"

[17] The most reliable account of subversion in West Africa generally as well as of that by Ghana is in I. William Zartman's *International Relations in the New Africa*, Englewood Cliffs, Spectrum, 1966, pp. 87-142 in general, 97-99 on Ghana.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

German and Soviet technicians were in the process of establishing technical branches of the National Security Service and training personnel for domestic and foreign operations when Nkrumah was overthrown.[18]

Ties of this nature certainly indicate intimacy and mutual trust. Yet the question of who was getting the most out of the relationship was clearly on everyone's mind. While Ghana and the Communist world shared the same goal of reducing Western influence in Africa, their policies aimed in two fundamentally different directions. Nkrumah was not reluctant to oppose the USSR on African issues (*i.e.*, the Congo and South Africa [19]) and he was rather wary of the Soviet-Chinese machinations in the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement, the fourth meeting of which he reluctantly allowed to be held in Ghana in May 1965. Neither were the Soviets loath to criticize the Ghanaian president. For example, an early 1966 review of Nkrumah's *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* (published in *The African Communist*) expressed delight with the book's anti-imperialist and anti-US pose, but attacked it for its lack of concern with the worldwide class struggle and its overemphasis on Africa.[20] Yet, this is the point: Nkrumah was an African socialist or, for the judicial commission investigating his corruption, an African pseudo-socialist. While susceptible to advice and flattery, Nkrumah was his own man, driven by a vision of African strength through unity and rapid modernization.

The overthrow of Nkrumah was a consequence of Ghana's gross economic deterioration and bankruptcy, the widespread distaste for Nkrumah's and the CPP's abuse of power, and his disruption of the army. The only orthodoxy had been Nkrumah's authority, and neither his thoughts nor favors had shown any consistency. By the time he was overthrown, nothing had been resolved. His methods of promoting order had withered participation in the party and society; his methods of promoting change left the party leadership divided into bitter factions, none of which trusted him or was trusted by him. The Communist countries had significant influence in Accra, but the new government ministers he appointed in 1965 were not socialist militants and objected to the Communist system of barter trade. Despite genuine economic alterations, socialism had become a manipulative myth, its imprecisions a response to varying needs. The problems of socialist development in African society were not studied and debated but were used by Nkrumah as a platform and by others as a weapon in factional conflicts. In the end, Nkrumah had not surrendered his options to any faction, country or system; he had frittered them away.

[18] A documented (though not always clear) account of Ghana-Communist country accords on security and intelligence assistance is found in the new Ghana government's *Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa*, State Publishing Corp., 1966, pp. vi-ix, 1-2, 6-8, 28-40; there is little on the subject title. It is less noteworthy, because less indicative, that Ghana recruited small teams of first Russians and then Chinese advisers to train African freedom fighters in guerrilla warfare; most fighters were from southern Africa, and those from independent states (Niger, Cameroon) were in more or less permanent exile.

[19] Ghana supported the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) which split from the Soviet-supported African National Congress (ANC) due to its ties with the South African CP in the Congress Alliance. *The African Communist* (London), April-May, 1962, p. 11-12, bitterly attacked *The Voice of Africa*, published by the Ghana BAA, home of Ghana's "scientific socialists" and publisher of *The Spark* (Accra), for printing PAC articles which attacked the ANC and their Communist allies. *Spark* also published pro-PAC articles.

[20] *The African Communist*, First Quarter, 1966, pp. 72-74.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Whither Russia?

EDITORS' NOTE: Thus far the contributors to this symposium have dealt almost exclusively with political trends in the USSR. Mr. Bregman, however, set himself a somewhat different task: to explore the possible impact of changes within the East European "people's democracies" on political developments in the Soviet Union, and vice versa. *Our discussion will continue through this year and will conclude, in the November-December issue, with essay-replies by Messrs. Michel Garder and Zbigniew Brzezinski.*

The USSR and Eastern Europe

By Alexander Bregman

Since this discussion has focussed on the nature and prospects of the Soviet political system, it is perhaps natural that the authors taking part have almost completely abstained from discussing the future of communism in the East European countries. Yet developments in the "People's Democracies" could, and probably will, affect to a considerable degree the course of events in the Soviet Union.

To be sure, changes within Russia itself are bound to generate a greater impact on the situation in the East European countries than *vice versa*. If, as suggested by Professor Brzezinski, reforms leading to a profound transformation of the Soviet system were to be forced upon the ruling bureaucracy in the USSR, then the other Communist bureaucracies could hardly resist pressures for similar changes; and any kind of violent upheaval in the center of the Communist world would reverberate to its periphery. In the reverse direction, the momentum would be much weaker. One can visualize a radical change in Czechoslovakia, for example—even to the extent of the emergence of a two-party system—without Moscow automatically following suit.

Nevertheless the political and economic links between the Communist countries have by now created a kind of interdependence which makes it impossible to isolate events in any one of them. This has been so for

---

Dr. Bregman is the chief editorial writer of the Polish Daily (*London*). *He contributes articles on East European affairs to American and European publications, and on a regular basis to* East Europe (*New York*).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quite some time. As early as 1956, the gains of Polish intellectuals in the wake of the "October" events had a decisive effect on the morale of the Soviet intelligentsia. The Moscow hotels were besieged by crowds of Russians anxious to buy the few Polish newspapers and journals that were available, and knowledge of Polish soon became *de rigeur* for those who thirsted for information and ideas relatively free from the stifling shackles of Agitprop. Today the Polish journals are no longer exceptional; Czechoslovak literary reviews are often more outspoken. Even so, the Soviet authorities decided to ban certain Polish publications, including the weekly illustrated *Przekroj* and two film reviews, on the ground that they were disseminating "decadent" Western views.[1]

If—however improbable it may appear today—another revolution were to break out in Eastern Europe, the Soviet leaders would be faced with an even more agonizing choice than that which confronted them during the Hungarian revolution of 1956, and their course of action would undoubtedly have a profound effect in the Soviet Union itself: a lack of intervention would encourage any latent opposition, while repression might well provoke a deep feeling of solidarity with the victims.

Thus, one can hardly answer the question "whither Russia?" without also trying to determine "whither Eastern Europe?"

In view of the growing differences between the Communist countries, general conjecture on the latter issue is not easy. Still, there are sufficient common features to warrant a few tentative hypotheses on the future of the present political system in Eastern Europe.

The same forces for change that have been at work in the Soviet Union are appearing all over Eastern Europe—though stronger in some countries, weaker in others. Everything Professor Brzezinski has said about the degeneration of the Soviet political system into a rigid bureaucracy "inimical to talent and hostile to political innovation" applies to the East European Communist states as well. The bureaucracies, in trying to defend their vested interests, have had to cope with the assertiveness of the technocrats, the younger generation, and the intellectuals, as well as with the demands of the masses at large for more consumer goods. The party leaders are finding it difficult, especially in the more advanced states with sophisticated economies, to adapt the system to the needs of a modern society, but they remain extremely reluctant to share power with anyone.

There are also parallels to the Soviet situation with respect to the recent curb on destalinization, the halt in the liberalization process, and the adoption of harsher methods towards intellectual dissidents and other rebels, especially in Poland and Hungary.

Yet while the similarities between the Soviet Union and the European Communist states are understandably great, the differences remain considerable. In particular, the pressures for change are greater in Eastern Europe.

The Soviet apparatus is now 50 years old. The Communist structures in the "people's democracies" are much younger—little more than 20 years on the average. In all of the countries except Yugoslavia, the Communists gained power not through domestic revolution, as in Russia, but through force imposed from without. Thus the bureaucracies are less strongly entrenched and less capable of resisting pressures; they must strive to replace rule based on force by rule based on popular consent—and they are still very far from achieving this aim.

Many other factors contribute to making the Communist system weaker in East Europe than in the Soviet Union itself. For one thing, traditions of freedom and multiparty rule are much stronger in the European countries. While some of the countries could hardly claim to have had democratic systems before the war, all have traditions of political freedom that have no match in Russian history. Moreover, all of them feel that they belong to Western civilization, and they long to rejoin Europe in spirit. Despite disappointments with Western policy on the part of the people (for instance, during the Hungarian revolution), and a considerable distrust of present Western motives on the part of the regimes, there is great admiration for the Western way of life. The desire to enjoy the benefits of "consumer civilization"—which even in the USSR shapes the attitudes of millions of people (as Mr. Galli pointed out in an earlier commentary)—is far more widespread in Eastern Europe. While Soviet citizens, comparing present conditions with those of 20 or 30 years ago, can find them greatly improved, the comparison is apt to be far less favorable for middle-aged Poles, Czechs or Hungarians.

In addition, some Soviet citizens can find consolation for shortcomings and for the slow improvement of their everyday life in the spectacular accomplishments of the Soviet Union. While it is true that the average Soviet citizen would opt for another pair of shoes rather than for yet another "Sputnik," there

[1] This ban went into effect on Jan. 1, 1967, according to the Moscow correspondent of *Le Monde* (Paris).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are those whose enthusiasm for the successes of their country—for example in the conquest of space—may tend to help them forget the shortage of consumer goods. In the people's democracies there are no similar achievements for the rulers to exploit, and whatever gains have been made are generally viewed by the masses as having been won by themselves, *despite* rather than because of the Communist system of rule.

Knowledge of life in the West is also much greater in Eastern Europe. The European Communist rulers have never succeeded in cutting off their peoples from contacts with the West as completely as the Soviet masses were isolated up until a few years ago. Even in the years of Stalinist terror, when the Iron Curtain seemed almost impenetrable, contact was maintained, especially through radio services. Western stations have always had many times more East European than Soviet listeners. And now there are other links. Traveling to the West has become possible for a large number of people, especially Poles and Hungarians. In 1965, 150,000 Hungarians—or 1.5 percent of the total population—visited Western countries, although stricter regulations reduced the number of travelers by some 10-15 percent in 1966. By contrast, the Soviet Union, with a vastly larger population, allows only a few tens of thousands to travel to the West annually, and most of these are officials. For Czechs, Rumanians and Bulgarians, traveling to the West remains difficult, but they are increasingly in touch with Westerners thanks to the large number of tourists visiting their countries. More important, all the East European peoples have greater access than their Soviet brothers to Western literature, art, films, music, and other cultural influences. Even women's fashions show the strong influence of French and Italian trends.

Another important factor differentiates the Soviet from the East European situation. While, of course, no organized opposition exists in any Communist country, in Eastern Europe there are strong forces which are resistive to the Communist ideology, particularly the Catholic Church. In Poland, and to a lesser degree in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the ties of religion seriously weaken the hold of the party over the nation.

Finally, nationalism plays a quite different role in the people's democracies than in the Soviet Union. For the Soviet ruling class, the ethnic loyalties of the non-Russian nationalities constitute a problem which, as Prof. Brzezinski has pointed out, may become more acute, but at least the Russian half of the population does not oppose the existing system for nationalistic reasons. On the contrary, the ruling bureaucracy is able to exploit Russian patriotism; it can make the Russians feel that, right or wrong, it is their country and their government.

In Eastern Europe nationalism could also be exploited to strengthen the Communist dictatorships; in fact, the Rumanian leadership has been doing just this with some success in the last two years. By defending national interests against the Soviet Union, particularly in the economic field, by taking an increasingly independent line in international affairs, by exalting the nation's past, and by going so far as to hint that it will reclaim the territories annexed by the Soviet Union, the Ceausescu regime has gained—at least for the time being—a certain popularity that helps it resist demands for greater freedom and strengthens its hold over the nation. But the other East European regimes are either unwilling, or unable, to follow this example. They feel too dependent upon the Soviet Union for their survival to take the risks involved in playing up nationalist, anti-Russian feelings. Nationalism for them is a source of weakness, not of strength. They are faced with demands not only for reforms and greater freedom but also for more independence from Russia, and they continue to be regarded as tools of Moscow.

With so many factors contributing to the weakening of the political system in most of the countries of Eastern Europe, one might be tempted to call the situation prerevolutionary. Yet in fact it is not; the mood of the people is antirevolutionary. The nations of Eastern Europe want change, but they hope it will come about in an evolutionary way.

There are quite a few reasons for this mood, but the most important is a sense of the futility of violent revolt, as shown by the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and the East German rising of 1953, and a decade earlier by the tragic Warsaw rising of 1944. Nobody came to the aid of the insurgents; their sacrifices were in vain. These memories die hard.

Yet while there is no indication of a revolutionary trend anywhere in Eastern Europe, it would be rash to conclude that a violent upheaval is out of the question. As Mr. Lyons rightly stressed in his commentary, revolution has always seemed "impossible" and apocalyptic until it occurred. To the examples he quoted, one could add others. Thus the bloody events in Poznan in June 1956, which paved the way for the October upheaval and which could easily have resulted in a full-scale uprising, started with a peaceful demonstration in which the participants had no thought of vio-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lence. Rebellions do not require an organization, or leaders, or a revolutionary plot. In the Poznan case, the error of a frightened security officer in ordering his men to open fire on an unarmed crowd in a few moments transformed a peaceful protest into a violent riot.

Several factors may in the future combine to create a climate more favorable to upheaval. First, a younger generation is coming along which has no personal memory of the uprising that failed. Young Poles were not yet born when the Warsaw rising took place. In a few years East German and Hungarian youths will know of their elders' revolt only from hearsay. Within the last year or two the authorities in several East European countries have announced the discovery of anti-state "conspiracies," mostly involving schoolboys. Such plots might be dismissed as infantile, but they allow conjecture that the mood of apathy that has marked the last decade may be slowly passing.

Another subtle psychological change can be noticed in current evaluation of the events of 1956. Until recently the opinion prevailed that the Hungarian revolution had been totally in vain, but that the Poles, by stopping short of revolt and by being satisfied with reforms and liberalization, had gained much without any sacrifice. Yet over a period of time Kadar has been forced to make far-reaching concessions in order to gain support and to erase the memories of his treason, while Gomulka has been busy withdrawing the concessions the party made in 1956. By now, quite a few Poles have come to think of the "Polish October" as a gigantic fraud perpetrated with great skill by the party to save itself. Although this view seems much exaggerated to the writer, the fact remains that there is little chance of a second "October." If there is another revolt, the Poles will not stop at half-measures. More important, many Poles have ceased to believe that the regime can really evolve peacefully into something better.

A third factor worth mentioning is the emergence of revolutionary groups that call on the working class to revolt against the Communist bureaucracy. Paradoxically, it is not the enemies of communism who openly advocate a revolution, but young Marxist intellectuals, such as the Polish University lecturers Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, who have been in prison since 1956. In a recent open letter addressed to the Polish party and smuggled to the West for publication, they declared that "in view of the impossibility of solving the economic and social crisis within the bureaucratic system, a revolution is inevitable." In their view, the "industrialized bureaucratic states"—the USSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Hungary—are all ripe for revolution, and while no one can forecast where a revolt may break out, there is no shred of doubt that it will spread to the whole camp.[2] While there are probably not many Marxist intellectuals of this persuasion, the fact that such trends exist among disillusioned Communists must be noted.

Perhaps the most important of the factors which make a violent change possible, even if improbable, is the view that the risk of Soviet intervention has lessened considerably since the crushing of Hungary in 1956. The fear of such intervention, which for many years was considered a virtual certainty in the event of an outbreak, has been the biggest deterrent to revolt even where discontent was extreme. Now opinion seems to be shifting. Certainly few East Europeans would share the conviction of Kuron and Modzelewski that Soviet intervention is already highly improbable. Since the two writers are persuaded that any outbreak would spread quickly to the Soviet Union itself, they maintain that "the possibilities of armed intervention by the Soviet bureaucracy (supposing it is still in power) would be measured not so much by the number of tanks and planes in its possession, but by the intensity of class conflict inside the USSR." Most East Europeans are nowhere as certain as this, but they have ceased to consider armed intervention by the Soviet Union inevitable. Future attitudes will depend in part, of course, on what happens in Asia: should the Soviet Union become involved in an armed conflict with China, the chances of its intervening to prevent changes in Eastern Europe would become almost nil in the eyes of East Europeans.

What, then, are the alternatives for Eastern Europe? The choice seems wider than in the Soviet Union itself, making predictions even more difficult.

Everything indicates a growing pressure on the Communist parties for greater freedom and more extensive economic and social reforms. Faced with such demands, how will the ruling bureaucracies react? Their likeliest attitude will be to make some concessions but to try to limit them as much as possible, to take two steps forward and one backward, never forgetting that a period of concession and relaxation is usually the most dangerous for a dictatorship: it was during such a period of liberalization that the East

[2] Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, *List Otwarty* (Open Letter), addressed to the Basic Party organization of the Polish United Workers' Party at Warsaw University; published under separate cover by the Paris monthly, *Kultura*, in 1966.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

German revolt, the Poznan events, and the Hungarian revolution took place.

Yet the East European Communists may find it more difficult than the Kremlin to keep changes and concessions under strict control. They will be faced with demands which are not, as yet, likely to be put to the Soviet rulers. For example, Djilas' demand for a two-party system is not yet heard in the Soviet Union, but it is openly discussed in Czechoslovakia.

The return to a Stalinist system of coercion cannot be excluded in Eastern Europe any more than in the Soviet Union, although it may seem a remote possibility. Here again, much will depend on developments in Asia. Should the Kremlin be able to reestablish its supremacy there, it may feel able to tell the East European leaders to resist demands for reforms and to suppress opposition by every possible means. On the other hand, however unlikely it may appear today, one cannot exclude the possibility that the Kremlin, preoccupied by the conflict with China, may come to the conclusion that it must have peace and tranquility at its European borders, and that this would be best guaranteed by having autonomous neighbors like Finland instead of discontented satellites.

A few years ago it seemed that Moscow might one day accept the Finnish solution for the East European states because of the danger that the Communist states might fall under the influence of China and become its allies against Russia, just as Albania did. A democratic, neutral and friendly Finland is certainly preferable to a Communist—but hostile—Albania. But this possibility now seems to have practically vanished; there will hardly be any new Albanias. Still, the Finnish solution may appear to the men in the Kremlin a lesser evil than chaos and violent upheaval, which would become a real threat in the case of Soviet involvement in Asia.

Another possibility is what could be called the Rumanian solution: a regime unwilling to make concessions could try instead to gain popular support by appealing to nationalist and anti-Russian feelings. The result would be a kind of nationalist, non-ideological Balkan dictatorship. It could work for a time. But, as already mentioned, few East European rulers are likely to follow Rumania's example.

Whether changes in Eastern Europe take place through peaceful evolution or through violent upheaval depends on factors unknown today, such as the future of Sino-Soviet relations, and also on what Mr. Robert Conquest has so aptly called the accidents of history. But there can be little doubt that changes of major significance are bound to come.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Marxism in France

GEORGE LICHTHEIM: *Marxism in Modern France.*
New York, Columbia University Press, 1966.
MILORAD M. DRACHKOVITCH, ED.: *Marxist Ideology in the Contemporary World.*
Hoover Institution Publications. New York, F.A. Praeger, 1966.

Reviewed by David Caute

FRENCH MARXISM has for the last ten years been in a state of permanent flux and revolution. The events of 1956 burst the dams. Today the visitor to Paris will find stimulating controversies in process between Marxists and neo-Marxists not only in the fields of politics and philosophy, but also among sociologists, historians and literary critics. Such a phenomenon calls for a work of mature synthesis and evaluation, and few scholars in the English-speaking world are better qualified for the task than George Lichtheim. Mr. Lichtheim's brilliant earlier study, *Marxism* (New York, F.A. Praeger, 1961), combined a sympathetic understanding of the original relevance of the Marxist critique of 19th century capitalism with a keenly empirical respect for the changing structure of modern technocratic economies. Appreciative of the virtues of Marxism as a method, as a tool for investigation, he showed himself refreshingly free from all orthodoxies.

The same virtues are evident in his new book, *Marxism in Modern France*. Yet I find it a disappointment. The fault lies not so much in the judgments or perspective as in the book's failure to live up to its title. It would be a great pity if, for example, graduate students were to assume that Mr. Lichtheim had covered the relevant ground and discussed all of the more influential contemporary French Marxists. He has not. To omit entirely Louis Althusser and his work is rather like offering a study of modern French social anthropology which leaves out of account Lévi-Strauss. Mr. Lichtheim is more a social philosopher than an historian of ideas, and what he has in fact provided is a highly selective essay which projects the author's own values through history and finally brings him face-to-face with the intellectuals who seem to him to be grappling most rewardingly with present-day socio-ideological problems. Consequently the discussion of the neo-Marxist revisionist school, formerly associated with the review *Arguments*, occupies a disproportionate space in the text. Other Marxists, with whom Mr. Lichtheim has less patience, are either ignored or accorded only a cursory glance. The general balance achieved would, I suspect, look very peculiar to a French intellectual, whether of the Left, Right or Center.

Essentially the book falls into two parts. The first half comprises a lucid examination of the historical development of Marxism in France, Until the 1930's at least, French Marxism was primarily a political phenomenon. Despite Guesde and Lafargue, and despite the creation in 1920 of the French Communist Party in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution, Marxism was very slow to penetrate the universities. While the depiction of the mutations of the French political Left provides the necessary backcloth for the rest of the book,

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one might have expected it to occupy perhaps a quarter of the available space rather than half. (In fact *Marxism in Modern France* is only 212 pages long, including the notes and index.) Apart from the valuable discussion of revisionist writing, and some useful pages on the German and other foreign sources which directly inspired the modern generation of French Marxists, it is fair to say that Mr. Lichtheim gives himself too little space to examine any other aspect of the subject thoroughly.

COMPARING GUSTAV WETTER'S systematic approach to the history of Soviet Marxism (*Dialectical Materialism*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958) with Mr. Lichtheim's essay technique, the advantages of the former seem overwhelming. It might have been helpful to begin by delineating, even at the risk of schematization, the basic divisions within the spectrum of French Marxism: the orthodox Communists (Garaudy *et al.*), the Trotskyists and neo-Trotskyists (Pierre Naville, Guérin, etc.), the existentialists and phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty and the earlier Sartre, the Christian Marxists (*Esprit*), the revisionists of the late 1950's (ranging from the dissaffected Henri Lefebvre to Morin), the later Sartreans, and, finally, the new Communist philosophy associated with Louis Althusser and his younger colleagues at the Ecole Normale Supérieure. Of course Mr. Lichtheim does touch upon some of these groups, and his critique of Merleau-Ponty is well worth reading, but the lack of systematization is clearly a symptom of the author's arbitrary selectivity. We need to know how these groups have interacted both in terms of attraction and repulsion.

Furthermore, if the title of a book is to have any relation to its contents, I can see no justification for the exclusion of historiography and literary criticism, fields in which French Marxism has recently been at its most creative and sophisticated. Nor do these fields exist in isolation. The present synthesis of neo-Marxism and existentialism reached by Sartre, for example, is partly the product of his work on Baudelaire, Genet and Flaubert, while the confident rejection of Sartre's philosophy of history by many Communist scholars has been reinforced by the researches of Soboul and other leading Marxist historians. Mr. Lichtheim pays remarkably little attention to the post-*Critique de la Raison Dialectique* Sartrean school, a movement which has generated sizeable repercussions within French Marxism as a whole.

The most inexplicable omission is Althusser. The fact that Althusser has been able to write from within the Communist Party is indicative of the changed climate of the 1960's. Whereas most orthodox Communist intellectuals have surmounted the problem of the growing gulf between Marxist categories and the realities of the age by juggling with the categories or dissipating the realities, Althusser has embarked upon a systematic epistemological reinterpretation of Marx's writings. Whether or not his conclusions are convincing (I do not find them so), Marxists both inside and outside France have had to recognize the quality of his work.

Althusser has realized that the Hegelian legacy is ultimately an embarrassment to Marxism. He has argued that, Marx's own opinion notwithstanding, Marx in no sense took over the Hegelian dialectic and tuned it upside down. Despite the retention of certain terms, such as "dialectic," Marx's fundamental "problematic" differed radically from Hegel's; in de-mystifying the dialectic and discarding speculative philosophy, says Althusser, Marx changed its very *structure*. Whereas Hegel reduced history to the single principle of an internal contradiction, Marx did not. His contradic-

Reviewers in This Issue

DAVID CAUTE—Presently with New York University's Schweitzer Program in the Humanities; author of *Communism and the French Intellectuals* (New York, Macmillan, 1964).

BEN B. SELIGMAN—Director of the Labor Relations and Research Center, University of Massachusetts (Amherst); author of *Main Currents in Modern Economics: Economic Thought Since 1870* (New York, Free Press, 1962).

F. L. CARSTEN—Masaryk Professor of Central European History at the University of London; author of *The Reichswehr and Politics* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1966).

FIRUZ KAZEMZADEH—Professor of History at Yale University (New Haven, Conn.); author of *The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 1917-1921* (New York, Philosophical Library, 1951).

ROBERT C. RICHTER—Formerly Associate Editor of *East Europe* (New York); now on the staff of *Problems of Communism*.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion is *surdéterminé*. In other words, it admits a multiplicity of concrete and superstructural factors. According to this interpretation, the traditional Marxist monism is contrary to the writings of Marx.

In a further essay, Althusser attempted to transcend yet another traditional difficulty: if ideologies in general are subjective expressions of class interests, must not the proletarian ideology be as subjective as the others? Althusser argues that this is the case, but adds that "socialist humanism" works as an instrument of historical change, whereas mature Marxism itself is the *science* of that change—in other words, it can be verified internally. The mature Marx had discarded humanism for a scientific sociology, and was indeed theoretically an anti-humanist. It is not surprising that almost all of Althusser's formulations have been politely but resolutely condemned by the party leadership and the official philosophers such as Roger Garaudy. Yet Althusser himself, Secretary-General of the Ecole Normale Supérieure, remains within the party.

If these omissions in Mr. Lichtheim's book are particularly disappointing, it is because Lichtheim himself is in every sense the best-equipped scholar to undertake such a study.

THE VOLUME *Marxist Ideology in the Contemporary World* is a collection of essays on related themes. Two distinctive notes are sounded throughout: confidence that Marxism must soon wither away, and a marked irritation that it has not already done so. Some of the contributors remind one of angry citizens debating why slum children continue to adhere to crime and violence despite all the excellent arguments advanced against such activities—and hitting upon every answer except the one that the children continue to live in slums. Nowhere in this volume is the validity of a fundamental critique of capitalism allowed. The mood of irritability is particularly marked in the opening essay by Professor Sidney Hook, on the subject of the continuing appeals of Marxism. Of course, what Professor Hook has to say about any aspect of the theory itself remains as distinguished as ever, and his discussion of the alienation theme is excellent. But when he reflects on the individuals who continue to flirt with, or take seriously, Marxism, exasperation replaces understanding and we are treated to a denunciation of "the latest varieties of alienation celebrated among the literary sophisticates of Paris and New York."

Professor Lewis S. Feuer provides an interesting essay on the appeals of the alienation concept to students in the United States, Japan and the Soviet Union. He detects a schism between student Marxism, which has turned from "exploitation" to "alienation," and middle-aged, bureaucratic Marxism. But even if such a duality exists in tendency, there surely also exist important intermediary varieties such as the class antagonism felt by many French and Italian workers towards their employers. Professor Feuer's view is evidently a projection of his belief that modern managerial society, whether socialist or capitalist, must generate a basic conflict between the managers and the managed. Therefore the new schism in Marxism "is as universal as the dualities in human nature itself."

Professor Joseph M. Bochenski's "Marxism in Communist Countries" is both relatively objective and informative. He discusses the evolution of official attitudes toward Marxist theory in the Soviet Union, and concludes that there now exists a tacit division, as follows: (a) basic dogma available to all ("there is no God"); (b) speculative superstructure ("there is a dialectical logic"); and (c) problems on the border between ideology and pure science. These are declassified doctrines.

In his "The End of Ideology in the Soviet Union?", Professor Daniel Bell approaches similiar ground. This is much the most rewarding essay in the volume. Mr. Bell shows how in recent years Soviet dialectical materialism has been on the defensive against science, which has finally gained the right to start from no other premises than its own. Bell believes that dialectical materialism is less and less able to cement together the different branches of thought; and since, apparently, the specifically socialist features of Soviet society are few, is not its end as an ideology in sight? As additional evidence, he cites the shift in Soviet economic planning toward Western methods of determining the best allocation of scarce resources (such as capital) to competing ends. Official Soviet ideology has been in continual retreat against previously denounced new techniques, such as cybernetics. All this is perfectly plausible. On the other hand, it has to be remembered that the existence of capitalism as it exists, and not simply as Soviet ideology depicts it, will for a long time to come reinforce the basic credibility of Marxism for millions of people in the world.

The economic essays in this volume sometimes suffer from a primitive view of Marxism as a diabolical cancer. I could find little to sympathize with in Professor Peter T. Bauer's "Marxism and

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Underdeveloped Countries." Professor Bauer is right in insisting that colonial rule has often developed the material resources of African and Asian countries, and has increased rather than diminished their total wealth. But he seems to be incapable of distinguishing between overall national wealth (or poverty) and sectional wealth (or poverty). The charge against capitalist colonialism, after all, is that it not only creamed off enormous profits, but that the benefit mainly accrued to the metropolitan countries rather than to the colonized ones. While the European working classes were able to make their demands for higher wages and greater welfare benefits felt, the African workers and peasants were unable to do so. But Mr. Bauer refuses to associate colonialism with exploitation in any form. Equally he refuses to accept that centralized planning will hasten the rate of development in the underdeveloped world. Under every bush he finds the Marxist snake. Even Gunnar Myrdal's call for a national economic development policy is said to "echo Marxist-Leninist ideas." From Professor Bauer's analysis, one would be forced to conclude that anyone regarding the activities of the Union Minière as a threat to the complete independence of the Congo is a victim of "a messianic, all-embracing secular religion promising salvation on earth."

The editor of this book, Mr. Milorad M. Drachkovitch, obviously wished to assemble a group of essays sharing common assumptions. This in itself is reasonable, although controversy can be more stimulating. Unfortunately, the viewpoint is often so extreme, so lacking in its range of sympathy, so uncritical of the system under which we ourselves live, that it fails to convince.

Critiques of Marxism

MURRAY WOLFSON: *A Reappraisal of Marxian Economics.*
New York, Columbia University Press, 1966.
FRED M. GOTTHEIL: *Marx's Economic Predictions.*
Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 1966.

Reviewed by Ben B. Seligman

ONE OF THE MORE fascinating games that economists play is the challenge and refutation of Marxian economics. Started by Philip Wicksteed, a kindly 19th-century theologian-economist, the game was continued by the Italian sociologist, Vilfredo Pareto, the Austrian economist Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, and in our own day by the noted MIT theorist, Paul Samuelson. Hence, the books under review may be regarded as the latest efforts in a long and honorable tradition.

In almost all instances critics of Marxian economics have focused on its technical apparatus. Professors Wolfson and Gottheil both approach their task in a similar manner, but with some variations on the main theme. Against the labor theory of value—in any case a thin reed on which to base an economic model—the critics have set notions of marginal utility. Against the theory of increasing misery, they have posed the patent advance in the West's standard of living. Against the idea of increasingly severe economic crises, they have fixed the continuous gain in the Gross National Product. The rebuttal seems incontrovertible: Marxian theory fails as economic analysis and as predictive science.

Why is this so? According to Mr. Wolfson, an assistant professor of economics at the University of Oregon, Marx could not come up with a proper theory because he was a rationalist whose analytical structure could not help but be based on false

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

philosophical foundations. The entire first chapter of Wolfson's book is given over to exploring these foundations, with the conclusion that the empirical content of Marxian economics is virtually nil. It becomes impossible, consequently, to deduce "singular factual data" from Marxian propositions. Marx's rationalism, argues the author, was of the dialectical variety, a peculiar form of 19th-century discourse that enabled him to evade contradiction between analysis and fact. The dialectic has to be viewed as opposed to scientific positivism, a system of logic in which propositions were to be verified (or refuted, according to some contemporary logicians, such as Karl Popper). In Marxism, then, which was a dialectical system, there was no need to worry about potential falsifiers in the system—that is, to construct a positive theory in a way that might enable one to reject any of its statements as unverifiable. A rationalist theory could include diverse and even contradictory elements. Marxism, says Wolfson, rides many horses at once.

Professor Gottheil of the University of Illinois, on the other hand, is concerned mainly with the panoply of predictions that may be extracted from the Marxian corpus—*Capital, Theories of Surplus Value, The Communist Manifesto, The German Ideology*, and numerous other works. He tallies in all 153 predictions, 77 from *Capital* alone. However, one is not always certain how Mr. Gottheil evaluates the Marxian crystal ball, for many of the predictions are simply listed without much comment. As to technical analysis, he does not stray too far from the standard established by earlier critics, which is to say that his book does not add appreciably to an understanding of the Marxian schema. In this sense, Mr. Wolfson's approach is somewhat more venturesome.

The philosophic or methodological problem, according to Wolfson, may be sharpened when we set rationalist discourse against positive, empirical analysis. Rationalism wants to know why historical events take place and whether they were really necessary. Empiricism suggests that events happen because they have certain points of origin in time and unfold as a matter of causal sequence. Rationalism, in a sense, asks moral questions; empiricism searches for facts to sustain predictability. Morality implies judgment and prescribed norms; facts are objectively neutral and positive in the scientific sense.

Yet all this, it would seem, is a simplistic conception of the Marxian intent. Granted that Marxian economics *in detail* is wrong on many counts, an evaluation of its place in the history of thought nevertheless demands that we examine it from the inside. Failing this effort, it is a relatively simple matter bluntly to oppose Marxian analysis with subjective utility theory, as Wolfson does, and from this to state that Marx could not explain price ratios of exchange. As if that indeed was his purpose, Volume III notwithstanding!

INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, Mr. Gottheil begins with what has come to be known as the transformation problem, how Marx got from value to price. The logical difficulties inherent in the procedure were recognized a long time ago. Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, a founder of the Austrian utility school, greeted the third volume of *Capital* in 1896 with the pronouncement that the Marxian system had come to its demise. The shift from value to price could not be made within the context of Marxian theory, said Böhm-Bawerk, for the third volume simply implied price determination through cost of production, an illegitimate procedure from the standpoint of the first volume. The transformation of value into prices consequently failed to maintain the Marxian balance, for total profit could not equal total surplus value at the same time that total prices equaled total profit. Mr. Gottheil, unfortunately, seems to accept the Marxian position that a theory of price within the framework of *Capital* is perfectly valid. He does not make it clear that if Volume III is to be accepted, then the labor theory of value in Volume I must be set aside as so much metaphysics.

Nevertheless, Marxian economics ought to be studied functionally; that is, one ought to uncover what its main ideas revealed for the particular time in history to which they relate. One ought to seek its genetic relevance and explore the character of its intellectual growth before weighing its truth or falsity. It was such a perception as this that permitted Joseph A. Schumpeter, an avowed anti-Marxian, to demonstrate that Marx ". . . was primarily concerned with sharpening the tools of analysis proffered by the science of his day, with straightening out logical difficulties, and with building . . . a theory that in nature and intent was truly scientific whatever its shortcomings." In a sense, Gottheil tries to assume a Schumpeterian posture, but does not quite succeed.

The validity of Schumpeter's comment can be perceived only when Marx's basic purpose is grasped. Orthodox economists have evolved over the years some rather elegant analyses that describe

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with great accuracy the price of tea and other little things. Marx, however, possessing much cruder tools, and working decades before the age of Keynes, responded to broader and ultimately more significant questions. He was interested in monopoly, cycles, accumulation, and economic growth, issues that have now come to the forefront of economic inquiry. Yet Marx did reveal a grudging admiration for capitalism; its productive powers, he conceded, had spread over the face of the globe, and it had increased the wealth of nations. He merely wanted to prove that capitalism's inner contradictions would cause it to collapse.

THE LABOR THEORY of value, which is where Marx began, had a logical function, for with this notion, now discarded by almost all economists, he sought to establish the conditions of economic equilibrium. Marx's value theory was, of course, a macroeconomic conception—that is, it was applicable to the economy as a whole, for the rate of surplus value applied to a single enterprise could be little more than a heroic abstraction. Unfortunately, and here Mr. Wolfson is quite right, the labor theory of value fails as an operational model. As a consequence, it cannot handle details. Try to explain price level changes via surplus value and one comes up against the skilled versus unskilled worker problem. Or how does one account for packaging and bookkeeping services as elements of cost? What indeed is "abstract labor?" And how does one define "socially necessary labor time?" The inevitable conclusion is that the first six chapters of the first volume of *Capital* are unadorned metaphysics. Yet, while these questions are explored in competent fashion by Wolfson, it is all done without any connection to Marx's supposed rationalist bias. The author's analysis is almost exclusively framed in the somewhat forbidding format of mathematical economics, leading one to question the need for the long philosophic disquisition at the beginning of the book.

Further, Mr. Wolfson, who is primarily interested in value theory, wages, exploitation, and economic crisis, pays rather minimal attention to the Marxian schema of circulation and accumulation. This is a pity, for many economists will concede that these portions of *Capital,* mainly in the second volume, present the most spectacular parts of Marxian economic doctrine. They suggest in a fundamental way a theory of economic development and offer a highly suggestive analysis of the impact of accumulation. Industries were divided by Marx into those supplying new means of production, those providing workers with subsistence, and those whose output consisted of luxury goods for the edification of capitalists. Variable capital, constant capital, and surplus value represented the components of each industry. In all three groups surplus value might be consumed or invested. If the latter took place, surplus value was converted into either constant or variable capital. In essence, Marx constructed a flow analysis of the national income, one of the first such models in the history of economic thought.

At first there was no accumulation, but merely replacement, as in the stationary state of ordinary economics. The flow contained elements of aggregate supply and demand, no technical progress, and a constant ratio of capital to labor, analytical devices that economists have always used. The dynamics were introduced with "expanded reproduction," intended to show how capital was augmented, and how it might increase more rapidly in some sectors than output did in others. All this suggested an inevitable instability that could only cause the system to falter periodically.

Wolfson's treatment of this aspect of Marxian doctrine is less than completely satisfactory. The patent contradiction between the falling rate of profit and the "law" of increasing misery seems lost in a welter of mathematical equations. The falling rate of profit, according to Marx, was rooted in the very structure of the economy: in effect, declining aggregate demand did not enter the analysis at this point. Rather, it was the increase in the organic composition of capital, the higher ratio of capital to labor, that explained the tendency for profit to fall. Yet accumulation could not really continue unless the profit ratio was favorable, for without profit there could be no accumulation. Had Marx redefined the relationships in his model to allow for a decline in constant capital, he might have acknowledged the sort of technological change that was capital saving. In such instances, surplus value might be maintained at a constant or larger proportion without reducing the rate of profit. The most serious weakness in the theory, however, was the refusal to relate profit to the rate of output and to effective demand. In short, the Marxian theory of the falling rate of profit is too constricted to be completely useful for analytical purposes.

MR. GOTTHEIL'S EXPOSITION of circulation and accumulation, the core of Marx's law of capitalist motion, is fairly lucid. He sticks quite close to

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the original formulation, without translating the analysis into modern mathematical notation. Thus the degree of turnover is effectively incorporated into Gottheil's analysis, as well as the "models" of reproduction. Here the transformation problem seems to enter somewhat surreptitiously, for, says Gottheil: "Had Marx transformed value into price notations . . . the simple reproduction model he developed could no longer generate the equilibrium . . . he presumed followed from the model."

One would think that the predictions flowing from such a dubious technical apparatus would have been put to the test by the author. Only occasionally, however, does Gottheil do this, as in his comments on Marx's analysis of the Civil War and on the Marxian theory of breakdown. Otherwise, the 153 predictions are simply tallied, listed and classified. Possibly it is useful to know that Marx made so many predictions. Yet at the least, the author might have pointed out that some of the predictions, such as the falling rate of profit, were genuinely significant for Marx while others were no doubt quite trivial. It would have been good, too, to have had the author's views on which issues weighed heavily in the historical balance, for there was much in Marx that anticipated modern thinking—*e.g.*, his comment on the compulsion to produce beyond reasonable demand; his realization that the latter could affect investment, an idea close to the contemporary concept of acceleration; and his emphasis on technology, revealing that investment and accumulation were at the heart of economic change.

As both authors suggest, it is something of a tribute that *Capital*, however chaotic the text, must be repeatedly refuted, "even after one hundred years of refinement of the competing techniques of [standard] economic theory" (Wolfson). This exercise seems necessary because Marxian propositions are so attractively facile: they *promise* solutions of specific economic problems, though the promises cannot be redeemed. Its very generality renders the Marxian system incapable of unraveling issues in detail. Nonetheless, Marxism keeps on exerting an appeal, and one supposes that each new generation will have to examine for itself the problems and contradictions inherent in the doctrine. The books reviewed, despite their technical format, are essentially useful contributions to this continuing investigation.

Reviews in Brief

The Comintern

MILORAD M. DRACHKOVITCH AND BRANKO LAZITCH, EDS.: *The Comintern: Historical Highlights.* New York, F. A. Praeger, 1966.

DESPITE ITS TITLE, this composite volume of essays, recollections and documents contains little about any "historical highlights" of the Comintern. What many of the contributors discuss is the increasing extension of Russian control over the Comintern and its sections in different countries.

An essay by Mr. Branko Lazitch, based on interviews with seven former leading French Communists, describes the tight control over French party activities exercised through various emissaries sent from Moscow and through French party representatives resident in Moscow (with their names and periods of activity.) Mr. Lazitch also discusses the functions and composition of the real directing organ of the Comintern, the Little Commission, which had five members—three Russians, one usually a German, and the other an Italian—and whose "decisions had the force of law." Unfortunately we are told little about the origin of the Little Commission. Apparently it was set up in the early years of Stalin's rule.

The Lazitch essay is supplemented by extracts from the recollections of two leading French Communists, Henri Barbé and Albert Vassart. Barbé offers a graphic description of a meeting of the Comintern Presidium in December 1928, which sat in judgment of two "deviationists," Angelo Tasca and Jules Humbert-Droz, and was addressed by Stalin who "was listened to as one listens to an oracle." The Vassart extracts make clear that the switch to Popular Front tactics in the spring of 1934 was forced upon a very reluctant French leadership by the Russians in

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

control of the Comintern, especially by Manuilski.

That the Russians could impose the "correct" (rightist) tactics when local party leaders preferred an ultra-left policy is also borne out by another essay: Mr. Richard Thornton's discussion of Comintern policy towards China in 1928. After the disastrous defeat of the Canton Commune in December 1927 (an adventure undertaken at Comintern orders), Stalin favored a strategy of protracted guerrilla warfare rather than a direct challenge to the ruling Kuomintang. The extreme Left, however, advocated a policy of immediate revolt and attacks on the large cities, which could only have ended in another disaster. "The Comintern saw that its main opportunity lay in the countryside," at a time when the large majority of the party members were peasants, and it opposed "the tendency to destroy cities and kill, burn and rob purposely." Thus apparently even Stalin was able to draw the correct lessons from past failures.

As noted before, one of the major themes of this volume is Moscow's growing control over the Comintern sections. But this can also be exaggerated. When Mrs. Babette Gross, in her paper on the German Communists' United Front activities, asserts (without producing any evidence) that "Stalin was anxious to avoid bloody clashes between Communists and rightists in Germany" in 1931, the reader may legitimately wonder why Stalin did not issue any such orders to the German party. Surely his orders would have been obeyed? Some of Mr. Drachkovitch's assertions in his essay on the Comintern and the Partisan movement in Yugoslavia in 1941-42 are even more far-fetched—*e.g.*, "that the partisan insurrection and seizure of power were the best planned such enterprises in the history of the Communist International," and that they constituted a "conspiracy." But the evidence contained in his essay shows how tenuous were the contacts between Moscow and the partisans at this time. Their success, as Mr. Drachkovitch himself shows, was made possible above all by the wartime destruction of the Yugoslav state, by the demolition of the political, administrative and military structures, and by the chaos resulting from this collapse. A similar objection may be raised to the author's attempt to link Tito's tactics with the new directives of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern. These tactics seem to have been due to the situation facing the Yugoslav Communists in 1941 and to their reaction to it, rather than to any outside directives.

In short, there is much material of absorbing interest in this volume—including, in addition to the essays mentioned above, several documents from the early 1920's (especially Paul Levi's report to the Executive Committee on the splitting of the Italian Socialist Party by two Comintern emissaries in January 1921 and his subsequent controversy with Radek)—as well as a good deal that is overstated or questionable. It contains several valuable contributions to a controversial subject, and much of the raw material for its editors' forthcoming history of the Communist International.

F. L. Carsten

The Civil War

GEORGE A. BRINKLEY: *The Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in South Russia, 1917-1921: A Study in the Politics and Diplomacy of the Russian Civil War*. Notre Dame, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1966.

ON NOVEMBER 7, 1917, the Bolsheviks easily overthrew the Provisional Government which had been fatally weakened by the failure of the July offensive, the relentless conflict with the Petrograd Soviet, and the attempted *coup* of General Kornilov. The decisive factor was the absence of a military force willing to fight in defense of the democratic regime. Yet only a few months later anti-Bolshevik armies came into being in the North, the East and the South. They engaged the Reds in a bloody civil war which lasted almost three years, devastated large areas, exacted a heavy toll in lives and treasure, created lasting hatreds, and militarized both the Bolshevik party and the Soviet state.

Professor George A. Brinkley deals with the most important of the White forces, the Volunteer Army, and with its relations with Russia's former allies, Britain and France. Since the Volunteer Army interacted with the various governments and parties in the Ukraine, with the anarchist bands of Makhno, the Don and Kuban cossacks, the governments of the three Transcaucasian republics (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), the peasant guerrillas of the Black Sea coast, as well as others, the author must, and does, go beyond the narrower confines suggested by his title.

Having shown in the first two chapters the incredible political, economic, and administrative disorganization which had overtaken South Russia, Professor Brinkley traces the rise of the Volunteer Army and parallel with it, the Franco-British intervention. He sees the latter as a result of allied fear of Germany, not as a sinister plot to strangle the Soviet regime in its cradle. However, once Germany had collapsed, there was no longer a legitimate reason to continue the intervention.

The Franco-British intervention was half-hearted, uncoordinated and entirely inadequate to the task it was supposed to accomplish. The two great powers had virtually no policy in Russia after the Armistice of November 1918, which, as Winston Churchill pointed out, "proved to be the death warrant of the Russian national [*i.e.* White] cause."

On the basis of a vast amount of material, some of it unpublished, Professor Brinkley shows that in the final analysis the White movement could depend only on itself. In the end, the Volunteer Army proved incapable of solving the political problems of South Russia. The Army was beset by conflicting ideologies and personalities, and did not offer an inspiring alternative to Bolshevism. It aroused the suspicions of the left while failing to gain the loyalty of the right. Worst of all, it failed to come to terms with the non-Russian nationalities of the former Empire. While poor relations with the Mountaineers of the Caucasus or with Georgia were a hindrance, lack of an understanding with the reborn Poland was fatal. Moreover, the Volunteer Army could never coordinate its moves even with other White armies, such as those of Kolchak in the East. Thus the Bolsheviks were able to deal with their enemies one at a time, defeating each in turn.

One wishes the author had devoted some space to the political tactics employed by the Bolsheviks in undermining the Volunteer Army. Indeed, the conspicuous neglect of the Reds is this book's most serious shortcoming. Though the author did not intend to write a military history, a map would have helped readers who are not familiar with the geography of South

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Russia, the Ukraine, the Crimea, and Transcaucasia. Despite this, the book is a significant contribution to the growing literature on the Russian Civil War.

Firuz Kazemzadeh

Soviet Cartoons

MICHAEL M. MILENKOVITCH: *The View from Red Square: A Critique of Cartoons from Pravda and Izvestia, 1947-1964.* New York, Hobbs, Dorman and Company Inc., 1966.

IT SHOULD COME as no surprise to most people that the cartoons which appear in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* constitute an important element of Soviet propaganda, or that they have consistently projected a starkly unattractive image of the West and particularly of the United States. Caricature is by definition satiric and by nature didactic, and its power to influence minds has been recognized for centuries, long before Honoré Daumier sketched his world of monsters. The Russians have been no more astute in recognizing the value of such a weapon than anyone else, but they have perhaps been more consistent in using it.

In this volume, Mr. Milenkovitch has trained his political scientist's eye on 17 years of Soviet cartoons which appeared in the two principal Soviet dailies in order to find out what they can tell us about the shifts or constants in Soviet policy over a period which witnessed the Soviet reactions to the Marshall Plan, the several Berlin crises, the Korean War, Stalin's death, the "Spirit of Geneva," the 1956 revolutions and the Cuban missile crisis. Judging by the cartoons he has selected, the job must indeed have been tedious, for they are, at least by non-Soviet standards, clumsy, cluttered, unimaginative and trite. One cannot avoid the faint suspicion that at least a few Soviet readers felt the same way about them.

By limiting his investigation to only two sources and by not taking into account the content of the articles and editorials that appeared on the same pages as the cartoons, the author has set himself a difficult task and one of questionable reward. Mr. Milenkovitch's thesis is that Soviet cartoons have in the past telegraphed certain behavioral changes on the international level to which we should have paid more attention. With the help of charts and statistics, he claims that a more careful reading of cartoons in 1959 would have shown (along with other evidence) that the Soviet Union had no intention of concluding any meaningful negotiations during Khrushchev's visit to the United States or during the Paris Summit Conference of that same year. He further suggests that all Soviet postures on the international scene must be balanced against what the Soviet cartoonist presents to his readers, and that this is almost always calculated to produce an unfavorable image of the West.

Cartoons are no doubt valuable indicators of many things, such as prevailing attitudes, value systems, as well as psychological patterns of the cartoonist. To put too much emphasis on them, however, does seem like carrying positivism too far. Cartoonology may be scientific, and in the case of the Soviet Union it does tell us some of the things we want to know, but saying that the often tasteless scribblings of Kukryniksy or Yefimov are harbingers of policy change clearly overstates the case. Soviet policy has reversed itself many times without much attention to domestic public opinion. Even Mr. Milenkovitch points out that on many occasions the Soviet cartoonists have kept silent on issues to avoid embarrassment or confusion of images in the minds of Soviet readers.

The View from Red Square does us a service by reminding us that Soviet policy makers pursue a dual objective, that they tell us one thing and the Russian people another. Books such as this certainly do not darken knowledge, but one wonders if the little light they shed is worth all the trouble.

Robert C. Richter

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The War in Vietnam

EDITORS' NOTE: The following two articles deal with two intriguing aspects of the Vietnamese conflict. Mr. McGovern's essay theorizes on the reasons for and extent of the Soviet Union's involvement in that conflict, while Mr. Donnell focuses his attention on the role and composition of the Viet Cong as described in Douglas Pike's recent book, Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.

Moscow and Hanoi

By Raymond L. McGovern

Over the past two and a half years the Soviet Union has pursued a course in Vietnam determined first and foremost by the exigencies of its conflict with Communist China. Khrushchev's successors decided soon after his fall to involve the USSR more deeply in the Vietnamese conflict, calculating that that this course would enable them, more effectively than anything else, to counter and neutralize Peking's campaign to supplant Moscow as leader of the Communist movement and other "progressive" forces throughout the world. They judged that such action would not entail prohibitive risks of an armed confrontation with the United States.

Even though this initial decision was almost immediately overtaken by events which Moscow had not anticipated—*i.e.*, the massive US military buildup in South Vietnam and the inauguration of a sustained program of air strikes against the North —the Soviet leaders have managed to make the best of a potentially dangerous situation and have displayed a flexibility that has enabled them, by and large, to achieve their primary objective of frustrating the Chinese challenge. Hence the Chinese-inspired complaint that Moscow is doing its utmost "to exploit the Vietnam issue against China." [1]

Any study of recent Soviet tactics in Vietnam must go back to the autumn of 1964 and the fall of Khrushchev. It is clear that the ex-leader's associates had become increasingly disenchanted and alienated by his erratic, impulsive behavior, which

Mr. McGovern is an American specialist in Sino-Soviet affairs. He has taught at the Institute of Russian Studies, Fordham University (Bronx, N.Y.), and is currently doing research work in the Washington, D. C. area.

[1] *Zeri i Popullit* (Tirana), Dec. 13, 1966.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had had deleterious effects in various domestic and foreign areas. His successors soon indicated their feeling that the cardinal fault in his conduct of foreign affairs had been the way he handled the conflict with China. He had left the international Communist movement a shambles, and Moscow's claims to leadership in serious jeopardy.

The new leaders gave first priority to doing what they could to repair the damage to Moscow's international position. A careful reassessment of Khrushchev's anti-Chinese crusade led to the conclusion that, although his basic policy of unflinching opposition to the Chinese challenge was correct, his manner of conducting it was foolish and, in fact, played into the hands of Peking. In the Kremlin's judgment, a more subtle tactical line was demanded.

The Soviets clearly were not prepared to introduce any essential changes in the Khrushchevian policy of peaceful coexistence. Here too, however, they reasoned that the ousted leader had been unnecessarily and unwisely straightforward in the manner in which he had pressed for improved relations with the West, especially with the United States. Moscow had been stung more than once because of this unsophisticated approach, and Peking had been quick to exploit the propaganda windfall. A more adroit approach was drawn up to counter more effectively the challenge from China.

Preoccupied with the Chinese problem, Khrushchev's successors decided to readjust the priorities given to the USSR's various foreign policy goals. While retaining the essence of their predecessor's policies toward both Peking and Washington, they proceeded to modify the trappings with which the world had become familiar while Khrushchev was in power. The resulting shift in emphasis was manifested in various ways, most obviously in the propaganda emitting from Soviet media. Less stress was given to the necessity for, and the benefits of, a global policy of peaceful coexistence, and Moscow's press and radio broadcasts played up the firmness of Soviet support for "national liberation movements" throughout the world.

But propaganda alone was insufficient. The Soviet leadership was clearly in search of other relatively cheap—but more concrete and hopefully more convincing—ways of demonstrating its revolutionary élan. A Soviet reassessment of the situation in Vietnam made it increasingly apparent that the first and most effective step might be taken there. What better way to draw the sting out of Chinese accusations than for Moscow to launch, with appropriate fanfare, a dramatic campaign of political and material support for the Vietnamese Communists, who alone were engaged in an open military confrontation with the "arch-imperialist" United States?

A move of this kind could not, of course, be taken lightly. We can be sure that Brezhnev and Kosygin carefully weighed the risks against the anticipated benefits in the light of all the evidence available in late 1964 and early 1965 pertaining to American intentions in Vietnam and the military prospects of the Viet Cong. We can be just as sure that the vast preponderance of this evidence led the Soviet leaders to feel relatively safe in concluding that the risk of a dangerous and open Soviet-US military confrontation would be minimal.

In order to comprehend fully the reasons for this conclusion, it is necessary to reconstruct—at least in outline—the situation as it must have appeared to the Russians in late 1964. The Soviet leaders, of course, paid close attention to the Johnson-Goldwater presidential election campaign and drew from President Johnson's overwhelming victory what they thought to be appropriate conclusions as to its implications for the Vietnam struggle.

Moreover, the Soviets may already have been somewhat predisposed toward the judgment that Washington would probably shun deeper involvement in Vietnam. Quite conceivably, they were influenced by their own assessment of what policy alternatives were feasible, even for such superpowers as the United States and the Soviet Union. As for themselves, the Russians had hitherto shown a determination to avoid becoming too heavily committed in an area such as Vietnam, geographically distant from the USSR and with relatively slight relevance to Russian national interests. They probably judged the situation to be analogous from the standpoint of US interests and consequently would have considered it highly unlikely that Washington would in two years time have committed close to half a million men to the struggle in Vietnam. Even now that this has happened, it apparently remains somewhat incomprehensible to Moscow.

Anticipating no significant change in the extent of the US commitment in South Vietnam, the Soviets also doubtless took a rosy view of the prospects for the Viet Cong war effort, which in late 1964 looked very good indeed. It is clear that—barring a drastic and speedy step-up in US involvement—the Vietnamese Communists expected at that time to be able, within a matter of months, to drive such South Vietnamese and US troops as were left into the sea. Moreover, it seems universally recognized now that these expectations were not mere wishful thinking.

Thus, convinced that Washington would not take the drastic steps necessary to prevent or even delay an otherwise inevitable Communist victory in South Vietnam, the Soviet leaders evidently judged it safe enough to become more deeply involved in Vietnam. They may indeed have reasoned that they could hardly

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

afford not to. For here lay what appeared to be a ready-made opportunity to get in before the dénouement and claim a share of the credit for the imminent Viet Cong victory, thus bolstering Moscow's position in the cold war with China and preventing the latter from gaining most of the benefit. In certain respects, the USSR's decision to enter the fray on the side of what it saw to be the imminent victor resembled Stalin's last-minute entry into the war against Japan.

There were some early hints that Khrushchev's successors had concluded that an offer of increased political and material support for Hanoi would serve them well in neutralizing Peking's anti-Soviet campaign. In early November 1964, just after President Johnson's definitive victory at the polls, North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong arrived in Moscow together with other foreign Communist dignitaries who seized the occasion of the November anniversary celebrations to journey to the Soviet capital for personal encounters with the Kremlin's new leaders. That Pham Van Dong liked what he heard in Moscow was indicated shortly after his return to Hanoi, when the North Vietnamese took the unusual step of withdrawing an anti-Soviet article which had already appeared in the November issue of their theoretical journal, *Hoc Tap*. After distributing early copies of the issue, the North Vietnamese suddenly called them back and replaced the article with a relatively innocuous speech.[2] This curious incident strongly suggested that Khrushchev's successors had decided to reverse his policy of disengagement from Vietnam and had conveyed this intention to the North Vietnamese premier during his November visit.

On January 31, 1965, *Pravda* published the announcement that Soviet Premier Kosygin would shortly lead a top-level delegation to Hanoi,[3] and the inclusion of high-ranking military and economic officials in the delegation clearly indicated Moscow's intention to step up Soviet assistance to North Vietnam. The Chinese immediately saw in this a dangerous challenge to their influence in Hanoi and, as will be shown later, overreacted in such heavy-handed fashion as to play ultimately into Moscow's hands.

Kosygin's eye-catching visit to the North Vietnamese capital was overtaken, however, by unanticipated events. Even while he was there, US bombing of the North in retaliation for the Viet Cong attack on the US base at Pleiku added a new dimension to the conflict. Surprised and angered, the Soviet leaders were forced to reassess their increased involvement in Vietnam.

After Premier Kosygin returned home, the Soviet leaders accordingly faced some hard decisions. Their approach to the North Vietnamese had been predicated on the need to give priority to challenging Chinese influence in Hanoi and in the Communist movement generally. At the same time, however, they had sought to employ tactics that would not entail excessive risks of a serious military confrontation with the United States, as this would not only run counter to the USSR's vital national interests but would also, to some degree, lend weight to Peking's thesis that peaceful coexistence between the Communist and capitalist powers is impossible. As a result of the new developments in Vietnam, the Soviet leaders could no longer feel quite so confident that the risks involved in increased Soviet involvement were as controllable as they had previously calculated. Nevertheless, in spite of the new uncertainties resulting from open US raids against North Vietnam, they evidently concluded that the risks were still manageable and worth taking in view of the anticipated advantages in the struggle with the Chinese.

To be sure, a larger Soviet role in Vietnam would necessarily lead to a worsening of the atmosphere in Soviet-US relations. Moscow's leaders, however, considered this disadvantage tolerable when weighed against potential Soviet gains in the conflict with China, and they thought that the deterioration could almost certainly be kept within safe bounds. These calculations have proven essentially correct. The Soviets have coupled their more active opposition to the United States in Vietnam with a "freeze" in such well-publicized areas of Soviet-US relations as cultural exchanges, but at the same time they have avoided other provocative moves they might have made—in Berlin, for example—and have displayed a consistent desire to keep the lines open to Washington.

Moscow probably felt that its course in Vietnam was jeopardizing no impending East-West agreements of any moment which had not already been placed in jeopardy by factors quite independent of the Vietnam war. In fact, the Soviets have on occasion utilized the "freeze" in Soviet-US relations over the Vietnam issue to justify curtailment of certain low-level agreements and contacts in which they had but little, if any, interest. Soviet cancellation of the scheduled US-Soviet track meet in the summer of 1966 was a flagrant example of this tactic. (There is room for suspicion that the Russians'

[2] For a translation of the speech by Le Thanh Ngi, which was substituted in place of the anti-Soviet article by Hong Chuong in the November 1964 issue of *Hoc Tap*, see Joint Publications Research Service, No. 27,971, Dec. 23, 1964.

[3] Interestingly, the same issue of *Pravda* warmly welcomed President Johnson's State of the Union remarks about US-Soviet relations. Certainly no coincidence, this indicated an attempt by the new Soviet leaders to temper Washington's reaction to the announcement of the Kosygin mission to Hanoi.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dim prospect of success in this competition—in contrast to their unprecedented victory the previous year—was a very real factor in the cancellation.) On the other hand—and more important—a number of recent Soviet-American bilateral agreements have demonstrated that the USSR never intended to let the "freeze" preclude understandings with Washington when some concrete Soviet interest might be served.

Apart from this generally reassuring review of the probable impact of Soviet support for Hanoi on relations with the United States, the Soviet leaders probably felt that they could not afford to back away from their decision in favor of increased involvement in Vietnam without serious prejudice to their position vis-à-vis China. Kosygin's visit to Hanoi obviously made it even more difficult for Moscow to extricate itself, and even if the Russians had not already committed themselves, they would almost certainly have felt compelled, in view of increased US military support of South Vietnam, to provide some aid for the defense of a "brother socialist state."

Moreover, on the positive side, Moscow had already derived tangible advantage from its more cooperative attitude toward the North Vietnamese, in the form of the virtual cessation of the rather obvious—albeit indirect—criticisms of Soviet "revisionism" which had been voiced by Hanoi during Khrushchev's tenure. With this as a beginning, the Soviet leaders naturally hoped that material aid to the North Vietnamese would elicit positive expressions of gratitude from Hanoi which would draw much of the sting out of Chinese allegations of Soviet perfidy.

While they thus appeared determined to proceed with their plans for more positive support of North Vietnam, the Soviet leaders were manifestly alarmed by the launching of sustained US air strikes against the North and set about mustering political pressure for an early cessation of the bombing and a damping down of hostilities. In a televised report in late February 1965 on his mission to North Vietnam earlier that month, Kosygin stressed that "peace-loving countries" were trying "to find ways of solving problems in Indochina at a conference table," and he called for an end to "US aggression" in order "to create conditions for the exploration of avenues leading to the normalization of the situation in Indochina." [4]

This cautious formulation was accompanied by a widespread Soviet propaganda campaign in which the Russians elicited and played up proposals by various organizations, foreign governments, and Communist parties for a timely reconvention of the Geneva conference or some other political forum whereby the conflict might be moved away from the battlefield. Concomitantly the USSR employed various diplomatic maneuvers designed to increase pressure for a political settlement. Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov in Paris deliberately gave the impression of close Franco-Soviet collaboration in seeking ways to reach a negotiated settlement. On February 23, 1965, he paid an ostentatious call on President De Gaulle, apparently to associate the USSR with French appeals for an accord excluding all foreign intervention in Indochina.[5] In early March TASS reported a Vinogradov speech in which he stressed that the Vietnam crisis could not be resolved by military means, and that the solution lay in talks.[6]

That Moscow was in dead earnest to see what could be done to move the conflict to the conference table was indicated by an unpublicized Soviet diplomatic initiative undertaken on the day after Kosygin arrived back in Moscow from Hanoi. As the Chinese later revealed in a polemic charging Moscow with double-dealing in Vietnam,[7] the Russians had sent a message to Hanoi and Peking in which they suggested that a new international conference on Indochina be convened without prior conditions—a proposal which was, of course, rebuffed by the North Vietnamese and Chinese. Although Peking's disclosure probably exaggerated the Soviet move in order to drive home the charge of Soviet perfidy, there is no reason to doubt that such a move did take place—the more so since the Soviets have never denied it.

Moscow's interest in stemming the conflict in Vietnam is readily understandable. Not only have the Russians from early on displayed an apparently genuine concern over the potential dangers of escalation of the war, but they have been acutely embarrassed by the fact that the US has been able to carry the war to North Vietnam, a brother Communist country, with relative impunity. This embarrassment has, of course, grown to the extent that the more sophisticated Soviet weaponry supplied to North Vietnam since early 1965 has proved ineffectual. Hence Moscow's recognition that its interests would be better served if it could persuade Hanoi to make a tactical move toward some kind of negotiations, if only to bring an end to US air raids on the North.

The Soviet leaders quickly learned, however, that they could do virtually nothing to move the expanding war to the negotiating table. This did not prevent them from trying, but it did compel them to employ the utmost discretion in their overtures

[4] *Pravda*, Feb. 27, 1965.
[5] *The New York Times*, Feb. 24, 1965.
[6] *Washington Post*, March 12, 1965.
[7] *Jen-min Jih-pao/Hung Ch'i* joint editorial, Nov. 11, 1965.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

so as not to leave themselves open to new accusations from Peking. Accordingly, the USSR—with as much tact as possible—kept exerting pressure on the North Vietnamese to adopt a more flexible diplomatic posture toward possible peace talks.

On April 8, 1965, the day after President Johnson's Baltimore speech announcing US readiness to enter "unconditional" discussions towards a Vietnam settlement, Moscow publicly called for the immediate convocation of an international conference on Cambodia.[8] At the same time, the Soviets pressed successfully for Hanoi's formal endorsement of proposals to reconvene the "relevant international conferences" to guarantee "compliance with the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962" with regard to Cambodia and Laos. This endorsement was given in a joint communiqué issued on April 17 at the conclusion of a visit to Moscow by a high-powered North Vietnamese delegation headed by party First Secretary Le Duan and Defense Minister General Vo Nguyen Giap.[9] Wide currency was being given at the time to the idea of using a new conference on Cambodia as a "back door" for entering into discussions—be they only "corridor talks"—on Vietnam, and the April 17 communiqué strongly suggested a Soviet desire to open the way for such talks. The proposal for a conference on Cambodia proved abortive, however, when Cambodia's neutralist chief of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, irritated by talk of using the conference for discussions on Vietnam and subjected to strong pressure from Peking, put a damper on any hopes for an early meeting.

During the prolonged US bombing pause in December 1965-January 1966, the Russians again made a serious attempt to nudge the North Vietnamese toward a more flexible diplomatic posture—to get them to make some sort of reciprocal concession or agree to some kind of negotiations which would make it prohibitively costly from a political standpoint for the US to resume air attacks on the North. A. N. Shelepin, Soviet party secretary and member of the Central Committee Politburo, led a high-ranking mission to Hanoi, apparently to sound out the North Vietnamese and to urge them to give more serious consideration to political alternatives to the war. Presumably, his specific task was to draw a more flexible response to the intensified American efforts then being made to bring about a peaceful solution of the conflict. These efforts included not only the bombing pause, but also far-flung diplomatic activity by high-level envoys sent from Washington. As became clear quite early, however, Shelepin's mission failed to soften the North Vietnamese position.[10] Although the Soviet leaders have undoubtedly continued to make their views known in Hanoi, there has apparently been no comparable Soviet effort to influence the North Vietnamese on peace negotiations since the Shelepin visit.

Soviet experience over the past two years has thus indicated a clear inability to make Moscow's influence felt and its advice heeded with regard to the tactics to be pursued in the Vietnam conflict. In fact, it would probably not be an exaggeration to say that the USSR's advice counts for little in Hanoi; certainly this is very close to the truth when it comes to North Vietnam's conduct of the war.

In a sense, the North Vietnamese have no foreign policy; they have only a Vietnam policy, the struggle for the South being a domestic issue to their way of thinking. Their relations with other countries are almost exclusively determined by whether or not, and to what degree, a given country is prepared to support Hanoi's war effort. The willingness of Khrushchev's successors to render substantial military and economic aid as well as diplomatic support to Hanoi has, to be sure, won them the good will of the North Vietnamese, and it has brought a halt to the more obvious sort of criticism formerly voiced in the North Vietnamese press against Soviet "modern revisionism." It has indeed elicited open expressions of gratitude from the North Vietnamese leaders—no mean achievement for Moscow from the standpoint of the contest with Peking, the prime motivating factor behind Soviet involvement. These gains are, of course, important for Soviet political purposes, but they are relatively inconsequential in terms of their impact on the Vietnam war.

The North Vietnamese, for their part, realize only too well the limited nature of the Soviet commitment. They understand quite clearly that the Soviet Union remains determinded to avoid any step that would entail real risk of a direct Soviet-US military confrontation, and that Soviet assistance to North Vietnam is motivated not so much by altruistic devotion to the principles of proletarian internationalism as by the desire to do what is necessary—and only what is necessary—to win the battle with Peking for leadership of the world Communist movement.

In attempting to gauge the extent

[8] *Pravda*, April 9, 1965.
[9] *Ibid.*, April 18, 1965.

[10] Even while Shelepin was in Hanoi, the North Vietnamese leaders pointedly denounced Washington's peace offensive as "deceitful and perfidious trickery." Not only did Shelepin fail to echo this denunciation, but the Soviets, in their own propaganda media, even toned down some of the particularly abusive North Vietnamese comments. The absence of any reference whatever to US peace efforts in the communique issued at the conclusion of the talks was a sign that the two parties had been unable to reach agreement even on a compromise, which might have been expressed in an ambiguous formula allowing for various interpretations.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of current Soviet influence in Hanoi, particularly with respect to the question of peace negotiations, it is also important to bear in mind that the North Vietnamese leaders are not likely to have forgotten the bitter lesson of the 1954 Geneva Conference and the role of the USSR therein. It it hardly necessary to reconstruct the events that led up to the Geneva Conference, when the Ho Chi Minh regime, with complete military victory over the French well within sight, nevertheless came to the bargaining table and agreed, in effect, to postpone full realization of its goals for what it thought would be two years. Why did the Vietnamese Communists go to Geneva at all; and more important, why did they make important concessions when total victory was already all but assured? They were certainly motivated in part by a desire to avoid deeper US involvement in Vietnam, but there is good reason to believe that Soviet pressure also played a role in influencing Hanoi's decision. The Soviets, who historically have subordinated Southeast Asian policy to higher-priority national interests in Europe, were determined at that time to block Western plans for the European Defense Community (EDC), and France's attitude was, of course, crucial. It seems fairly clear in retrospect that the USSR, in the hope of inducing Paris not to ratify the EDC, made a strong effort to prevent the total humiliation of France at the Geneva Conference—at the expense of the North Vietnamese.

In the light of this past experience, it may safely be surmised that the North Vietnamese are somewhat suspicious of Soviet intentions now, and certainly not very confident that Moscow will not again be willing to sacrifice their interests in favor of more important Russian national interests in the West. Soviet attempts to bend Hanoi toward peace negotiations over the last two years can only have fed such suspicions and made the North Vietnamese more sensitive to Peking's allegations that Moscow is prepared in the final analysis to sell them out. Needless to say, this imposes severe limits on Moscow's capability to influence Hanoi's decisions relative to the war.

On the other hand, China's influence on Hanoi's policy is not decisive either. Many have been inclined to blame North Vietnam's intransigent stand on Chinese pressure (the Soviets themselves have not been reluctant to propagate this line), but this is misleading. The Vietnam conflict is not a Chinese war by proxy; it is being fought by the Vietnamese Communists for their own ends. Peking would, of course, seek to capitalize on a Communist victory; still, the North Vietnamese are their own agents and—while obviously aided and abetted by Peking—are capable of determining the policies they will follow quite independently of Chinese pressure. There is no good evidence to support the suggestion that Peking alone is

Sino-Soviet Polemic on Vietnam

The refusal of the Chinese leaders to agree with other socialist countries on joint action in defense of Vietnam arouses among all socialist states, among Communists of the whole world, and among all honest people supporting the struggle of the Vietnamese people against the aggression of the American imperialists, bitter regret and stern censure.

The position of the Chinese leadership on this question is all the more important because China is the only socialist country which has a common border with Vietnam. Unfortunately, instead of uniting their efforts with all the friends of Vietnam in order to give joint support, the Chinese leaders prefer to excel in fierce attacks against those who render Vietnam extensive and effective assistance in its struggle. Acting in such a way, they are in fact helping US imperialism and are taking upon themselves grave responsibility before the revolutionary, anti-imperialist forces of the whole world.

—From speech by CPSU First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, in **Pravda**, *Oct. 16, 1966,*

. . . the new leaders of the CPSU have been vociferously advocating "united action" by the Communist parties and socialist countries. They are incessantly spouting such fine words as "unity," "common struggle with the enemy," "unity against imperialism," and "joint support for the struggle of the Vietnamese people." But all this . . . is nothing but a fraud. . . . Whether in quantity or quality, their aid to Vietnam is far from commensurate with the strength of the Soviet Union. They have ulterior motives in giving a certain amount of aid: they are trying to hoodwink the people at home and abroad, to keep the situation in Vietnam under their control . . . and to strike a bargain with US imperialism on it.

Furthermore, the new leaders of the CPSU have been using their "aid" to Vietnam as a pretext for wantonly vilifying China and have been assiduously spreading the lie that "China has obstructed the transit of Soviet military equipment for Vietnam."

—From **Jen-min Jih-pao/Hung Ch'i** *Joint editorial, Nov. 11, 1965.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

responsible for preventing Hanoi from negotiating a peaceful settlement.

Nevertheless, Communist China's basic aims and tactics are a great deal closer to those of Hanoi than are Moscow's. The North Vietnamese have been inclined to look on China as their ace in the hole. Indeed, one of the most significant lessons taught by the experience of the last two years is that despite the traditional distrust of the Vietnamese towards China, and despite their evident reluctance to see a substantial increase in China's presence in Vietnam, the North Vietnamese leaders have been willing to invite in sizable numbers of Chinese specialists and give them a greater role in defense of the North rather than bow before increasing US military pressure.[11]

Hanoi's leaders must consequently be extremely anxious over the uncertainties created by the current upheaval in Communist China. The North Vietnamese press has been noticeably reticent regarding China's so-called "great proletarian cultural revolution," but there have been signs that the extremism of Mao's supporters has repelled the North Vietnamese and caused a cooling of relations between Peking and Hanoi. The confused situation in China, moreover, introduces a very big question mark into the evolving conflict in Vietnam. Unlikely though this may seem at present, there is a possibility that at some point in the future the North Vietnamese leaders will want —or will be obliged—to write off China as a dependable and desirable supporter of Hanoi's goals in the South. They would then be obliged to reassess the war in the light of the new equation and might eventually decide that Hanoi's aims could best be served by the line of tactical concession and political maneuver long urged on them by the USSR. Any such turn, however, would have to be predicated upon a prior basic decision by the Hanoi leadership that North Vietnam would have to settle for a good deal less than it has heretofore shown itself willing to accept.

Even though the Vietnamese Communists have suffered sharp reverses in recent months, their determination to carry on apparently has not yet been seriously shaken. Nor has Chinese support of North Vietnam yet shown real signs of faltering despite the bizarre goings-on in Peking. Consequently, even if the present military trend should continue and North Vietnam should come to feel really hard-pressed, Hanoi seems more likely, for the time being, to ask Peking for greater help and to press on with the fight, rather than heed Soviet advice to moderate its stand.

From North Vietnam's point of view, however, excessive dependence upon either the Russians or the Chinese holds serious disadvantages. The preponderance of available evidence suggests that Hanoi will most probably try to avoid a definitive swing toward either Moscow or Peking, even if the military situation should force it to recognize that its goals in the South have become for a time unattainable. In such a case, the North Vietnamese would probably opt for a quiet and temporary tapering off of Communist military and guerrilla activity in the South.

For the immediate future, we can only expect more of the same, both in terms of Vietnamese Communist tactics and in terms of Moscow's policy toward the war. All things being equal, the USSR would almost certainly like to see the fighting brought to an end through some sort of compromise political settlement. But all things are never equal: Moscow simply does not now—and may never—have the influence to force a change in Hanoi's policy, and Soviet determination to exploit the Vietnam issue against China precludes a resort to heavy-handed pressure tactics in North Vietnam, even if Moscow thought such moves might have better prospects of success. On the diplomatic front, the USSR clearly cannot afford any open divergence from Hanoi's position on the war.

Meanwhile, the Soviet leaders can derive comfort from the fact that the tactics they have pursued in Vietnam have yielded them appreciable gains in the crucial contest with China, their primary objective. It must be pointed out, however, that Peking's own heavy-handed reaction to the Soviet challenge for influence in Hanoi contributed immeasurably to the success of Moscow's maneuvers. The Chinese have indeed displayed an uncanny knack for blackening themselves.

When Kosygin passed through Peking in February 1965, Mao Tse-tung presumably made clear to him that the Chinese viewed his mission to Hanoi as a direct challenge to them in an area that they considered within their own exclusive sphere of influence. It was apparent that the Chinese were adamantly against any kind of cooperation in Vietnam with a Soviet regime which Peking held to be "revisionist" and "in collusion with imperialism." Consequently, Moscow decided to exploit Peking's vulnerability on this issue and launched a major campaign in favor of Communist "united action" and joint meetings to coordinate aid in defense of North Vietnam, knowing full well that Mao would continue to reject all such proposals.

The exceptional virulence of China's reaction to this maneuver actually brought the Russians dividends exceeding their own expectations. According to Soviet allegations, the Chinese even went so far as to obstruct Soviet aid shipments moving

[11] See article by John W. Finney concerning Chinese construction workers in North Vietnam, *The New York Times*, July 2, 1966.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to North Vietnam via China.[12] This "dog in the manger" attitude was just what the Russians needed to help them achieve their primary aim, which after all was not so much to aid North Vietnam as to counter Chinese allegations of Soviet "collusion with imperialism" and betrayal of Communist internationalism. The Soviets used all this to good effect in weaning important Communist parties, such as the North Korean and Japanese, away from their former almost total identification with Peking's policies and toward a position of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

In November 1965, the Chinese came out with an open denunciation of all proposals for Communist-bloc "united action" in support of North Vietnam and demanded instead that "a clear line of demarcation" be drawn to separate China and its supporters from the Soviet Union and all other wrong-thinking "revisionists." [13] This, of course, was tantamount to an open acknowledgement that China was out to split the Communist movement—a charge that Khrushchev had frequently hurled at Peking without ever succeeding in proving it conclusively.

The Soviet leaders have since gone so far as to lay virtually all the blame for the continuing Vietnamese conflict on Peking's shoulders. Premier Kosygin, for example, in a speech last October, contended that China was responsible for continued "US aggression" in Vietnam. He claimed that if China had only agreed to a joint rebuff of US actions there, "a quick end would have been put to US outrages." [14] More recently, Kosygin added a new twist in alleging that US efforts earlier this year to "eliminate" any prospect for talks on Vietnam had "received support from Peking." [15] Soviet President Podgorny took this line a step further in accusing the Chinese of opposing a "proposal" by North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Trinh that talks with the US "could" begin if attacks on North Vietnam were stopped unconditionally. Podgorny cited Peking's silence on the Trinh initiative as proof that China's policy "does not accord with the views of the North Vietnamese government." [16]

Such remarks and Moscow's general propaganda treatment of the war graphically illustrate Soviet determination to exploit the Vietnam issue primarily against China. The thrust of the Soviet message is this: "US aggression" is the sort of thing to expect from "imperialism," but there is no excuse for the behavior of the Chinese, who claim to be Communists.

Turning to the prospects ahead, it seems certain that the Russians will continue their attempts to exploit the Vietnam issue to discredit China. They will doubtless carry on their program to supply North Vietnam with weapons and equipment, while scrupulously maintaining a public position in support of Hanoi's terms for a settlement of the conflict. Moscow's policy for the foreseeable future will undoubtedly continue to eschew any strong diplomatic initiative for a resolution of the war not having North Vietnam's prior endorsement.

The USSR's posture will also require a continuing coolness in Soviet-US relations. However, the supposition that Moscow entered the fray in Vietnam with the intention of directly confronting the US is clearly a gross oversimplification. As this brief survey has attempted to show, recent Soviet policy on Vietnam strongly suggests that Moscow's tactics have been conceived and implemented primarily with a view to undercutting China's anti-Soviet offensive, and Khrushchev's successors can take some measure of satisfaction at the extent to which these tactics have achieved their aim.

---

[12] Soviet charges of Chinese harassment became more frequent and open early this year. Marshal Grechko's speech on Armed Forces Day, for example, included a direct charge that Peking "strives to slow down the delivery of supplies to embattled Vietnam over Chinese territory" (TASS, Feb. 22, 1967). There is good reason to believe —allowing for the usual embroidery and distortion aimed at painting the Chinese in blackest colors—that Moscow's accusations have had some basis in fact. Certainly, Peking's protestations that it has always honored "reasonable requests" to transport arms "which were required by the Vietnamese," its denigration of the quality of Russian aid sent, and its repeated taunts daring the USSR to ship weapons to Vietnam by sea add up to a rather disingenuous and unconvincing plea of innocence. (See New China News Agency accounts of Chinese Foreign Ministry statements of Jan. 4, 1966, and May 3, 1966, as reported in *The New York Times* on Jan. 16 and May 4, 1966.)

[13] *Jen-min Jih-pao/Hung Ch'i* joint editorial, Nov. 11, 1965.

[14] *Izvestia*, Oct. 14, 1966.

[15] *Pravda*, March 7, 1967.

[16] *Ibid.*, March 10, 1967.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Viet Cong

By John Donnell

Douglas Pike's recent book, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*,[1] is a most welcome work. For far too long the public at large both here and abroad has thrown up its hands in bewilderment over the fundamentals of this war in a rush to take positions for or against it. While it will be years before anyone truly understands the Vietnam conflict, here at least is a book based on a goodly number of important documents, interviews and careful analysis which describes perhaps the most crucial belligerent—who it is, what it wants, how it proposes to achieve its goals.

The most important thing to keep in mind about the NLF today is that it has changed greatly in terms of composition, leadership, size, and goals from the organization it was in 1960. Patterned eight years ago in the North (Ho Chi Minh's fine hand was apparent in its carefully worked-out program and structure), the NLF "sprang full-blown into existence and came crashing out of the jungle, an organizational steamroller, nationally conceived, nationally organized, endowed with ample cadres and funds" and bent on destroying the government of South Viet Nam (the GVN). Although at first it won followers rapidly in the South—for all sorts of reasons and not necessarily because of Ngo Dinh Diem's repressive measures (in effect the rural countryside was more or less up for grabs)—the Front carried with it a program of such scope, skill, precision and refinement that it could not pretend to represent simply the desires of the Southern peasantry or to be the answer to the South's real needs.

Mr. Pike, who spent several years carefully studying the Viet Cong and amassing an extraordinary amount of valuable material, believes that the Vietnamese Communists decided to begin building the Southern organization in mid-1959 and concentrated on finding organizational talent in the period preceding the public launching of the NLF in December 1960. He acknowledges the preconditions for insurgency did exist, but "not perhaps in the traditional revolutionary sense." Composed of many Viet Minh cadres and an even larger number of Southerners then regrouped in the North (some 40,000 Southerners are believed to have returned to the South as infiltrators between 1959 and 1964), the NLF was basically inspired by the North Vietnamese, who asserted that their goal of reunification was legally and morally justified. Among their supporters in the South were the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious, paramilitary elements with strong grievances against Diem and who, with a small group of Southern revolutionaries, acted impatiently and independently of Hanoi's orders in the early days of the revolt. There is indeed reason to believe that Hanoi, having drawn up the program, left it, at first, to the Southerners to implement.

In Pike's view, the evolution of the NLF depended to a great extent on the evolution of the war itself, which he divides into two wars, the first beginning in 1960 and lasting to late 1964 or early 1965. His book deals mainly with the first.

In that early period, superb NLF organizational and political communications techniques were extremely effective in gradually drawing peasants and their communities within the movement. Recruitment was essentially based on political, social and personal manipulation, which usually included appeals to opportunism and self-interest. It was related to and

[1] Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*, Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1966.

Mr. Donnell, who for the past few years has been engaged in a study of communism in Vietnam, is Associate Professor of Political Science at Temple University (Philadelphia, Penna.). He spent five years in South and North Vietnam between 1950 and 1964.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dependent on the degree of subversion and *de facto* political control in any given area. For example, a part-time leaflet distributor in a contested area would be pressured to participate in more NLF activities and then at some point be persuaded that his personal safety as well as the revolutionary cause required him to break with home and family to take a full-time guerrilla assignment in a combat unit. This was the case of many who, having joined the front for a combination of reasons—not all ideological—soon found themselves inextricably entangled in the growing demands of the organization.

As the war progressed and met increasing resistance by the Saigon government's forces backed up with heavy US aid and personnel, the NLF began to lose its momentum. Recruitment became more and more a matter of pure coercion, not persuasion. Great cracks began to appear in the structure of the organization in 1963 as opposition groups proliferated to break the NLF monopoly on anti-Diem activities. Soon it became apparent that the North would have to take a stronger hand.

Since the beginning of the first war in 1960, the NLF has had a basic plan, a flexible strategy designed to win power, which has depended on the political, diplomatic and military realities of the moment. The three phases of the strategy overlapped but guided the conduct of the war. Pike describes them as follows: 1) the General Uprising; 2) the political settlement or negotiated end to hostilities; and 3) the Mao-Giap guerrilla warfare—final stage.

The general uprising (*Khoi Nghia*) was a "Sorelian-type myth" based on ubiquitous political agitation led by the NLF and its political core, the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP). This, in turn, was to be followed by a "series of violent actions, some of the military cast," by small units up to battalion size across the country and accompanied by revolts in the South Vietnamese armed forces and widespread assassinations of GVN officials. The theory opposed the creation of a large-scale military force designed for fixed battles (*e.g.*, such as Dien Bien Phu) on the grounds that it would bring all-out war with the United States.

This strategy did not achieve its goal, however, and by mid-1963 the NLF had to step up its military effort in response to greater GVN military activity. As a result the NLF became increasingly dominated by trained cadres who came to militarize the "looser, more self-contained fighting units and to structure them into more traditional armed forces with more orthodox military assignments."

The conference table approach to peace and ultimate victory was generally linked to the expectations of the General Uprising. It was in some vogue as late as 1963 when the NLF might have considered some sort of coalition government in the hope of eventually taking complete power without the necessity of resorting to the third-stage war plan. By 1964, however, this approach was no longer feasible.

Increased US military intervention actually precipitated a doctrinal debate which rocked the NLF leadership, and for the first time the dominant doctrine of the General Uprising was openly questioned. Not suprisingly, it was the Northern cadres who won out and imposed the Mao-Giap third stage (which in Pike's view meant the beginning of the second war), a fatal decision since the combined NLF-DRV forces could never hope to win a complete military victory over the GVN-US force.

The NLF having failed in its mission, the Northerners took over its leadership. The "uprising" had failed to come off, and negotiations were out of the question indefinitely. Organizational efforts had not produced sufficient converts among important ethnic and religious groups of the population, and peasant parochialism remained a stubborn problem. The "bandwagon" appeal, which had attracted many when NLF momentum seemed unchallenged, had declined, and the movement was not producing enough of the superhuman cadres crucial to its viability.

Actually, the "Northern take-over," or "regularization," had begun in mid-1963 to weed unreliables out of the leadership. It enabled the NLF to withstand the pressures of the widespread anti-Diem political effervescence which, as had been foreseen, would drain off large numbers of NLF supporters and, if not countered, tend to dilute the revolution into mere reformism. The regularization continued, however, and by early 1965, as Pike writes, the choice of revolutionary strategies—between the predominantly military and the politico-military struggle culminating in the Uprising, or the diplomatic quest for a negotiated settlement—"was no longer in the hands of the NLF but rested chiefly with the DRV in Hanoi and Communist China."

Both the Communist and non-Communist Vietnamese have shown great concern over the ideological underpinnings of politics for many years. The important role of the highly codified doctrines of Marxism-Leninism in the Viet Minh and the NLF have led many non-Communists to search for an alternative doctrine, reflecting a rather traditional Southeast Asian "cosmomagical" approach to politics. Purely Communist goals were of course imported into Vietnam (though by now it can be said that both communism and anti-communism are endemic there). But except among the higher echelons of the NLF, at least during the "first war,"

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as Pike writes, communism was not regarded as "a new body of wisdom to be learned, understood and put to use." Rather the movement was Communist by alliance and affiliation. The fervor which the NLF is supposed to instill in its members is due rather to a curious blend of romanticism, idealism, utopianism, anarchism and Asian fatalism that are all part of Vietnamese culture.

The NLF has constantly hammered at the theme that US neocolonialism has merely replaced French imperialism, and it is true to some extent that the early success of the NLF was based on the appeal their war had to the widespread nationalist élan that grew out of the war with France. The colonial war, however, is not a valid parallel. Under the French, all Vietnamese were second-class citizens, and they were basically fighting for their dignity as a people. In the present contest, however, both sides have emphasized sociopolitical appeals and are thus competing in the social arena for the loyalties of the rural people, something the French never did. It is possible, for example, for a Vietnamese to feel himself a patriot today regardless of which side he is on, the NLF or the GVN, something that was much less true earlier.

Pike deprecates the role of ideology in NLF Main Force morale. He comments that their formidable combat performance, often credited by outside observers to "dedication to an ideological cause," is more accurately attributable to a unit *esprit de corps*. Here he overlooks certain factors. First, even in the "first war," significant numbers were young recruits with shorter service in the élite units and hence with less claim to being professional soldiers physically superior to the enemy. Secondly, these men are exposed continually to political indoctrination in their daily *kiem-thao* critiques which stress the concept of revolutionary brotherhood.

The book describes the widening of political and social horizons of village-bound peasants by that indoctrination, but it could say more about how some village youths were excited by the NLF's arrival in the early days and tended to compare their own humdrum life unfavorably with that of a guerrilla fighter on a crusade. Even fairly well-administered Vietnamese villages have been vulnerable to NLF agitprop activity, for even when a village milieu originally may have been perceived by the young as satisfying, it frequently offered only slowly widening educational and career opportunities. The NLF exploited this by making grandiose promises, and when it could manipulate the situation further by gradually sealing off the village from outside (GVN) political messages, it would sedulously inflame what may have been only tolerable or perhaps latent dissatisfaction into harsh condemnation of the GVN system, expressed in the newly-taught language of discontent.

The fact is that the organizational structure of the NLF still seems to be pretty much intact, although higher defection rates have indicated some strain. Associations of farmers, women and youth combined with the highly developed techniques of the agitprop cadres continue to operate and hold many in the movement. Women in particular have been given important roles in village organizations, and the proselytization of the GVN armed forces continues, often leading to a good many intelligence leaks.

The precise degree of DRV domination of the NLF is one of the murkiest areas in the whole Vietnam war, but this reviewer believes Pike should have made more allowance for the tensions and divisions within the leadership and even between leaders and rank-and-file which doubtless still plague the DRV-NLF effort. (Pike's estimate of those Vietnamese who went North — 30,000-100,000 — is lower than what this reviewer deems reasonable, *i.e.*, 100,000 to 120,000.

The old Southern spirit of regionalism and the mutual distrust of Northerners and Southerners are too well known to merit further attention here. Admittedly, they never were as strong as the French hoped when they attempted after World War II to carve out a separate Cochinchina, and they undoubtedly have been weakened by nation-centered political appeals by Communists and anti-Communists alike over the years. The NLF even seems to have been able to give the reunification theme some down-to-earth comprehensibility to Southern peasants by the use of such simple slogans as "A kingdom cannot be ruled by two kings; Vietnam cannot have two masters." But despite these developments, any conversations with political figures in South Vietnam today will reveal that regionalist attitudes and prejudices still are potent political factors not to be dispelled in a season or a decade, even within the NLF.

Furthermore, what has happened to those Southerners who lost out in the NLF leadership debate over the need for large-scale warfare? If they were as high-ranking as Pike indicates and they were not liquidated, can they be assumed to have accepted and carried out Hanoi's policy decisions with equanimity even in the face of the military reverses suffered later by NLF forces?

Pike's hypothesis here is not completely consistent with his admission in the preface that he has overlooked "internal conflict within the NLF and how it was resolved" and that "we had no accurate way of estimating the degree of cohesiveness within the leadership ranks" (xi). Max Millikan's foreword to the book does say that "Pike believes that, under some circumstances in the event of a settlement of the Vietnam conflict,

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the divergence of interests that has for the moment been suppressed might again rise, especially between the 'North' and 'South' elements within the NLF" (v).

To conclude, then, Douglas Pike has given us an extremely valuable look at the NLF in transition and provided some keen insights into its development. The analysis of the manipulative aspects of NLF political organization is particularly good, though it sometimes seems overstated to the detriment of the consideration of non-manipulative factors. Unfortunately readers will not be able to check much of the book's analysis against original sources. A small amount of such material is more available in Saigon than in the US, but non-official access to data on the NLF will continue to be very restricted for the foreseeable future. In his capacity as a United States Information Service officer living in South Vietnam for over six years, Pike had access to documents which are not available to persons other than those engaged in official research. "In the final analysis," Pike comments when describing the massive evidence of the prime role of the North Vietnamese in the struggle, "one's conclusions must amount almost to a matter of faith." As things stand, many other interpretations of the Vietnam war remain matters of faith, too.

Correspondence

EDITORS' NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC, 20547.*

Party Apparat

TO THE EDITORS: Mr. Lewytskyj, in his fine article "Generations in Conflict" (January-February 1967), has dealt with an interesting and useful topic—the changing character of CPSU membership—pinpointing with surgical precision that area where "conflict-of-generations" pains are apt to cause growing distress in the Soviet body politic: in the gap between the upper and lower apparat.

I should like to raise a minor question of fact. Mr. Lewytzkyj states that all of the 11 full members of the present Politburo "theoretically received their education before 1939." Theoretic or not, Alexander Shelepin is credited by *Who's Who in the USSR, 1965-1966* with having graduated from the Moscow Institute of History, Philosophy and Literature in 1941. Since we cannot have it both ways, I wonder if Mr. Lewytzkyj might clarify for us, if only by naming his source, which statement is the accurate one.

JAN S. ADAMS
Michigan State University
East Lansing, Michigan

MR. LEWYTSKYJ REPLIES: Professor Adams is completely right. When the original manuscript was typed, a few qualifying words were omitted by mistake. The original German text should have read: "Von den 11 Mitgliedern des Politbüros haben alle mit *technischer und volkswirtschaftlicher* Bildung vor 1939 abgeschlossen"—or, in English, "All of the eleven members of the Politburo finished their *technical and economic* training before 1939."

On Totalitarianism

TO THE EDITORS: . . . . I share the opinion of Professor Shanti Tangri ("China and Peaceful Coexistence," January-February 1967) that the doctrine of convergence cannot withstand close examination. I think the best antidote for such misguided views is J. L. Talmon's *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (2nd edition, New York, F. A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 1-3, 132, 249, 253. Talmon argues that all existing political systems are derived from two schools of political thought, which can be distinguished in reference to their attitude toward politics. These are the liberal, empirical attitude, which presupposes politics to be "a matter of trial and error and regards political systems as pragmatic contrivances of human ingenuity and spontaneity," and the totalitarian, absolutist attitude, which posits the existence of "a sole and exclusive truth in politics."

Sheldon Wolin in his *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought* (Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1960), p. 293, makes a similar distinction between these two traditions of political thought, which may be styled democratic radicalism and liberalism. Both, he argues, are indebted to the political principles of Locke, but whereas the former was "largely molded by eighteenth-century rationalism and the experience of the French Revolution," the latter is the heir of classical economics and the ideas

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of David Hume and Adam Smith, "two thinkers distinguished by a profound respect for the limits of reason and the pervasiveness of irrational factors in man and society."

Talmon holds that democratic radicalism has its roots in the eighteenth-century beliefs in the rationality, innate goodness, and perfectibility of man, and in the natural order as an "attainable, indeed inevitable and all-solving end." He calls this view "political Messianism" in that it holds forth the promise of a "preordained, harmonious and perfect scheme of things" towards which society will inevitably evolve. In the eyes of its adherents, political ideas achieve legitimacy as derivatives of an all-embracing and coherent philosophy. In such a conception the field of political activity is expanded to embrace all human action. Politics becomes "the art of applying this philosophy to the organization of society" with the end of realizing this philosophy in all fields of human endeavor. Such an exclusive creed, he argues, "cannot admit opposition. It is bound to feel itself surrounded by innumerable enemies. . . . Political Messianism is bound to replace empirical thinking and free criticism with reasoning by definition, based on *a priori* collective concepts."

Such political behavior is the result of political attitudes and ideas, not economic conditions. It was characteristic of the independents of seventeenth-century England, of the French Jacobins, and of modern-day Communists. The Calvinists based their faith on God, the Jacobins on nature and reason, and the transformed Marxists on dialectical materialism. Each of these groups, on attaining power, transformed the meaning of liberty from the absence of restraint to the imposition of a set of values. To create their vision of a new society they found they had first to remold recalcitrant man. This, as Talmon has observed, is the irony of Messianic politics—to be born of the noble human instincts for order and freedom and evolve out of frustration into tyranny. It cannot be otherwise. Even if it were conceded that economic conditions in Communist and liberal Western societies were converging, the convergence of their political systems would be precluded by the nature of the political thoughts which shaped them.

JOHN P. HAITHCOX
Research Institute on Communist Affairs
Columbia University, New York

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED